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Abstract
My thesis is a study of the liberalism of Nortlirop Frye. Frye believes that the process of 
matching an idea with its opposite effects a transcendence whereby ‘an adversary relationship’ 
is resolved ‘not by reconciling both sides but by breaking clear of the antithesis into a new 
level’ (NFLN6, p. 622), and this observation is deeply suggestive of the nature of Frye’s 
liberal thinking. In my thesis I argue that Frye’s liberalism is characterised by ‘the dialectic’: it 
represents a transcendence of the Left-Right opposition.
Part I covers Frye’s writings throughout the fifties, sixties and seventies. In Chapters 2, 3 and 
4 I consider the tliree topics that dominate Frye’s work in this period: the poetry of William 
Blake, secular ‘imaginative’ literature, and education and work. Frye’s thinking, I argue, is a 
thoroughly liberal one because dialectical, in each case an attempt to transcend oppositional 
thinking. In Chapter 5 I go on to discuss Fiye’s desire to go beyond Left and Right in the 
political arena. Frye developed as a critic of culture, politics, society -  and literature in 
relation to all of those against the backdrop of the Cold War, and his theory of politics is one 
which seeks to go beyond both what he terms ‘laissez faire’ and Communism.
hi Part n  the focus shifts to Frye’s work in the second half of the twentieth century. In 
Chapter 6 I return to Blake, secular literature and the university, giving an account of the 
radicals’ view of these aspects of culture, before discussing Frye’s attitude to the new cultural 
radicalism, which takes the form of a reassertion of his liberal thinking.
In Chapter 7 I turn to Frye’s consideration of the Bible, seeking to throw light on his liberal 
thinking within this context. Though Frye is not working against a clearly ‘political’ divide 
within this field, he is, I explain, still seaiching for a liberal ideal, and thinking dialectically.
At this time Frye also returned to political issues, providing a second statement of his views of 
global politics, and I conclude this chapter with an account of Frye’s attitude to the new 
unconstrained capitalism, where his attitude is decidedly liberal and dialectical once more.
My thesis also offers an overarching examination of Fiye’s liberalism, brought out in Chapters 
4 and 7. The terminus ad quern of Frye’s secular thinking is the three ideals of the French 
revolution: liberty, equality, and fraternity. At the end of his career Frye turns systematically 
to Christianity and the Cliristian Bible. Like Blake, Frye sees no contradiction in such a 
combination of cultures. Indeed, his liberalism, I argue, is a matter of the combination of a 
liberal attitude to culture and a liberal approach to Scripture and Christianity.
My thesis concludes with an Epilogue, in which I stand back and consider the larger historical 
context of Fiye’s liberal thinking, his ‘liberal’ literary criticism in particular.
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1. Introduction 
Frye Studies Today
The present time is a vibrant one for Frye studies. The Collected Works o f Northrop 
Frye, being published by the University of Toronto Press, is precipitating a 
transformation of the field. Based on the large collection of Frye’s papers in the Pratt 
Library of Victoria University, the Collected Works is providing us with scholarly 
editions of all of Frye’s works, with a total of thirty-one volumes planned. The 
publication of these volumes means that for the first time Frye scholars have easy 
access to all of his writings, including his previously unpublished work. ‘Frye was not 
just a prolific writer,’ explain Boyd and Salusinsky, ‘but a prolific jotter as well, and 
after his death in 1991 he left behind thousands of pages of notebooks, diaries, and 
letters.’  ^ And some of the first volumes to appear include much previously 
unpublished material.
These scholarly editions have already stimulated new directions in Frye studies, 
certain aspects of which stand out as especially noteworthy. Above all, readings of the 
notebooks by Frye scholars have had a profound effect on our view of Frye, for they 
alter our perception of his career to a considerable degree. We now know, for 
example, from the notebooks that he worked on a ‘third book’ between the late fifties 
and early seventies which would have served as a follow-up to Fearful Symmetry and 
Anatomy o f Criticism. In his authoritative essay on the subject, ‘The Book of the 
Dead’, Michael Dolzani describes the scope of the proposed study:
At its heart was a diagram, meditated in numerous forms over two
decades but never ultimately published, called the Great Doodle -
^Rereading Frye: The Published and Unpublished Works, ed. by David Boyd and Imre Salusinszky 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), p. xx. Further references are abbreviated to RF and 
incorporated parenthetically within the text.
though we can call it the cycle of mythoi for solemnity’s sake. It 
developed out o f the cycle of mythoi in the Third Essay of Anatomy, 
but differs in two ways. Fhst, it is what Fiye would have called the 
thematic stasis of the Third Essay, taking its hero’s-quest circular 
narrative and spatializing it into four quadrants which he called topoi, 
by which he means to evoke ‘particularly their literal sense as 
"places’” (NB19, 343). However, since ‘his soil is man’s mtelligence,’ 
in Stevens’ phrase, each landscape, each ‘place,’ becomes the locus of  
an interconnected set of themes and thematic images, often lyric- 
centred. [...] In addition, the Third Book was to explain how 
literature’s order of words is the shadowy préfiguration [...] o f a 
totally revealed Word that is its antitype or realized form, a ‘spiritual 
Other’ that is beyond literature, even if it is to be arrived at by going 
through literature.
(RF, pp. 22-3)
Of perhaps even greater significance is the broader discovery that throughout his 
working life Frye harboured a desire to write a special sequence of book-length 
studies. (The Third Book would only have been the third in a much larger sequence.) 
Again, Dolzani is our guide:
As my co-editor Robert Denham and I worked our way deeper and 
deeper into the branching tunnels of about ninety unorganized, 
undated notebooks, transcribing Fiye’s difficult handwriting, we began 
to come upon references to eight one-word titles of what were clearly 
projected works, sometimes half-jokingly referred to by Frye as the
ogdoad, as if  they were a pantheon of eight gods -  a suggestion that 
turned out to have several kinds of truth to it.
{RF, p. 20)
In ‘The Book of the Dead’ Dolzani provides us with a definitive account of the ever 
changing ‘eightfold ghost that seems to have haunted Frye over sixty years’ {RF, pp. 
23-4), explaining that it went through at least six clear stages of development in 
Frye’s mind, though ultimately it did not result in a monograph.
In the context of such publication, the past ten year's have seen a burgeoning interest 
in Fi*ye’s religious thinking, and much of the vibrancy of the field also stems from this 
development. The posthumous publication of The Double Vision signalled the 
completion of Frye’s four-volume study of the Bible and literature, and this event 
prompted two conferences on related themes. In 2000 an ambitious international 
conference on the subject of the religious context in the criticism of Nortlrrop Frye, 
‘Frye and the Word’, was held at McMaster University in Hamilton, and in 2001 this 
conference was supplemented by one on ‘Northr op Frye and the United Church 
Ministry’ at the Northi'op Frye Centre in Victoria University, Toronto: in both cases 
the focus of interest was the sequence of books beginning with Creation and 
Recreation. These conferences were followed hy Northrop Frye and the Afterlife o f 
the Word! in 2002, and the publication in 2004 of Frye and the Word: Religious 
Contexts in the Writings o f Northrop Frye^, a selection of papers given at the ‘Frye 
and the Word’ conference. Additionally, Robert D. Denham’s recent Northrop Frye:
 ^Northrop Frye and the Afterlife o f the Word, James M. Kee, Guest ed., Adele Reimhartz, Board ed., 
(Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2002). Further references are abbreviated to NFAW and 
incorporated parenthetically within the text.
 ^ Frye and the Word: Religious Contexts in the Writings o f Northrop Frye, ed. by Jeffery Donaldson
and Alan Mendelson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004). Further references are abbreviated
to FW  and incorporated parenthetically within the text.
Religious Visionary and Architect o f the Spiritual World^ represents an exhaustive 
study of Frye’s religious thought which draws on a comprehensive knowledge of the 
notebooks.
My Thesis
As Frye repeatedly made clear, and as his commentators have underscored, he is a 
liberal thinker. It has been said that if one is not a radical at twenty years of age, one 
has no heart, and that if one is not a conservative by the time one is forty, one has no 
‘brains’. Frye’s life, however, is not illustrative of the all-too-common radical to 
conseiwative trajectory; he remained a liberal throughout. It is probably fair to say that 
Fiye’s liberalism was modified in the course of his life, however. In ‘A Liberal 
Education’ (1945) he boldly states that ‘More and more people are beginning to 
realize that there is no coherent liberalism nowadays except that which is attached to a 
socialist theory of economy’ (NFR, p. 45). And of course later in his career, he 
identified himself as a liberal at a time when radical thinking seemed to be in the 
ascendancy. Now his declarations are characterised by a different sort of defiance, for 
it is a defiance the imagined audience for which is perhaps the Left. In The Double 
Vision Frye defines himself as a ‘bourgeois liberal’ (NFR, p. 172).
Despite such changes, ‘liberal’ is undoubtedly the term that is appropriate for Frye, 
but we should be careful about where this conclusion talces us. We should not 
automatically assume that he belongs to a homogeneous ‘liberal camp’ or that there is 
such a thing as a monolithic structure which can be described as cultural liberalism. In 
the essay ‘The histruments of Mental Production’ Frye discusses the conservative and 
radical conceptions of education, and, as we would expect, he is satisfied with neither
4 Robert D Deiiham, Northrop Frye: Religious Visionaiy and Architect o f  the Spiritual World
(Charlottesville; University o f Virginia Press, 2004). Further references are abbreviated to NFRVASW
and incorporated parenthetically within the text.
way of conceiving of education in society. He continues his discussion by turning to 
the coiresponding Tiberal’ view of education:
In those whose bias was toward science and technology, notably 
Huxley and Herbert Spencer, we find a liberal view of education 
halfway between the conservative humanist one and the radical 
socialist one. Here society is assumed to be primarily a producing 
society, and the student to be preparing for absorption into a society of 
producers. [...] From this nineteenth-century view has mainly 
descended the conception of a liberal education as a preparatoi-y 
period, in which the student is allowed four years to get some 
perspective on the society aromid him. After that, in the standard 
phrase of commencement oratory, he is ready to go out into tire world, 
conceived as a more or less productive activity, where he will use the 
small percentage of what he has learned that is relevant to what he is 
doing, use an even smaller percentage to help ornament and cultivate 
his spare time, and let the rest gradually erode.
{NFWE, pp. 269-70)
Interestingly, his evaluation of this liberal attitude to education is nothing short of 
damning:
It will be seen that this view of liberal o f education has a basis that is 
really antiliberal. A grimly utilitarian standard is the logical response 
to it. This standard is modified in various ways: some things are good 
in themselves, their own ends as Newnmn says, and we have to think 
of the values of education as including them too. [...] But as long as
we accept, even unconsciously, a vision of society in which the 
machinery o f production assumes an overwhelming and inescapable 
urgency, our defences of the liberal arts and sciences will continue to 
have a panic-stricken tone in them.
{NFWE, pp. 270-1)
Clearly, there is liberalism, and there is liberalism, but what distinguishes Frye’s 
liberalism from that of thinkers such as Huxley and Spencer?
We can obtain a better understanding of Frye’s liberalism tlirough considering his 
discussion of dialectical thinking. In The Great Code he provides us with a 
fascinating insight into his understanding of the conception of Hegelian dialectic. He 
begins by discussing Dante’s conception of polys emous meaning. ‘What is really 
implied’ he states ‘is a single process growing in subtlety and comprehensiveness, not 
different senses, but different intensities or wider contexts of a continuous sense, 
unfolding like a plant out of a seed’ {GC, p. 221). This leads him to Hegel, for 
polysemous meaning is ‘the development of a single dialectical process, like the 
dialectical process described in Hegel’s Phenomenology^ {GC, p. 222). In the crucial 
following section Frye provides us with an account of Hegelian dialectic:
What Hegel means by dialectic is not anything reducible to a patented 
foimula, like the “thesis-antithesis-synthesis” one so often attached to 
him, nor can it be anything predictive. It is a much more complex 
operation o f a form o f understanding combining with its own otherness 
or opposite, in a way that negates itself and yet passes through that 
negation into a new stage, preserving its essence in a broader context, 
and abandoning the one just completed like the chrysalis of a butterfly 
or a crustacean’s outgrown shell.
(ibid.)
For Frye the failure to think dialectically points to one-sidedness and partiality in 
one’s thinking. If one’s thinking is to rise above the level of entrenched positions, one 
must think dialectically. hi the sequel to The Great Code, Words With Power, he 
returns to the theme:
Increasingly, since Hegel at least, we have come to see how every 
affirmation is a partial statement containing its own opposite, which 
remains attached to that affirmation. If we say “There is a God,” we 
have suggested the possibility of saying “There is no God,” and in a 
sense have already said it.
{WWP, p. 38)
Denham speaks of Frye’s interest in dialectical thinking in his recent staày Northrop 
Frye: Religious Visionary and Architect o f the Spiritual World. Commenting on the 
question of ‘tension’ in Fiye’s thinking between ‘theological immanence’ and 
‘transcendence’, he goes on to provide us with a revealing account of Frye’s interest 
in the dialectic which draws directly on Hegel:
Frye is a dialectical thinker, and the effort to answer this question, in 
the various ways he introduces the opposing terms of the dialectic, will 
recur throughout this present study. [...] The process of resolution, to 
be examined in detail as we proceed, is an imaginative mode of 
Hegel’s philosophical Aufh&bung, a process of canceling, preserving, 
and lifting up to a higher level. This dialectic, which refers to both a 
retention and a transformation of the two opposites of the dialectic and
which is related to Frye’s sense of an ending, manifests itself at those 
points where Frye is confronted with an either-or opposition.
(RVASÏV, p. 11)
Wlien discussing his own liberalism Frye is happy for it to be viewed as liberal 
because dialectical. His biographer John Ayre makes the observation that Frye is a
FRYE; The bourgeois liberal to me is the nearest analogy I can think 
of to a man who is sufficiently left alone by the structure of authority 
in his society to develop his individuality. Because he’s a liberal, he 
doesn’t become an anarchist, that is he doesn’t grab all the money and 
comer all the property in sight. He’s a person who can relate to other
'.I
‘mandarin and rebel in one skin’ (Ayre, p. 180), and in an interview with Frye David 
Cayley picks up on this image. Frye and Cayley discuss Frye’s liberalism and the 
discussion slowly moves towards the conclusion that Frye is liberal in the sense that 
he is both conservative and radical:
J
people. He doesn’t either withdraw from society or become a mass
iman.
CAYLEY : So the emphasis is not the same as Marx gives to the tenu 
bourgeois when he uses it to signify the hegemony o f a certain class?
FRYE: The bourgeois liberal is capable of seemg something of the 
limitations that that situation puts him into. You can’t avoid being 
conditioned, but you can to some extent become aware of your 
conditioning.
CAYLEY : And your identification with bourgeois liberalism is part of 
your reaching back, let’s say, to Mill or Arnold -  not endorsing what 
they are in their context, but seeing them as ancestors?
■
FRYE: Seeing them as ancestors and as a kind of human type that is 
produced when society is left sufficiently open. Actually, what I mean 
by bourgeois liberal -  and of course I’m being deliberately 
provocative when I use the term -  is steering a middle course between 
tire totalitarian mass man on the one hand and a kind of anarchism on 
the other.
CAYLEY : Is there no antithesis between the bourgeois liberal and the 
left-wing Christian revolutionary? Your biographer John Ayre sees 
you, I think, as a mandarin and a rebel in one skin. Is there anything to 
this?
FRYE: There could be. In certain types of society, including, I should 
think most of classical China, the mandarin could not be a rebel. The 
principles of Confucianism wouldn’t allow it. I think it is possible to 
be both, up to a point.
CAYLEY: And you’ve tried it?
FRYE: Up to a point I’ve tried it, yes.^
Frye’s thinking, then, is ‘liberal’ in this special sense. (Throughout I shall refer to 
Frye’s thinking as ‘liberal’, ‘both conservative and radical’ and ‘beyond Left and 
Right’, phrases which within this context are used interchangeably.) From Fearful 
Symmetry onwards his work has shown an interest in what we might think of as the 
search for a third position beyond opposing and apparently irreconcilable views. Such 
third positions tend to be relatively unfamiliar compared to the relatively familiar 
opposing thesis and antithesis. In some contexts a third way may be a controversial 
hypothesis; in others, the possibility of a third position may even be denied. 
Conservatives and radicals both have a penchant for such denial. The Left is
 ^David Cayley, Northrop Frye In Conversation (Concord: House of Anansi Press, 1992), pp. 120-1.
Further references are abbreviated to Cayley and incorporated parenthetically within the text.
particularly guilty of gestures of this type, with revolutionaries routinely judging 
gradualists as closet conservatives and counter-revolutionaries, though conservatives 
have a history of viewing all those who show an unhealthy interest in change with 
suspicion.
Frye ties dialectical thinking in with Hegel, but undoubtedly his concept of dialectical 
thinking which is both conservative and radical descends from Milton and Blake. 
Milton has radical and conservative instincts:
CAYLEY; I see Milton as being more of a polestar for you than other 
writers to whom you’ve devoted equal attention and who would be 
equally great in your view, Shakespeare or Spenser. Is that tme?
FRYE: Perhaps so,
CAYLEY: You’re in his lineage?
FRYE: Yes, Milton is solidly within my tradition. The combination of 
the humanist conservative and the revolutionary was a very fascinating 
one for me.
CAYLEY : How was Milton a revolutionary?
FRYE: He was a revolutionary in the sense that he went through four 
English revolutions and took the revolutionary side each time, until he 
was finally checkmated by the Restoration. He fought for liberty all his 
life, for civil and domestic and ecclesiastical liberty. I felt that I was on 
his side in all three areas. But at the same time he was a conservative 
m that he thought that liberty was a good tiring because it was what 
God wanted for man, but that man could not and did not want liberty 
for himself. What man wants always is slavery or mastery.
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And similarly Blake combines Christianity and radical politics. In our contemporary 
western civilization, such a combination of interests can be seen as contradictory, but 
there is no contradiction in Blake’s thinking. ‘There will always be a curse’ Frye 
states ‘upon any critic who tries to see the Christianity and the radicalism of Blake as 
a dichotomy instead of a unity’ (FS, p. 346).
Perhaps the principal paradigm for this kind of thinking is, given their political 
dimension, Blake’s conceptions of innocence and experience, and the transcendence 
suggested by the ‘contrary states of the human soul’. Innocence and experience 
function as opposites and suggest dualism, but they are in fact ‘contraries’ which are 
conducive to ‘progress’ to another level. As Foster Damon explains in his Blake 
Dictionary in the entry on Songs o f Innocence and Experience, imiocence and 
experience give way to a third term:
The first poem in the book, the “Introduction” to the Songs o f  
Innocence, indicates the two Contrary States when the piper plays his 
tune twice: the fir st time, the child laughs, and the second time, he 
weeps. But at the third performance (this time with words) the child 
weeps with joy -  the third stage where the contraries are synthesized.
The last poem of the book, “To Tirzah”, (added about 1795), is a 
fitting conclusion, as it expresses the third stage -  revolution. The lad 
becomes himself by rejecting the maternal authority, using Jesus’ own 
words to Mary: “Woman, what I have to do with thee?” {John ii: 4).
But the sense goes deeper; for in rejecting the mother, the lad also 
rejects what his mother gave him: his mortal body, with its closed 
senses and the misery o f sex. When that is transcended, “it is Raised a 
Sphitual Body” ( / Cor xv: 44).^
 ^S. Foster Damon, A Blake Dictionaty: The Ideas and Symbols o f William Blake (Hanover: 
University Press of New England, 1988), p.378. Further references are abbreviated to Damon and 
incorporated parenthetically within the text.
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(Interestingly, the last figure from Paul’s letter to the Corinthians, which is 
oxymoronic if not fully dialectical, is, as we shall see, one Frye makes pivotal in his 
later works.) Damon’s commentary is helpful here, but unsurprisingly Frye’s own 
articulation of the Orc-Urizen relation is even more illustrative of his kind of 
thinking. The move beyond Ore and Urizen to Los points to the move beyond Left 
and Right, revolution and conseiwatism:
The world o f law, sti’etching from the stany heavens to the moral 
conscience, is the domain of Urizen in Blake’s symbolism. It sits on a 
volcano in which the rebellious Titan Ore, the spirit of passion, lies 
bound, wr ithing and struggling to get free. Each of these spirits is 
Satanic or devilish to tlie other. While we dream, Urizen, the principle 
of reality, is the censor, or, as Blake calls him, the accuser, a smug and ^
grinning hypocrite, an impotent old man, the caricature that the child 
in us makes out of the adult world that thwarts him. But as long as we 
are awake. Ore, the lawless pleasure principle, is an evil dragon bound 
under the conscious world in chains, and we all hope he will stay 
there,
[...] Plainly, we cannot settle the conflict of Ore and Urizen by siding 
with one against tlie other, still less by pretending that either of them is
an illusion. We must look for a third factor in human life, one which Jj
meets the requisite o f both the dream and the reality.
This third factor, called Los by Blake, might provisionally be called
'71work, or constructive activity.^
 ^Northrop Frye, ‘Blakes’ Treatment of the Archetype’ in Critics on Blake, ed. Judith O’Neill |
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), pp. 47-61. Further references are abbreviated to BTA and S
incorporated parenthetically within the text.
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and Blake’s Eden.
 ^ Jonathan Hart, Aor/Ara/7 Frye.' The Theoretical Imagination (London: Routledge, 1994). (Further 
references are abbreviated to Hart and incorporated parenthetically within the text.) Book-length 
studies of Fiye have gradually become more and more inclusive. Anatomy o f  Criticism is the main 
subject of two book-length studies, Robert D. Denham’s Northrop Frye and Critical Method (1978) 
and A. C. Hamilton’s Northrop Frye: The Anatomy o f his Criticism (1990). In addition to this, it is also 
given prominent consideration in various other books on Frye’s criticism. Ian Balfour devotes the 
second chapter of his Northrop Frye to the study of it, and in ‘Reconstructing Criticism’ in Northrop 
Fiye: The Theoretical Imagination, Jonathan Hart also gives a great deal o f attention to the book. 
Signs of the beginning of a shift in focus in Frye scholarship can be seen, for example, in Ian Balfour’s 
Northrop Frye. Balfour sets out to discuss more of Frye’s works than his predecessors, and when 
speaking of this intention in his Preface he emphasises particularly the importance o f Fearful 
Symmetry'. ‘My own study devotes considerable space to Fearful Symmetry, which I take to be of an 
importance almost equal to that o f the Anatomy, though its circumscribed topic, the poetry o f William 
Blake, has of necessity not gained it as wide an audience’ {Balfour, p. ix).
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Los’s world, beyond the world of law and the spirit of passion, is Eden, and we might
.expect there to be some connection between Frye’s radical and conservative thinking
A thesis focused on this theme should take in all of Frye’s principal theoretical 
interests. In Northrop Frye: Religious Visionary and Architect o f the Spiritual World
fRobert Denham argues that
iThe persistent effort to move beyond is [...] typical of Frye’s late
work. We can see the Aufhebung at work, for example, in the first half !
o f Words With Power, the four chapters of which have dialectical
. 4
pairs in their title: sequence and mode, concern and myth, identity and 
metaphor, and spirit and symbol. At tlie end of each of these chapters 
Frye advocates going beyond the dialectic that he has established.
4{RVASW .^.W ) i
My argument is that the entirety of Frye’s career can be understood in light of the 
conception of dialectical thinking. My thesis follows the example set by Jonathan 
Hart’s Northrop Frye: The Theoretical Imagination.^ Hart comments on the
importance of Frye’s interest in Blake. Like Balfour before him, Hart dedicates a 
complete chapter to Fearful Symmetry, and in addition to a chapter on Anatomy o f 
Criticism, he also includes chapters on The Great Code, Frye on education, and Frye 
and cultural studies. I focus on what I take to be the principal theoretical concerns of 
Frye’s writings: the theory of the poetry of Blake; secular literature; education and 
work; and the Bible. In two separate discussions I also consider the political beliefs of 
Frye in the wake of the Second World War, and at the close of the Cold War, beliefs 
which are also testimony to his insistence on dialectical thinking, hi addition, the 
overall structure of Frye’s writings are also testimony to a dialectical liberal impulse. 
He focused on secular themes, which led him, as we shall see, to consider the 
meaning of the ideals of the French revolution; but at the end of his career he turns to 
the Christian Bible, thereby completing a neat dialectical design. My thesis seeks, 
then, to also bring out the overarching dialectic of his career. The study complete,
Frye emerges as a critic whose thinldng is characterised by a desire to transcend 
oppositions that is rare in the study of culture.
Summary of Chapters
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 represent studies of the dialectical and liberal nature of Frye’s 
thinking in thi'ee different areas: the focus of Chapter 2 is his theory of Blake; Chapter 
3 deals with his literary theory; and Chapter 4 is concerned with his interrelated ideas 
about education and work. Chapter 5 is focused on Frye’s political philosophy, which 
is again characterised by its liberal and dialectical nature: his interest is in breaking 
free of the capitalist-communist opposition that dogs the world in the wake of the 
Second World War.
My analysis of Frye’s main themes follows the chronology of his achievements. Frye 
started his professional career with Blake, before moving on to the theory of 
literature. As he gained seniority in the university, he increasingly turned his attention
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to the theory of education and work. And towards the end of his life, he devoted all 
his energy to his comprehensive study of the Bible and literature. But in the second 
half of the twentieth century cultural radicalism started to make its presence felt in 
universities and public life generally in North America. In his writings Frye engaged 
with the ‘New Left’ phenomenon, and in Chapter 6 I consider the new radical view of 
education, of literature and of the poetry of William Blake, before going on to 
consider Frye’s view of each of these developments, which once again is suggestive 
of his liberal outlook.
In Chapter 7 the focus shifts to the last phase of Frye’s career and the sacred realm. 
Here I continue my consideration of the dialectical nature of Frye’s view of thinking, 
focusing on Frye’s ideas about the Bible. In this chapter I also consider developments 
in politics concomitant with developments in culture. Soon after the New Left came 
to life, a New Right, which achieved its first success with the election of Ronald 
Reagan as President, began to emerge. I give a short account of this emergence before 
going on to consider Fiye’s critique of the new enthusiasm for unconstrained 
capitalism, and his insistence on dialectical and liberal politics in the post-Cold war 
world.
hi addition, in Chapters 4 and 7 I draw attention to Frye’s overarching dialectical 
liberalism. Frye goes from a secular concerns to Christian faith and the interpretation 
of Scripture, and in sections of these two chapters I draw out Frye’s concern with 
secular and Biblical cultures. In connection with this point, it is worth noting that Frye 
begins his career as a Christian thinker focused on secular themes, and concludes it as 
a literary critic (albeit a Christian man writing as a literary critic) focused on the 
Christian Bible. In The Great Code Frye explicitly identifies himself as a literary 
critic studying the Bible, but he is not equally declarative about the fact that he is a 
Christian thinker focused on secular powers. In the Cayley interviews he comments 





-'i'course of my discussion of Frye’s secular thinking I endeavour to bring out the 
Christian and Biblical background of this area of his thought.
The Background to Chapters 3 and 6
i) The Background to Chapter 3
I
 ^W. K. Wimsatt, ‘Noihirop Frye; Criticism as Myth,’ in Northrop Frye in Modern Criticism, ed. by 
Muiray Krieger (New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 75-107 (p. 78). Further 
references are abbreviated to Wim and incorporated parenthetically within the text.
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Undoubtedly the work on Frye that anticipates my thesis is that of a small handful of 
commentators who at different times attempted to start to give an account of the 
dialectical nature of Frye’s theory of literature. I
IIn 1969 Frye published The Stubborn Structure: Essays on Criticism and Society, ‘a 
collection of essays and lectures, composed at inteiwals between 1962 and 1968’
(StSt, p. vii). In the preface to the volume he explains the origin of both his title and 
his sub-title, and after having spoken of his title, he goes on to observe tersely: ‘And, 
as some of those who write about me are still asserting that I ignore the social 
reference of literary criticism, the sub-title calls the attention of those who read me to 
the fact that I have written about practically nothing else’ {StSt, p. x).
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that more than any other single critic, it is W. K. f
Wimsatt to whom Frye is responding with this statement. In his essay ‘Northrop Frye:
Criticism as Myth’ (1966) Wimsatt challenges Frye’s views on literature and criticism 
with reference to Anatomy o f Criticism, the recently published The Educated 
Imagination (which Wimsatt sees as a ‘small-scale account of his system’). The Well- 
Tempered Critic, Fables o f Identity, A Natural Perspective 2iiià.T.S. Eliot: An 
Introduction. {Fearful Symmetry is spoken of later in the essay, but plays little part 
in the essay.)^ In his essay Wimsatt pays homage to Frye’s ‘liveliness, [...] vivid wit
and charm’ {Wim, p. 84), and compares him to Oscar Wilde, but the essay represents 
a somewhat ill-tempered and rambling attack on Frye’s work. Undoubtedly, the most 
important section is an early one in which Wimsatt speaks of Plato’s Ion and chapter 
IX of Aristotle’s Poetics and goes on to argue that Frye finds himself in the same 
situation as Aristotle and his modem day descendants - Coleridge, Croce and 
Richards - in that he is bound to work within ‘a circle of paradox (or contradiction)’ 
{Wim, p. 79) that is inseparable from literary theory: ‘I mean the double difficulty, of 
poetry in relation to the world, and that of criticism in relation to value - the so-far 
irreducible critical experiences: that literature is both more lively and less lifelike than 
the real world (this impossible pig of a world); that criticism cannot demonstrate 
value but is at the same time inescapably concerned with trying to do so’ (ibid.). 
Wimsatt is clearly indignant about what he views as Frye’s blithe denial of any 
connection between literature and ‘reality’. What distinguishes Frye from his 
forebears, argues Wimsatt, is simply his self-confidence: ‘In his thinking on these 
problems Frye differs from other literary theorists mainly in the extreme assurance, 
the magisterial sweep and energy, with which he at moments attempts (or pretends) to 
detach literature fi*om the world of reality, and criticism from evaluation, and in the 
aplomb with which he involves himself in the oddities, implausibilities, even the 
patent contradictions, required for this detachment’ {Wim, p. 80). (It may be that in 
this section Wimsatt unintentionally recognizes features that delight some of us in 
Fiye. And it may be that Wimsatt is responding negatively to the veiy kind of thinking 
which is dialectical and therefore liberal.)
Subsequently, critics sympathetic to Fiye’s theory sought to clarify the social nature 
of his literary criticism. In his essay ‘Northrop Frye and the Necessary Hybrid: 
Criticism as Aesthetic Humanism’ (1971) Peter Cummings seeks to address what he 
sees as the antithesis at the heart of Frye’s work: Cummings maintains that ‘in Frye’s 
work the disinterested philosophy of aesthetic literary criticism and the socially 




force and immovable ob ject.C ritic ism  in Frye’s view is ‘a hybrid of two distinct 
and apparently antithetical mental attitudes’ {Cummings, p. 256). Cummings traces 
the development of this kind of thinking about criticism through Frye’s writings from <
y;
the emphasis on both ‘the dolce and the utile of literary experience’ {Cummings, p. |
257) evident in Fearful Symmetry, to the ‘understanding of the necessity of both 
aesthetic and humanistic attitudes’ {Cummings, p. 258) manifest m Anatomy o f
ICriticism. Similarly, in ‘Writing in Canada: Innis, McLuhan, and Frye: Frontiers of 3ICanadian Criticism’ (1972) Jan Sian begins the section of his essay dedicated to Frye
ffby declaring that we may well think The Critical Path as a ‘radical departure for a
■’i:writer who had often been accused of being too schematic, too much of a purist and ■:s
too little concerned with the “real issues of life,”’ but that this would be a mistake for 
his works are characterised by ‘an unwavering meditation on a theme which we can 
trace back to the first chapter of his study of William Blake,’ this theme being ‘that as 
human beings we participate simultaneously in two worlds, the one in which we find
ourselves and the one in which we would like to live.’^^ And Sian proceeds to make |
'■Ihis way through the canon of Frye’s writings demonstrating that this concern is 
present in each of his works. Likewise, in ‘Frye and the Social Context of his 
Criticism’ (1974) Robert Denham argues that those with misgivings about the social 
reference of Frye’s work are guilty of promulgating a ‘caricature’ which a close 
reading of Frye’s work is sufficient to dispel, ‘Even in the Anatomy,' states 
Denham, ‘where Frye’s primary concern is the formal nature of literature, we see his 
willingness to confront such questions as the role of literature in society, the ethical 
ends of art, and the social function of criticism’ {Denham, p. 63). Setting the record
P. M. Cummiiigs, ‘Northrop Fiye and the Necessary Hybrid: Criticism as Aesthetic Humanism,’ in 
The Quest fo r Imagination: Essays in Twentieth-Centwy Aesthetic Criticism, ed. by O. B. Harbison, Jr 
(Cleveland: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1971), pp. 255-76 (p. 256). Further references 
are abbreviated to Cummings and incoiporated parenthetically within the text.
Jan Sian, ‘Writing in Canada: Innis, McLuhan, and Frye: Frontiers of Canadian Criticism,’
Canadian Dimension 8 (August 1972), 43-6 (p. 46). Further references are abbreviated to Sian and 
incorporated parenthetically within the text.
Robert D. Denham, ‘Frye and the Social Context of Criticism,’ South Atlantic Bulletin 39 
(November 1974), 63-72 (p. 63). Further references are abbreviated to Denham and incorporated 
parenthetically within the text.
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straight, Denham argues, ‘It is clear from the “Tentative Conclusion” to the Anatomy 
that Frye neither endorses the view that criticism is finally autonomous nor accepts 
that idea that literature is aesthetically self-contained’ {Denham, p. 64), and he goes 
on to draw the reader’s attention to pertinent sections of the final essay. Denham 
identifies ‘two poles of reference in Frye’s explanation - ‘the imagination and society’ 
(ibid.) - and he gives an account of the importance of both: ‘Fiye is unwilling to let 
either of them be his ultimate form. If society becomes the goal of criticism, then art 
becomes subservient to morality or to one of the practical sciences, and the 
detachment of the imaginative vision which Frye champions is lost [...]. On the other 
hand, if the aesthetic norm is given priority, the social function of criticism withers’ 
{Denham, pp. 64-5). And in the remainder of the essay Denham continues to trace 
Frye’s attempts to grapple with these conflicting impulses in his theory.
And In ‘Northrop Frye and the Defence of Imagination’ (1982) Deanne Bogdan 
argues that The Educated Imagination and the works that follow it are characterized 
by an ‘almost evangelical fervour about literary values and their importance to the 
preservation of c i v i l i z a t i o n . other words Frye’s work represents ‘one great 
apology for poetry [...] in the tradition of Sidney and Shelley’ (ibid.). ‘What has to be 
safeguarded’ writes Bogdan, ‘is not poetiy or literature as a form of morality or 
laiowledge, but the kind of knowledge and morality of man to which poetic creation 
attests’ {Bogdan, p. 204).
For Bogdan, every apology for poetry is a response to ‘the Platonic paradox, or 
Socratic dilemma’ and engages with the simultaneous independence and referential 
nature of art (ibid.). In Bogdan’s view Frye is concerned with the ‘“intrinsic” and 
“extrinsic” value of poetry’ {Bogdan, p. 205):
Deanne Bogdan, ‘Northrop Frye and the Defence of Literature,’ English Studies in Canada 8 (June 
1982), 203-14 (p. 203). Further references are abbreviated to Bogdan and incorporated parenthetically 
within the text.
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Frye also espouses both kinds of poetic value, but unlike Abrams he 
views them in terms of each other, not as two distinct critical activities.
(ibid.)
Bogdan attempts to find answers to these questions in her essay and towards the end 
of the essay speaks of a plane in Frye’s thought ‘where delight becomes instruction; 
integrity, seriousness; and intrinsie, one with extrinsic value’ {Bogdan, p. 212).
' #
That the extrinsic value of literature resides in the intrinsic value is the ÏIbasis o f all Fiye’s critical interests, and links his pleas for the
1autonomy o f literature to his claims for its social value [...] We must
■’Îbe prepared to demonstrate how the principle of social responsibility is f
compatible with that of aesthetic detachment, how, in fact, the twin 
goals of instruction and delight can be effected without doing violence Ito each other.
Bogdan proceeds by summarising Frye’s ideas on the social function of art, and then 
draws attention to the contradiction manifest in Frye’s beliefs about ‘literature’s 
extrinsic value’ and the fact that ‘he jealously guards the intrinsic value of literature’ 
{Bogdan, p. 208). Like both of the other critics we have considered, Bogdan 
acknowledges the patience-stretching nature of Frye’s thinking:
Firstly, how can Frye at the same time espouse and reject a principle 
o f aesthetic self-containment for literature? Secondly, how can he 
affirm its moral value while denying that tire arts, of themselves can 
transform life?
{Bogdan, p. 209) I
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In ‘Northrop Frye: Criticism as Myth’ Wimsatt had spoken of a ‘patent contradiction 
in Fiye’s theoiy’:
Thus, literature, on the one hand has no reference to life, it is 
autonomous, like mathematics, and sufficient to itself; it “takes over” 
life, envelops and absorbs it, swallows it. Literature is made out of 
literature. At the same time literature does refer to life, it must; it 
began with real life in a primitive situation, and it is concerned with 
promoting values for real life, the vision o f an ideal society [...].
{JVim, pp. 80-81)
In contrast to Wimsatt, Bogdan and the other critics we have considered see the 
aesthetic and the social aspects of Frye’s criticism, not as an infuriating inconsistency, 
but as two equally important tendencies within his work. Far from undermining the 
social function of literature, Frye’s theory is thoroughly bound up with the complex 
relation between literature and society. Such tensions must be understood in terms of 
a vital dialectic in Fiye’s work.
However, these critics fail to do justice to Frye’s ideas. Though they have uncovered 
the crucial tension in Frye’s literary theory, they stop short of a thorough exploration 
of the two dimensions of his theory, which is the task I have undertaken in Chapter 3. 
At the close of his essay ‘Frye and Ideology’ Salusinsky wonders ‘whether Fiye’s 
“‘middle way,” between determinism and aesthetic indeterminacy, may yet turn out to 
be the truly critical path’^^ ; my Chapter 3 is an endorsement of the idea that Frye’s is a 
third way, but it is, I argue, a third way which is characterised by Blakean exuberance 
rather than ‘middle way’ accommodation or compromise.
The Legacy o f  Northrop Frye, ed. by Alvin A. Lee and Robert D. Denham (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1994), p. 82. Further references are abbreviated to LNF and are incoiporated
parenthetically within the text.
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ii) The Background to Chapter 6
In Chapter 6 I discuss developments in university curricula, literary theory, and Blake 
studies in the second half of the twentieth century, before going on to discuss Frye’s 
response to these new attitudes. Here, again, I follow the example set by Hart who in 
his study of Fiye, dedicates a chapter to the challenge to the establisliment in the 
sixties and Frye’s view of education, and a chapter to Frye and ‘ideology’ criticism.
My discussion here, however, also challenges Fiye scholarship in various ways. Frye 
scholars tend to focus on the contrast afforded between Frye and the student radicals 
of the sixties. Frye himself wrote a great deal about the time of student unrest and it 
might appear wise to make this comparison our focus. However, it is my contention 
that rather than the original student movement, we should instead focus upon the 
institutional cultural radicalism that the student movement precipitated. What is most I
important about the influence of the Left in academia in the second half of the
twentieth century is not the student movement, which in line with Frye’s predictions ?
fizzled out; rather it is the creed of multiculturalism which burgeoned after that
::'Smovement’s high point, becoming a real power for change in the seventies and 
subsequent decades. Unsurprisingly, Frye views occasions to respond to these 
developments as opportunities to re-affirm his commitment to liberal thinking.
Turning to Frye and cultural studies, recent accounts of Frye’s relation to the focus on |
ideology in literary criticism have tended to dismiss the notion that a sharp opposition 
exists between Fiye and cultural criticism. In this chapter I also lay bare the enormous 
irreconcilable differences between Fiye’s theory of literature and that of those critics 
who foreground ideology.
The Present Thesis and Contemporary Literary Theory
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■The developments in Frye studies we glanced at have been taking place against a 
background of highly significant developments in theory. In our day literary studies
has come to be dominated by a small handful of divergent schools of political 
criticism which coexist with one another, together constituting a powerful academic 
culture. Marxist, Foucaldian, new historical and feminist models combine in a loose, 
multi-faceted culture which progressively turns its attention to different periods and 
literaiy genres.
Terry Eagleton is a key figure in this revolution, and his Literary Theory: An 
Introduction is a seminal text for it. Eagleton wants to see the development of 
‘political criticism’ produced by ‘radical critics’. Such political criticism would be 
able to draw on a number of twentieth-century theoretical dispensations:
Radical critics are open-minded about questions of theory and
method; they tend to be pluralist in this respect. Any method or theory 
which will contribute to the strategic goal of human emancipation, the 
production of ‘better people’ through the socialist transformation of 
society, is acceptable. Structuralism, semiotics, psychoanalysis, 
deconstruction, reception theory and so on: all these approaches, and 
otliers, have their valuable insights which may be put to use.
It has been said that within the context of contemporary studies of the Renaissance, 
Romanticism and the Victorian novel new theoretical readings have successfully 
changed and updated our understanding of the period/genre. Where no such 
revolution has as yet taken place, politically-minded scholars urge new work be 
carried out. Felicity Nussbaum and Laura Brown have identified eighteenth-century
U Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 211. Further
references are abbreviated to LT  and incorporated parenthetically within the text.
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literature as a particularly recalcitrant area. In their A New Eighteenth Century they 
argue that ‘approaches to literature informed by recent theoretical and political 
criticisms enable powerful new modes of reading and writing about eighteenth- 
century literature and culture’. The mood of the volume is sanguine: ‘the historical 
moment of this volume [...] is possible only because a number of eighteenth-century 
scholai's are beginning to believe that contemporary theory is now particularly 
productive for their work’ {NEC, p. 9)2"^
If one were to point to an absence in Frye studies today, one could argue that not 
enough has been done to flesh out Frye’s appeal at a time when socially concerned 
and political criticism is in the ascendancy. Frye cannot be sold as a critic who ‘fits 
into’ this culture: he is not a Marxist, Foucaldian, or the like. But even though his 
social concern manifests itself in a different way, and the political alliance of his work 
is not simply ‘left-wing’, his work is nonetheless socially concerned and political, and 
for these reasons Frye has great value today. I hope that my argument that Frye is a 
dialectical thinker and that his dialectical thinking has a political dimension which 
represents a transcendence of the Left-Right political opposition will help to clarify 
the appeal of Fiye today.
In our day Pierre Bourdieu has written extensively on the contrast between aesthetic 
theory, or ‘legitimate taste’, where foim rather than function is paramount, and 
‘popular taste’, where the ‘continuity between art and life’ and the consequent
The New Eighteenth Century: Theory, Politics, English Literature, ed. by Felicity Nusssbaum and 
Laura Brown (New York: Methuen, 1987), p. 7. Further references are abbreviated to NEC and 
incorporated parenthetically within the text.
Nussbaum and Brown make a number of salient points about tliis new political literary cultme which 
are of general interest to us. They identify journals such as Critical Enquiry, Cultural Critique, 
Diacritics, New Literary History, and Representations which serve to provide for a new criticism of 
this persuasion. While recognising genuinely different points of view inside this camp, Nussbaum and 
Brown are optimistic about the possibility of greater coherence in this culture: ‘the current articulations 
of material feminisms with versions of Marxism and new historicism makes possible, we think, a 
convergence of various diffuse versions of political and historical criticism in ideology critique’ {NEC,
p. 21).
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‘subordination of form to function’ is all important. These tastes Bourdieu 
associates with social classes, the former with the upper classes, more specifically 
with ‘those fractions of the dominant class that are richest in educational capital’ (D, 
p. 16), the latter with the working classes. While Bourdieu does not use the terms, it is 
clear that what he has in mind is cultural conservatism and cultural radicalism. In 
Bourdieu’s view ‘middle-brow taste’ is the third option, this being a taste he 
associates with the middle classes (Frye’s classes). The taste in question is simply a 
compromise taste, which in no way represents a way out of opposition and partiality; 
it is not dialectical. Fiye’s liberal and dialectical theoretical thinking, however, points 
to just such a release, and one could almost see Frye’s work as an attempt to 
transfonn through a redeeming process a middle class attitude to all of life.
It will be clear that I rank Frye’s liberal thinking highly and would claim it is arguably 
superior, in the various fields I consider, to the positions over against which I define 
Frye’s. (In another study it would be interesting to analyse in detail Frye’s stylistic 
strengths which are not, of course, separable from his strengths as a thinker, political, 
religious or in the theory of literature; the impact of Frye’s argumentation on one level 
of response owes much of its power to his literary style.) I would hope, however, that 
even those who disagree on this will find grounds for considering Frye’s thinking 
worthy of serious consideration. Some critics have questioned the soundness of Frye’s 
liberalism. In his ‘Reconfiguring the Liberal Imagination; A Response to Margaret 
Burgess, Patricia Demers, and William Robins’ J. Russell Perkin argues that there 
may be blind spots in Frye’s liberalism, and goes on to conclude that ‘To preserve 
Frye’s liberal ideal it may [...] be necessaiy to incorporate some of the methods he 
ruled out in his own writing on the Bible’ {NFAW, p. 152). ‘Literary analysis of the 
Bible’ Perkin argues ‘should be attentive to texture and idiosyncratic detail, learning
Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique o f the Judgement o f  Taste (London: Routledge, 
2004), pp. 3-4. Further references are abbreviated to D  and incorporated parenthetically within the 
text.
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from the poetics of the novel (e.g., Mikhail Bakhtin) and from the biblical studies of 
Robert Alter; it should also be open to critical and historical scholarship, as Burgess’s 
and Demers’s essays imply. Thirdly, Frye’s handling of female symbols needs to be 
rethought from a perspective that does not simply equate transcendence with 
masculinity and immanence with femininity’ (ibid.). Tf my own thesis does not set 
out to answer every question about the strength of Frye’s liberalism, it does attempt to 
provide a comprehensive mapping of it.
Throughout I have the luxury of being able to draw on a vast oeuvre in which the 
main ideas remain unchanged. Of course the repetitive element in Frye’s work 
troubled him. As early as The Stubborn Structure Frye had started to offer a 
commentary on the element of repetition in his work. T have tried to minimize all 
repetition, and hope that what remains will be more helpful than distracting. 
Sometimes, of course, repetition can be a sign not so much of a lack of ideas as of 
conviction, even of some consistency in one’s convictions’ {StSt, p. viii). However, 
the consistency of his thought means that one can confidently speak of Frye’s view or 
position within a number of contexts, and that there is always ample support for 
argument.
In connection with this, one striking characteristic of Frye’s writings is their 
occasional nature, numerous books and essays being based on lectures and talks. This 
characteristic ties in with another related facet: the accessible nature of his writings. 
Of course Frye’s writings are not only accessible from the point of view of the 
academy. The Educated Imagination, a text which is pivotal in what follows 
especially Chapter 3, started as a series of radio talks for C.B.C. And The Double 
Vision, a key text in my Chapter 7, is testimony to Fiye’s stylistic range, too, 
fulfilling a similar role as The Educated Imagination within the context of literary
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criticism of the Bible. One of Frye’s guiding principles is that the lay person can 
engage with his ideas. This is not simply populism. It descends from his sense that 
educationalists operate in relation to the genuine needs of a social group, and that a 
democratic, bottom-up paradigm is needed if the problems of education are to be 
solved. In his hitroduction to Words With Power Frye offers a polemical commentary 
on these interrelated factors, and takes on ingi'ained complacency within academia:
There are two reasons for this “public address” format. One is the 
conviction that radically new directions in the humanities can come 
only from the cultural needs of this lay public and not from any one 
version o f critical theory, including my own so far as I have one. The 
other is that books appear from time to time telling us that the 
educational establishment in our society has betrayed our cultural 
heritage and allowed young people to grow up barbarously ignorant 
of it traditions. Such books are often warmly received, with everyone 
apparently convinced that something should be done. Nothing is 
done, mainly because the only implicit recommendation for action is 
to prod the educational bureaucracy. I think this starts at the wrong 
end, besides inhoducing assumptions in the philosophy of education 
that may surely be mistaken and are in any case unnecessary. Surely 
a constant awareness o f the widest possible audience for scholarship 
in the humanities can start the educational breakthrough that 
everyone seems agreed is needed.
(WWP, pp. xix-xx).
Needless to say, on no occasion does Fiye ‘dumb down’ his argument. Frye’s very 
approach, then, would seem to be suggestive of a dialectic, too, one where an 
insistence on communicating with as large an audience as possible and an
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uncompromising union of secular and Biblical cultures are combined with one 
another. Tluoughout my thesis I shall draw on the whole range of Frye’s writings, 
happily making use of those writings where the public address format is clear, thus 
foregi'ounding Frye’s social commitment on this level, too. And, given that I quote 
liberally from Frye, it is my hope that my own account of Frye may be rendered a 
thoroughly accessible one in the process.
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Part 1: Aspects of Frye’s Liberal Thinking
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Chapter 2: Frye’s Theory of Blake’s Poetry
In his bibliography of Blake scholarship Frye discusses Swinburne’s contribution to 
the field. Swinburne, argues Frye, is responsible for promulgating the notion that 
Blake is something of an aesthete:
Swinburne’s brilliant and generous essay, William Blake, appeared in 
1868 as a critical pendant to the Gilchrist life, and established Blake 
once and for all as an important poet. The virtues of tliis essay speak 
eloquently for themselves; its limitations are unfortunately tire main 
concern of the historian of Blake scholarship, however ungrateful the 
task. In the first place, Swinburne, on the authority less of Gilchrist 
than of his own temperament, strongly emphasized the social isolation 
of Blake, and passed over Blake’s radical, even revolutionary, political 
views, dismissing The French Revolution, for instance, as “mere wind 
and splutter.” The stereotype that he took from Gilchrist was rather 
that o f the rebellion o f the artist against society, and it was this aspect 
of Blake that was str essed in later Victorian criticism of him. Blake 
thus became a prophet of the aesthetic radicals, whose enemies were 
the Philistine and the Puritan ratlrer than tire tyrant and the usurer.
Yeats, for instance, speaks of Blake as having begun the practice of 
“preaching against the Philistine.”
‘The two fine essays of Yeats in Ideas o f Good and Evil (1903)’ Frye goes on ‘did 
much to establish Blake as a prophet of English symbolisme' (WB, p. 13). Arthur 
Symons’ William Blake ‘gives us a less sadistic but even more aesthetic Blake than
‘William Blake’ in The English Romantic Poets and Essayists: A Review o f  Research and Criticism, 
ed. by Carolyn Washburn Houtchens and Lawrence Huston Houtchens (New York: Modem Languages 
Association, 1957), pp. 1-31 (pp. 12-13). Further references are abbreviated to WB and incorporated 
parenthetically within the text.
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Swinburne’s, a Blake whose defence of the more energetic virtues was now seen to 
have affinities with the Herrenmoral of Nietzsche’ (JVB, p. 14). Whatever the merits 
of these eritieal endeavours, for Frye they are characterised by one striking weakness: 
they fail to discuss the social function of Blake’s poetry. And for Frye this would have 
meant that that these critical responses were cmcially flawed.
In the same bibliography Frye cites a diametrically opposed reading of Blake when he 
goes on to speak of a study of Blake published in the same year as Symons’ which 
aspires to serve as a con-ective to the aesthetic view:
Pierre Berger produced William Blake, mysticisme et poésie, fraiislated 
by D.H. Coimer as William Blake: Voet and Mystic (1914). Berger’s 
book was among other things the first really thoughtful and systematic 
study yet made of the Prophetic books. It demonstrated a coherent and 
controlling mind at work in them; the commentary provides much new 
and specific information about Blake’s meaning— something that 
Swinburne and Symons hardly provide at all outside The Marriage o f  
Heaven and Hell—and it marks the beginning o f the critical effort to 
clear up these poems for the common reader. Also, as one might have 
expected from his nationality, Berger’s view of The French 
Revolution, and of the political and social reference of Blake’s outlook 
generally, was better balanced than Swinburne’s.
(ibid.)
Blake criticism which tackles the meaning of Blake’s poetry for the ‘common reader’ 
and also fleshes out Blake’s political outlook is clearly of value in Frye’s opinion. 
However, the tendency is to ignore the aesthetic identity of the work when attending
31
to the social context, and, reading between the lines, Berger’s work is, in Frye’s view, 
an illustration of this shortcoming.
With Berger’s book we can correlate, from a much later period of Blake studies, 
David Erdman’s Blake, Prophet Against Empire: A Poet’s Interpretation o f the 
History o f His Own Times In his Blake bibliography Frye speaks of Erdman’s
skilful exposition of ‘the social reference of Blake’s poetry’: ‘The book is based on a 
clear and accurate reading of the whole of Blake’s poetry, including the Prophecies, 
besides keeping in view the total range of his work as illustrator and engraver, which 
often throws unexpected light on the symbolism. Many traditional errors and vague 
notions, parroted fr om one writer to another, are corrected or cleared up, and an 
exhaustive program of resear ch not only explains an extraordinary number of obscure 
points and problems, but builds a logical narrative as it goes on’ {WB, p. 25).
Frye was clear about the importance of Erdman’s study. He praises it in his original 
review for much the same reasons as he lauds it in the bibliography: ‘There have been 
several studies of Blake’s social and political interests and of his awareness of, and 
involvement with, the historical events of his time. Mr. Erdman’s book, however, is 
the first in this tradition to employ consistently a full knowledge of the meaning of 
Blake’s prophecies and an ability to recognize the historical allusions made in 
them.’21 He is most complimentary on the subject of Erdman’s attention to the visual 
aspect of Blake’s canon: ‘The paintings and engi'avings are studied with a 
thoroughness unique in Blake commentaiy [...]’ {Rev, p. 274). He concludes with a 
minor criticism of the volume but also an endorsement of it: ‘In its totality the book 
may, perhaps, be criticized as exaggerating Blake’s domestic radicalism and 
underestimating his hatred and distrust of what he called “Deism,” which made him
20 David V. Erdman, Blake, Prophet Against Empire: A Poet's Interpretation o f  the Histoiy o f His 
Own Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954).
2^  Northrop Frye, Review o f Blake: Prophet Against Empire by David Erdman, Philological
Quarterly, 34 (July 1955), 273-4 (p. 273). Further references are abbreviated to Rev and incorporated
parenthetically in the text.
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dislike French imperialism quite as much as the English variety. But the host of new 
facts and the clarification of both text and context which Mr. Erdman’s study has 
brought are of value quite independent of this’ {Rev, p. 274). Indeed, we learn from 
the preface that Frye, along with Howard O. Brogan, read ‘various drafts’ {Erdman, 
p. ix) of Erdman’s manuscript. However, Frye must have held the same reservations 
about Erdman’s Blake criticism, for like Berger, Erdman’s focus on Blake’s ‘social 
and political interests’ points to a failure to consider Blake’s poetry are artistic 
creation.
These studies, then, are undoubtedly of considerable value, but it is equally clear that 
for Fiye they distort our understanding of Blake’s poetry somewhat. The Swinburne- 
Symons-Yeats’ response is bereft of a proper conception of the social function of 
Blake’s poetry; at the same time any commentary on Blake’s poetry which stresses 
exclusively the social context of the poetiy has no conception of the imaginative 
nature of Blake’s poetry. In contrast to these, Frye’s own criticism of Blake’s poetry 
addresses the fact that as one attempts to do justice to one dimension of Blake’s 
poetry, one is in danger of demoting the significance of another. His Blake criticism 
represents an attempt to produce a response to Blake’s poetry which is free of the 
shortcomings of both approaches, an overall account of Blake beyond the level of this 
opposition.
hi my Introduction I suggested connections between attitudes towards the arts and 
towards politics, and these two opposing tendencies are suggestive of different social 
classes and political sensibilities. The tradition of Blake criticism advanced by 
Swinburne and Symons is suggestive of a conservatism of aesthetic quietism, owing 
to its failure to address Blake’s radical politics. (Swinburne as an aristocratic 
republican, not to mention a flouter of much Victorian convention, might seem an odd 
figure to class as a conservative. His aestheticism, however, places him in the 
‘cultural conseiwative’ grouping.) Berger’s work on Blake represents a radical
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approach to the same subject on account of his consideration of the social function of 
Blake’s work, the very dimension that Swinburne and others ignore. And these factors 
point to the distinctive political character of Frye’s Blake criticism. Frye’s successful 
combination of the two same contrasting dimensions of Blake’s poetiy is suggestive 
of an attitude neither conservative nor radical, but both at once.
The Narrative and Meaning of Blake’s Poetry
‘Blake’ Fiye explains ‘thinks almost entirely in terms of two naiTative structures’ 
(BTA, p. 55). The story of the conflict of Ore and Urizen is the first of these. ‘The 
other’ he states ‘is the comic vision of the apocalypse or work of Los, the clarification 
of the mind which enables one to grasp the human form of the world’ (ibid.). Frye 
goes on to claim that this dimension of Blake’s poetry is ‘not concerned with 
temporal sequence and is consequently not so much a real narrative as a dialectic’ 
(ibid.). In Anatomy o f Criticism Frye speaks of the mythos, or narrative, and the 
dianoia, or meaning of a poem (AC, p. 73), and it is more or less this distinction that 
he is alluding to in this passage. I shall proceed by discussing Frye’s view of naiTative 
and meaning in Blake in succession.
Beginning with narrative, the central myth of Blake’s poetiy tells the story of ‘the 
conflict of Ore and Urizen’ {BTA, p. 55). Frye provides us with this summation of 
Ore’s rise and fall:
Ore is fii'st shown us, in the Preludium to America, as the libido of  
the dream, a boy lusting for a dim maternal figure and bitterly hating 
an old man who keeps him in chains. Then we see him as the 
conquering hero of romance, killing dragons and sea monsters, ridding 
the barren land of its impotent aged kings, freeing imprisoned women, 
and giving new hope to men. Finally we see him subside into the world
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of darkness again from whence he emerged, as the world of law slowly 
recovers its balance
{BTA, p. 55)
Like Blake, Frye encourages us to think in tenns a world of innocence and a world of 
experience in connection with literature. He also suggests that there are four basic 
‘generic plots’ {AC, p. 162): romance, tragedy, irony and satire, and comedy, and in 
this section of Anatomy o f Criticism he argues for a connection between the world of 
innocence and romance, and the world of experience and satire and irony. The Ore 
narrative, then, is a narrative beginning in the world of innocence and ending in the 
world of experience. If its mood is at first ‘romantic’, its resolution is bound up with 
the world of satire and irony, meaning that it is characterised by the downward 
movement from innocence to experience which Frye thinks of as a tragic movement. 
This narrative is ‘the narrative of history, the cycle of law and war’ {BTA, p. 55). As 
such, ‘[it] has no end and no point and maybe called the tragic or historical vision of 
life’ (ibid.).
If the narrative of Blake’s poetry presents us with the conflict of Ore and Urizen, the 
dianoia of his poetry comprises structures of imagery which represent worlds at the 
top and bottom of the cosmos, Eden and Ulro, his heaven and hell respectively. If 
Blake’s narrative is entirely mythical, the meaning of his poetry derives from 
‘Identity,’ or, to use Frye’s more usual term, metaphor. In this context metaphor 
identifies the individual of each class with its society, and through metaphor each 
category of reality is identified with each of the others. The identity of each 
individual with its class is identity with. The identity of each category of reality with 
each of the others is identity as\
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The common-sense view perceives separation and similarity; the 
imaginative view perceives two kinds of identity. Blake speaks of 
“Identities or Things”: a thing may be identified as itself, yet it cannot 
be identified except as an individual of a class. The class is its “living 
form,” not its abstract essence, and form in Blake is a synonym for 
image, or experienced reality (thus the “Forms Eternal” of M. 35:38 
are opposed to what Blake thought o f as Platonic forms). All Blake’s 
images and mythical figures are “minute particulars” or individuals 
identified with their total forms. Hence they are “States, Combinations 
of Individuals” (M. 35:10), and can be seen in either singular or 
collective aspects. Ololon is the sixfold emanation of Milton because 
Milton had three wives and three daughters, yet also a mighty host 
descending to the earth and a single virgin in Blake’s garden. Blake 
refers impartially to Ololon as “she” or “they.”
Further, all things are identical with each other. A  man feels identical 
with himself at the age of seven, although between the man and the 
child there is little that is similar in regard to form, matter, tune, space, 
or personality. And as in the imaginative view all things are within the 
life of a single eternal and infinite God-Man, all aspects, forms, or 
images of that body are identical.22
In total Frye thinks in terms of seven categories of reality in relation to Blake’s Eden: 
the divine, fiery, human, animal, vegetable, mineral and watery. The individual of 
each class is identified with its society, and, as is suggested in the account of the 
vegetable world, tlu'ough metaphor each category of reality is identified with each of
22 ‘Notes for a Commentary on Milton' in The Divine Vision: Studies in the Poetiy an Art o f William 
Blake, ed. by Vivian de Sola Pinto (London: Gollancz, 1957), pp. 99-137 (pp. 106-7). Further 
references are abbreviated to CM and incorporated parenthetically within the text.
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IAPOCALYPTIC DEM ONIC
Ail gods are One God.
(Tiie four Zoas are the spiritual body o f the 
W ord.)
‘Gods are conceived, on the analogy o f tire 
demonic human society, as inscrutable tyrants, 
jealous o f  their privileges [...] . One o f  them is 
irsually in supreme control, asserting that he is 
“God alone” and that “There is no other” (A/,[pi. 
9,11. 2,6)’ (CM  p. 113).
All spirits or angels are One Spirit. 
(The Seven Eyes o f God.)
‘A society o f self-righteous demons, who take 
possession o f man to destroy him. [ ...]  As the 
true spirits are all One Spirit or tongue o f flame, 
so evil spirits are all one “False Tongue,” or 
Satan as accuser of sin (M, pi. 2,1, 10; cf. James 
3:6). This false tongue is called by Blake the 
“Covering Cherub,” who is to Satan what the 
Holy Spirit is to Jesus [ . . . ] ’ (CM  p. 113).
All men are One Man.
(Bride and Bridegroom as one flesh.)
‘A society o f tyrants arrd victims, with a supreme 
tyrant usually in control. [...]  The individual in 
such a society is a Selfhood who creates the 
cruel and lazy sky-gods in his own image. 
Corresponding to tire Bride, the demonic vision 
has a harlot, tire W hore o f  Babylon whose name 
is Mystery, the opposite o f  revelation or 
apocalypse’ (C M  pp. 113-4).
All animals are a single sheepfold and all sheep 
O ne Lamb.
‘A society o f tyrants arrd victims also, and its 
symbols in Blake are either beasts o f prey or 
parasites’ (CM  p. 114).
‘The vegetable world is a world in which all 
plants are a garden or farm, the Eden and 
Promised Land o f  the Bible. All trees in tire 
garden are One Tree o f  Life; all plants on the 
fam r are a single harvest and vintage, the bread 
and wine o f  which are identical with the body 
and blood o f  the One Lamb o f  the animal w orld’ 
(C M  p. 110).
‘A heath, forest or wilderness, called Entuthon 
Benython [...] . Its individual form is the Tree o f 
Mystery, the self-enrooting banyan o f The 
H uman Abstract, which is also the oak 
worshipped by the Dmids, and, in tire Bible, the 
tree o f  moral knowledge, tire Cross and the 
barren fig-tree’ (CM  p. 114).
The mineral world is a city of streets and 
highways, a city in which all buildings are Oire 
Temple, a house o f many mansions, and that 
temple Oire (precious) Stone, the cornerstone o f 
Zion’ (C M  p. 110).
‘ [A] demonic city, is featured by hierarchically- 
shaped buildings like the pyramid or tower o f 
Babel, servile architecture as Ruskin would call 
them, and by structures which, like the furnace, 
the winepress, and the mill, imprison fire or 
disintegrate form (M, pi. 43,11. 16 ff.)’ (CM  p. 
114).
The chaotic world, represented by the sea, 
disappears in the apocalypse (Revelation 21:1), 
its place being taken by a circulating river o f 
fresh w ater (“the deeps sirrink to tlreir fountains”, 
as Blake says in America. Tiiis river is the water 
o f  life restored to man. and as it is identical witli 
the circulating blood o f  mart’s risen body all 
w ater is a single “Globule o f  Blood,” as Blake 
calls it’ (C M  p. 110).
‘The sea (or snow or desert), the sea which as 
the “Red” Sea recalls the spilt blood o f  fallen 
man (M, pi. 31,1. 63). As tire Dead Sea or salt 
lake it is called Udan Adan (M, pi. 25,1. 60)’ 
(C M  pp. 114-5).
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the others. And Frye thinks in terms of the same seven categories of reality in relation 
to Ulro, and provides us with a similar exposition of this world.
In addition to specific identifications between, for example, the animal and vegetable 
worlds, all the categories of reality are brought into metaphorical identification in 
Jesus, ‘the unifying principle which identifies all these images with one another’
rather than ‘an ego at the top’ (CM, pp. 112-15):
Jesus is God and Man; he is the bread and wine, the body and blood, 
the tree, bread and water of life, the vine of which we are branches, the
cornerstone of the city, and his body is the temple.
(CM, p. 110)
Ulro develops a set of symbols which correspond to the imagery of Eden. And just as 
the bread and wine of the vintage are identical with the body and blood of the One 
Lamb of the animal world, so ‘All demonic images may be also identified with one 
another,’ states Frye:
The entire universe of nature is the “dark Satanic mills” of a cyclical 
labyrinth (M. 14; 43), and this universe is, in relation to the real world, 
both underground and (adopting the deluge version of the Fall) 
undeiwater. It is an embryonic world, described by Blake as the 
Mundane Shell (M. 19:11, 21 ff.), and within it is the vast interrelated 
mass of spawning generative life which Blake calls the “Polypus” and 
identifies with Ore or Luvah, the natui al body of which we are 
members (M. 31:31; M. 38:24). The Covering Cherub may be seen in 
the stars who mark the circumference of the single vision, for Satan is
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above all a sky-god or lord of the natural heaven, a dragon whose tail 
drew down a third of the stars {M, pi. 13,1. 26). As his journey in 
Varadise Lost shows, his empire extends over both chaos and what we 
call the cosmos. As Leviathan, Satan is not only a sea-monster but the 
sea itself, the sea that covers Atlantis, Sodom, Pharaoh’s Egyptians, 
and, according to Milton, the Garden of Eden after the flood. To find 
Atlantis again we have only to drain the sea, not the Atlantic Ocean, 
but the “Sea of Time and Space” on top of our imaginations (M, pi. 
17,11. 36 ff.).
(CM, p. 115)
‘A work of literary art’ argues Frye ‘owes its unity to this process of identification 
with, and its variety, clarity, and intensity to identification as’ (AC, p. 123). Blake’s 
poetry is characterised by such unity, on the one hand, and variety, clarity and 
intensity, on the other: its unity deriving from, say, the bread and the wine being 
identified as themselves, its variety, clarity and intensity from the bread and the wine 
being identified with the body and blood of the Lamb of God. And such 
considerations are balanced equally in Blake’s poetry. If the vision of Blake’s poetry 
points to the achievement of identity with and identity as on equal terms, then unity 
and variety, clarity, and intensity are equally important and equally fully realised.
Preliminary Conclusion
Thus far we have identified the aesthetic dimension of Frye’s understanding of 
Blake’s poetry. To sum up what we have learned, the mythos of literature is mythical: 
it is the stoiy of two ‘Giant Forms’, Ore and Urizen. In other words, it is mythopoeic 
naiTative, its emphasis being on design; it is pure form or structure. In terms of
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meaning it is similarly disengaged with respect to social context, Blake’s poetiy 
having no descriptive content. Frye thinks of the meaning of Blake’s poetry in teims 
of metaphor, and metaphor, as Fiye states in Anatomy o f Criticism, ‘turns its back on 
descriptive meaning’ (AC, p. 123).
If, however, we conclude that Frye’s poetics of Blake is purely aesthetic, we miss the 
deeper nature of his theory. At the end of a preliminary suiwey of Blakean narrative 
and dianoia, it might seem that even if the ordinary world of social injustice is 
discernible in his mythological designs, Blake’s poetry is by definition mythical and 
metaphorical, and therefore an aesthetic artefact. This could lead us on to the 
conclusion that Frye’s Blakean theory is every bit as conservative as Swinburne’s. A 
second suiwey, however, reveals this conclusion to be false.
The Narrative and Meaning of Blake’s Poetry Revisited
i) Narrative
In ordinary or fallen experience heavenly bodies go through their cycles; everything in 
the animal kingdom goes through its life-cycle; the vegetable world has its annual 
cycle of seasons; cities expand and go into decline; and water goes ‘from rains to 
springs, from springs and fountains to brooks and rivers, from rivers to the sea or the 
winter snow, and back again’ {AC, p. 160). In the middle of all this, human life seems 
subject to two types of cyclical movement: the ‘cycle of waking and dreaming life’ 
parallels the solar cycle of light and darkness,’ but ‘in common with animals, man 
exhibits the ordinary cycle of life and death’ {AC, p. 159). Ordinary or fallen life is 
characterised by ‘natural machinery’ {FS, p. 360). ‘The natural sun that flashes on 
and off every day is a mechanical device to light up the wall of an underground cave’ 
{FS, p. 218), Frye states. What is most disturbing is that so much of human life 
follows the same pattern:
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Gradually, as the universe took its present form, the weakening human 
imagination was slowly pushed down and contracted into its present 
helpless state. Yet gigantic energies still remain in men, imprisoned, 
but struggling to be free. [...] This imprisoned Titanic power in man, 
which spasmodically causes revolutions, Blake calls Ore.
(FS, p. 129)
41
historical movements as closely bound to the natural world, as 
inevitable in their progress from birth to decay, as the vegetable life \
:s;which the very word “culture” is linked with.
From Blake’s point of view man fell into this state. Before the completion of the fall, 
the universe was inhabited by gigantic warring powers. ‘The silver age or Lucifer 
period’ Frye explains ‘was a time in which the universe was tearing apart in chaotic 
disorder, and gigantic energies, sprung from the body of Albion, were fighting for
7':'
imaginative control of it’ (FS, p. 128). Human beings exist now on what Blake terms
■ -.m
‘the “Adamic” level’ (FS, p. 296), the level of fallen human experience. I
But if mankind has dwindled to the ‘Adamic level’ the universe is still populated by %
giant forms, these being not powers separate from man, but the reality of existing
Crucially, ordinary perception tells us that human and natural orders are distinct, but 
ordinary perception is wrong. In Fearful Symmetry Frye suggests that art tells us that 
‘tears and tempests, joy and sunshine, love and the moon, death and winter, 
resumection and spring’ {FS, p. 123) are all identical with one another. Rather than 
being giants immersed in time, we are giants cloven by the completion of the fall. If
we could recover original perception all the subjective and objective aspects of I
I:
existence would be one once more and the universe would be revealed as a struggle
between Ore’s and Urizen’s giant fomis.
Poetiy restores vision to its original state and metaphor lends poetry its power. ‘The 
metaphor, in its radical form, is a statement of identification: the hero is a lion; this is 
that; A is B’ (CM, p. 107), states Frye. Blake’s central metaphors are his ‘Giant 
Forms’, figures who are at once human personalities and aspects of nature. ‘Blake’s 
Tharmas, the “id” of the individual and the stampeding mob of society’, Frye argues, 
‘is also the god of the sea, Poseidon the earth-shaker. His connection with the sea’ he 
goes on ‘is not founded on resemblance or association, but, like the storm scene in 
King Lear, on an ultimate identity of human rage and natural tempest’ {BTA, p. 58). 
To vis,Q XhQ \zng\X2igQ o f Fearful Symmetry, the universal perception of the particular 
applies to natural objects as well as human foims. ‘But when we speak of the desire 
of the selfhood or ego to restrict activity in others, it is rather inadequate to say that a 
prison is a “symbol” of the Selfhood. Prisons exist because Selfhoods do: they are the 
real things the Selfhood produces, and symbols of it only in that sense. [...] The 
character of everything in nature expresses an aspect of the human mind’ {FS, pp. 
122-3).
Blake’s poetry does not present us with discrete life cycles, then. Life cycles get 
identified with each other in Blake’s poetry, so that what we follow is the progress of 
a figure who is at once human, animal and mineral and so on. Blake’s poetry is a 
world in which youth and spring or age and winter are two aspects of the same thing,
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rebirth of nature: but he cannot see these two phenomena simultaneously as two 
aspects of the same thing. Ore, Frye explains, ‘represents the return of the dawn and 
the spring and all the human analogies of their return: the continuous arrival of new 
life, the renewed sexual and reproductive power which that brings, and the periodic 
overthrow of social tyranny’ (FS, p. 207). Urizen is a variety of images suggestive of 
negative aspects of the same cycles:
7 |
and that figure the focus of our interest. His poetry forges the identity of the world %
outside the artist and the world of the artist himself. His myths are condensed versions
of reality. A man may witness political revolution; he may also watch a sumise, the
Urizen is a sky-god, for the remoteness and mystery of heaven is the 
first principle of his religion. He is old, but his age implies senility 
rather than wisdom. He is cruel for he stands for the barring o f nature 
against the desires and hopes of man. [...] Urizen is a white terror: his 
white beard, the freezing snows that cover him and the icicles and 
hoarfrost that stick on him, suggest the “colorless all-color of
I
atheism,” the nameless chilling fear of the unknown, that Melville h
depicts in his albino Leviathan. |
(FS, pp. 209-10) I
::The struggle of Ore and Urizen, then, is not a struggle between characters who are 
nothing other than mythical. All of human existence is brought into metaphorical 
identification in these figures, and their story is the tragic story of society and nature.
ii) Meaning
Let us go back to the conception of the natural cycle in which the discrete categories 




and repose, life and death’ (AC, p. 158), and it is conventional to think of the positive 
aspects of the natural cycle at the top and the negative ones at the bottom. Soon we 
begin to think in terms of a higher order of reality and a lower one: in the Anatomy
iFrye calls them, the ‘top half of the natural cycle’ and the ‘bottom half (AC, p. 162).
Blake’s poetry leads us to think in terms of a higher and lower order of nature, the
.world of innocence and the world of experience, and associates these with Ore and 4
Urizen respectively.
For Frye the world of experience is ‘the world that adults live in while they are 
awake’ (BTA, p. 47). On account of ‘law’ we find this world semi-habitahle: that is, 
we can anticipate what is going to happen in it. People also seem to adhere to ‘laws’ 
so people, like nature, are to an extent, manageable. As such, law is ‘the basis both of 
reason and society’ (ibid.). The child who cries for the moon, however, knows
::Snothing of laws, and being free from laws his world represents a different world. His 
is a world of innocence, the child being ‘a little bundle of anarchic will, whose desires 
take no account of the either the social contract or natural law’ (ibid.). As the child 
matures into an adult, however, he rejects the power of desire, driving it ‘underground 
into a world of dream’ (ibid.), which takes an increasingly sexual character. The 
world of experience sits on ‘a volcano in which the rebellious Titan Ore [...] lies 
bound, writhing and struggling to get free’ (BTA, p. 48).
To Blake’s mind, life understood in this way is a hopeless deadlock. There is no 
power in human life that points to a way in which social evils can be adequately dealt 
with. On the one hand, the world of dream is a perennial threat to the social order.
When the dream world throws off its chains it manifests itself in war, ‘moral holidays 
of aggression in which robbery and murder soon become virtues instead of crimes’
(ibid.). At the same time we can only feel impatient with the world of experience.
‘The social contract,’ Frye states ‘which from a distance seems a reasonable effort of 
cooperation, looks closer up like an armed truce founded on passion, in which the
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It is a great comfort to know that this world, in which we are 
compelled to spend about a third of our time, is unreal, and can 
never displace the world of experience in which reason 
predominates over passion, order over chaos, Classical values over 




real purpose of law is to defend by force what has been snatched in self-will’ (BTA, 
p. 48). These two characters are devilish in each others’ worlds:
While we dream, Urizen, the principle of reality, is the censor, or, as 
Blake calls him, the accuser, a smug and giinning hypocrite, an 
impotent old man, the caricature that the child in us makes out of the
adult world that thwarts him. But as long as we are awake. Ore, the j
.,S
lawless pleasure principle, is an evil dragon bound under the conscious




A third factor in human life, however, makes it possible to move beyond this 
impasse. The third factor is work or constructive activity, symbolised by Los. Work, 
Frye explains, is related to both worlds. It ‘talces the energy wasted in war or thwarted 
in dreams and sets it free to act in experience,’ while taking account of Taw and our 
waking ideas of reality’ (ibid.). Parodying the attitude of the mediocre mind to dream, 
Frye states
{BTA, p. 47) I
f
The worker, however, has a more sophisticated view of the two worlds. The world of 
experience is not necessarily real: it is the ‘material cause’ of his work; similarly, the 
dream is not unreal but the ‘formal cause’ {BTA, p. 48). Work is ‘the realization of a 
dream [...] descended from the child’s lost vision of a world where the environment 
is the home’ (ibid.). By realising in experience ‘the child’s and the dreamer’s worlds,’ 
work ‘indicates what there is about each that is genuinely innocent’ (ibid.).
hr Blake’s vocabulary the world of innocence is Beulah, and the world of experience 
Generation. Ulro lies beneath Generation or the ordinary level of human experience. It 
is the world as it is ‘when no work is being done, the world where dreams are 
impotent and waking life haphazard’ {BTA, p. 51). Eden is ‘the world of apocalypse 
in which innocence and experience have become the same thing’ (ihid.). ‘Eden and 
Ulro are,’ states Frye ‘respectively, Blake’s heaven or unfallen world and his hell of 
fallen world’ (ibid.).
hi a sense Ulro represents the first stage in a process. Man begins his labours in Ulro, 
where the mineral kingdom consists of little besides rocks. He ‘tries to make cities, 
buildings, roads, and sculptures out of this mineral kingdom’, and these forms 
constitute ‘the intelligible foim of the mineral world’ {BTA, p. 52). ‘The city, the 
garden, and the sheep fold’ (ibid.) are the human foims of the mineral, vegetable and 
animal worlds respectively. In Ulro we have the demonic counterparts of ‘human 
foims’, the ‘city of destruction’, ‘the forest of menacing beasts like the famous tiger, 
the blasted heath or waste land full of monsters, or desert with its fiery serpent’, and 
‘the devouring sea and the dragons and leviathans in its depths’ (ibid.).
In Fiye’s view ‘Everywhere in the human world we find that the Ulro distinction 
between the singular and the plural has broken down’ {BTA, p. 53). hr Ulro objects 
are characterised by ‘discreteness and opacity’ : ‘all classes or societies are aggregates 
of similar but separate individuals’ {BTA, p. 52). The ‘human form’, however.
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‘includes its relation to its environment as well as its self-contained existence’ (ibid.). 
The stones that make a city cease to be separate stones. In the human world ‘the 
individual thing is there, and the total form which gives it meaning is there’ {BTA, p. 
53); what is not there is the shapeless collection or mass of similar things. We have 
found our way back to the tme society, which is one man as well as the flock of 
sheep that is one lamb. The individual of each class is identical with its society, but 
the individuals of each class are also identical with each other in Eden. Ulro is 
characterised by hierarchy, which results in the great chain of being. In the human 
world ‘all aspects of existence are equal as well as identical’:
The one man is also the one lamb, and the body and blood of the 
animal form are the bread and the wine which are the human forms of 
the vegetable world. The tree of life is the upright vertebrate form of 
man; the living stone, the glowing tiansparent furnace, is the furnace 
of heart and lungs and bowels in the animal body. The river of life is 
the blood that circulates witliin that body. Eden, which according to 
Blake was a city as well as a garden, had a fourfold river, but no sea, 
for the river remained inside Paradise, which was the body of one man.
(ibid.)
But Blake does not stop here, however. Thus far we have alluded to man and 
everything that is below him on the chain of being, but Blake also views the divine 
world in the same terms. It too is a society where the distinction between singular and 
plural has broken down, and just as man is identifiable with what is below him, so he 
is identical with what is above him:
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The more developed society is, the more clearly man realizes that a 
society of gods would have to be, like the society of man, the body o f  
one God. Eventually he realizes that the intelligible foims of man and 
of whatever is above man on the chain o f being must be identical. The 
identity of God and man is for Blake the whole of Christianity.
{BTA, pp. 53-4)
Heaven for Blake is a ’world of total and realized metaphor’; hell is ’the pure state of 
nature’ {CM, p. 112). ‘There is nothing in the Ulro world corresponding to the 
identity of the individual and the total form in the unfallen one. But’ Frye continues 
‘natural religion, being a parody of real religion, often develops a set of individual 
symbols corresponding to the lamb, the tree of life, the glowing stone, and the rest’ 
{BTA, p. 54). If the ‘human form of the community is Christ, the God who is one 
Man’, the ‘human form of tyranny is the isolated hero or inscrutable leader with his 
back turned to an aggregate of followers, or the priest of a veiled temple with an 
imaginary sky-god supposed to be behind the veil’ (ibid.). He goes on to give 
instances of the corresponding symbols on the other levels of reality:
Against the tree of life we have what Blake calls the tree of mystery, 
the barren fig tree, the dead tree of the cross, Adam’s tree of 
knowledge, with its forbidden fiuit corresponding to the fruits of 
healing on the tiee of life. Against the fiery precious stone, the bodily 
form in which John saw God “like a jasper and a sardine stone,” we 
have the furnace, the prison of heat without light which is the form of 
the opaque warm-blooded body in the world of frustration, or the stone 
of Dmidical sacrifice like the one that Hardy associates with Tess.
Against the animal body of the lamb, we have the figure that Blake
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calls, after Ezekiel, the Covering Cherub, who represents a great many 
things, the unreal world of gods, human tyranny and exploitation, and
the remoteness of the sky, but whose animal form is that o f the serpent ’
or dragon wrapped around the forbidden tree. The dragon, being both 
monstrous and fictitious, is the best animal representative of the bogies 
inspired by human inertia: the Book of Revelation calls it “the beast 
that was, and is not, and yet is.”
4
(ibid.)
‘This’ comments Frye, ‘is a view of things which can only be expressed poetically, 
through metaphor’ (CM, p. 107).
We have come full circle, reaching a second conclusion about Frye’s conception of 
the dianoia of Blake’s poetry, but the structures of imagery we started off with can 
now be seen to be the contending realities of human experience. The social function, 
the visionary social function, we should say, of Blake’s poetry becomes apparent now. 
Frye remarks that ‘Blake obviously hopes for a very considerable social response to 
vision in or soon after his lifetime’ {StSt, p. 198), ‘though the real ‘heaven’ is not a 
glittering city’ (ibid.). The artist reveals ‘the form of the world as it would be if we 
could live in it here and now’ {BTA, p. 51). The human form of the world is 
‘apocalypse’, in which ‘each individual is identical with its class or living form, and 
all living fonns are identical with, and therefore eternally different from, one another’
{CM, p. 108), and, as Frye explains ‘For Blake the function of art is to reveal the 
human or intelligible form of the world’ {BTA, p. 51). In the exposition we have 
followed it is the worker who is responsible for the work of the apocalypse. But in 
Frye’s view the ‘true hero’ may be a ‘thinker, fighter, artist, martyr, or ordinary 
worker’ {BTA, p. 55). (We shall return to the figure of the ‘ordinary worker’ in
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Chapter 4.) Each of these ‘helps in achieving the apocalyptic vision of art; and an act 
is anything that has a real relation to that achievement’ (ibid.).
Such action in the light of apocalypse leads the individual away from common sense
'Îconceptions of time and space. ‘Such an apocalypse is entirely impossible under the 
conditions of experience that we know, and could only take place in the eternal and 
infinite context that is given it by religion’ {BTA, p. 49). This does not mean, 
however, that ‘all practicable improvement of human status [...] remains forever out 
of man’s reach’ p. 50).
' : ï%
We make this inference because we confuse the eternal with the 
indefinite: we are so possessed by the categories of time and space that
:we can hardly think o f eternity and infinity except as endless time and 
space, respectively. But the home of time, so to speak, the only part of
'time that man can live in, is now; and the home of space is here. In the
■"Iworld of experience there is no such time as now; the present never ;|
4?
quite exists, but is hidden somewhere between a past that no longer
"Iexists and a future that does not yet exist. [...] In both time and space 
man is being continually excluded from his own home. The dreamer, 
whose space is inside his mind, has a better notion of where “here” is, 
and the child, who is not yet fully conscious of the iron chain of 
memory that binds his ego to time and space, still has some capacity 
for living in the present. It is to this perspective that man returns when 





For Frye Blake’s poetry is not a reflection of external events. Rather than offering 
socially concerned commentary on the social evils of its day, it presents the vision of 
the Ore cycle, as well as the visions of the apocalyptic and demonic worlds above and 
below the levels of Ore’s struggle with Urizen. At the same time, in Frye’s view 
Blake’s poetry does not run away from the needs of society, his poetry possessing an 
important social function. Rather than being a series of purely aesthetic creations, 
Blake’s poetiy provides us not only with a condensed vision of fallen existence, but 
also a vision of the end of human labours in the form of an apocalyptic world of 
fulfilled desire. (We shall deal with variations on this vision in the following 
chapters.) Frye’s theory of Blake’s poetry, we could say, is dialectical criticism which 
transcends the level on which Blake’s poetry is understood as either an aesthetic 
object or a mirror held up to the society of the time. And as such it possesses a 
distinct political identity, one which is liberal by being both conservative and radical 
at the same time.
Blake’s poetry is a source of authority in society in its own right, and Frye clearly felt 
that the authority of Blake’s poetry could inteiwene in history in his time. ‘Read Blake 
or go to hell; that’s my message to the modem world’ he wrote in a letter to Helen 
Kemp in 1935.^3 At the same time, however, Blake’s poetry can be viewed as one 
element within a larger framework of authority: the whole of literature.
John Ayre, Northrop Frye: A Critical Biography (Toronto; Random House, 1989), p. 114. Further
references are abbreviated to Ayre and ineorporated parenthetically within the text.
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Chapter 3 : Frye’s Theory of Secular Literature
Frye emphasised the fact that in the twentieth century the ironic mode was in the 
ascendancy. Fictions, he argues in Anatomy, ‘may be classified by the hero’s 
power of action’ {AC, p. 33). In the ironic mode the reader looks down on ‘a scene of 
bondage, frustration or absurdity’ {AC, p. 34). Frye’s consideration of the ‘thematic 
poet’ of this mode takes him into the heart of the modernist movement and the 
observations he makes about literature in this context are of importance to us. In the 
ironic mode the poet dedicates his energies to his ‘literal function as a maker of 
poems’ {AC, p. 60). ‘At his best’ writes Frye ‘he is a dedicated spirit, a saint or 
anchorite of poetry {AC, p. 61). The great writers of this age are ‘“pure artists’” 
(ibid.).
Frye thinks in terms of a pact between such pure artists and New Critics. Both ai e 
occupied with ‘literal meaning’:
Literal meaning, as we have expounded it, has much to do with the 
techniques o f thematic irony introduced by symbolisme, and witli the 
view of the “new” critics that poetry is primarily (i.e., literally) an 
ironic structure.
{AC, p. 116)
In his discussion of the phases of symbolism, Fiye presents us with this brief account 
of “new criticism”:
What is now called “new criticism,” on the other hand, is largely 
criticism based on tlie conception of a poem as literally a poem. It
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studies the symbolism of a poem as an ambiguous structure of 4
interlockmg motifs; it sees the poetic pattern of meaning as self-
4contained “texture,” and it thinks of the external relations of a poem as Ibeing with the other arts, to be approached only with the Horatian |
warning offavete Unguis, and not with tire historical or didactic.
{AC, p. 82)
As Frank Lentricchia points out, Anatomy o f Criticism includes a series of ‘anti-New 
Critical polemical r e m a r k s ’ .^4 Frye refers to New Criticism somewhat disparagingly 
as ‘the aesthetic view’ {AC, p. 350). As with Blake criticism, the problem with this 
aesthetic view seems to derive from questions surrounding the social reference of 
literature, A little further on in his consideration of symbolism, Frye speaks of the 
drawbacks of types of symbolism which demote or ignore the social context. Frye
thinks in terms of five phases of symbolism. Having introduced the literal phase, 
associated with New Criticism and a purely aesthetic attitude, he goes on to speak of 
the third phase of symbolism, describing it as every bit as ‘aesthetic’ as the literal 
phase:
24 Frank Lentricchia, After The New Criticism (Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1980), p. 5.
The formal or third phase of narrative and meaning, although it 
includes the external relations of literature to events and ideas, 
nevertlieless brings us back ultimately to the aesthetic view of the
work o f art as an object of contemplation, a ^ec/(ne designed for I
ornament and pleasure rather than use.
{AC, p . 1 1 5 )
i
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Needless to say, the view which throws the emphasis entirely upon ‘use’ is equally 
one-sided.
(^C, p. 78)
Within the context of literature the approach of the New Critics with its emphasis on 
the aesthetic artefact and its ignoring of the social function of literature is clearly also 
a conservative view. The rudimentary facts about New Criticism clarify this point. In 
his Literary Theory: An Introduction Terry Eagleton speaks of the New Critics as 
pre-modem and quixotic in their sensibility; their politics descend from these factors:
Significantly, the American movement had its roots in the 
economically backward South -  in the region of traditional blood and
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Descriptively, a poem is not primarily a work of art, but primarily a 
verbal structure or set of representative words, to be classed with 
other verbal structures like books on gardening. In this context 
narrative means the relation of the order of words to events resembling
the events in “life” outside; meaning means the relation o f its pattern |
to a body o f assertive propositions, and the conception of symbolism 4AAinvolved is the one which literature has in common, not with the arts, 
but with other structures in words.
Of course such a view represents a critical orientation paralleling one we identified in 
Blake scholarship. The approach in question produces significant literary criticism, 
but this is not the approach Frye wishes to promote. In fact, he has as many
.-ireservations about criticism of this type as any New Critic does. Clearly, the territory 
beyond the level where one settles for one half of a dialectic is what is desirable, and
'this is the level which interests Frye first and foremost in this field of enquiry, too.
I
breeding where the young T. S. Eliot had gained an early glimpse of 
the organic society. In the period of American New Criticism, the 
South was in fact undergoing rapid industrialization, invaded by 
Northern capitalist monopolies; but ‘traditional’ Southern intellectuals 
like John Crowe Ransom, who gave New Criticism its name, could 
still discover in it an ‘aesthetic’ alternative to the sterile scientific 
rationalism of the industrial North. Spiritually displaced like T.S. Eliot 
by the industrial invasion, Ransom found refuge first in the so-called 
Fugitives literaiy movement of the 1920s, and then in the right-wing 
Agrarian politics of the 1930s.
{LT, p. 46).
‘New Criticism’ argues Eagleton ‘was at root a full-blooded irrationalism, one closely 
associated with religious dogma (several of the leading American New Critics were 
Christians), and with the right-wing ‘blood and soil’ politics of the Agrarian 
movement’ {LT, p. 49). New critics’ conservatism is one element in a coherent 
world-view. Frye, who identified the English tradition as predominantly ‘Romantic, 
revolutionary and Protestant’ {FI, p. 1), speaks of New Criticism’s ‘conservative. 
Catholic, and southern leanings’ {NFWE, p. 597), a triad that unsurprisingly reminds 
us to a significant extent of the stance spoken of by T. S. Eliot as ‘classicist in 
literature, royalist in politics, anglo-catholic in r e l i g io n ’.25 For Ortega y Gasset 
modem art is ‘the art of a privileged aristocracy of finer s e n s e s ’ ;26 Frye speaks of the 
‘reversion to high mimetic standards’ in the modem period, coimnenting ‘The sense 
of the poet as courtier, of poetry as the service of a prince, of the supreme importance 
of the symposium or elite group, ai e among the high mimetic conceptions reflected in
25 T. S. Eliot, For Lancelot Andrews (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1929), p. vii.
26 José Ortega y Gasset, The Dehumanization o f Art and Notes on the Novel, trans. by Helene Weyl 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948), p. 7.
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twentieth-century literature’ (AC, p. 63). And, like modem artists, the New Critics 
are clearly members of Bourdieu’s ‘dominant class’.
In contrast to this, the descriptive phase with it engagement with the ordinary world of 
social injustice seems bound up to varying degrees with the left-wing political 
stances; in its most unapologetic form it is unequivocally radical. Again, the 
elementary facts of this development in theory testify to its political alliances. In their 
Literary Criticism, which provides us with a useful account of the ‘socio-realist 
tradition of literaiy criticism’ (LC, p. 473), Wimsatt and Brooks argue that realism, 
was a reaction against ‘classic composure and conservative morality’ (LCSH, p. 456). 
They begin with Courbet’s exhibition of 1855 and the publication of Flaubert’s 
Madame Bovary in 1856, before going to on discuss Zola’s conception of naturalism 
in connection with Claude Bemard. ‘“Naturalism” had all along made a strong claim 
to be socially oriented. It showed a modem conscience for the plight of the working 
classes. It dealt with ordinary folk here and now. [...] That is, naturalism was 
contemporary and socially didactic’ (LC, p. 460). They then tum their attention to the 
‘didactic theory of literature’ which burgeoned in the Czarist Russia of the mid­
nineteenth century, which is of course left-wing; ‘In the work of Belinsky’s disciples’ 
explain Wimsatt and Brooks ‘deterministic materialism, hedonistic utilitarianism, and 
enlightened egoism unite paradoxically with fervour for social reform and a 
revolutionary spirit of sacrifice and social optimism’ {LCSH, pp. 461-2). They go on 
to focus on Tolstoy, who is identified as ‘The greatest Russian figure to participate in 
the 19^ *’-century complex of socio-realistic theory’ {LCSH, p. 462).
Of particular interest to us is that fact that this tradition culminates in Marxist 
criticism in Russia and in the ‘instmcted echoes of this in English and American 
writing which sounded in the later 1920’s and the 1930’s’ {LC, p. 468). Wimsatt and 




In America the idea of a socially active literature appears during the 
first decades of the 20*^  century with the “muckraking” movement (of
Iwhich Upton Sinclair’s Mjwwonar?, 1924, may stand as the sufficient 
symbol) and after that in overtly Marxist criticism of the later twenties 
and thirties [...]. Here we meet the barefaced rehearsal of the whole 
canon of Marxist ideas — much about the pessimism and decay of the
middle class, the inferiority of the “bourgeois sexual code,” the |
modem sell-out of human values to the “burgher,” much about the 
“creative role” of the worker and the need of the novelist to keep up 
with the “vanguard of the Proletariat.”
(We note in passing that the ‘socio-realistic theory’ surfaces in a pre-revolutionary 
society (Russia), and in two countries in which revolution is, from the Marxist point 
of view, unfinished business (France and the United States of America.)
Imre Salusinsky sees Frye’s time as one in which two views of literature clash with 
one another: referring to ‘vulgar’ Marxism and New Criticism, he speaks of the 
‘historical detenninism’ of the former and the ‘linguistic nihilism’ of the latter {LNF, 
p. 81). Frye’s own theory is again one which is characterised by a sensibility which is 
neither radical nor conseiwative, but both at once.
The Mythos and Dianoia of Literature as a Whole
While it is self-evidently the case that Blake’s poetry can be, indeed must be, 
approached as a whole, it is far from self-evident that the whole of literature forms a 
similarly coherent unit, but this is Frye’s point of departure. (In the following I shall 
draw on key passages in Anatomy o f Criticism and The Educated Imagination, a
short book based on a series of CBC radio talks. Throughout his career Frye strove to 
connect with the larger ‘university without walls’. His rejection of the ‘ivory tower’ 
attitude is unequivocal, his social engagement extending to a desire to communicate 
theory to the entirety of the reading public.) In The Educated Imagination Frye 
appeals to the listener, reminding him of how we continually add to our ‘knowledge’ 
of literature: ‘All the themes and characters and stories that you encounter in literature 
belong to one interlocking family. You can see how true this is if you think of such 
words as tragedy or comedy or satire or romance: certain typical ways in which stories 
get told. You keep associating your literary experiences together: you’re always being 
reminded of some other stoiy you read or movie you saw or character that impressed 
you’ {El, p. 16). Frye argues that ‘you don't just read one poem or novel after another, J
but enter into a complete world of which every work of literature forms a part’ {El, p.
27). From Frye’s point of view the only possible inference is that ‘literature is a total 
form’ {AC, p. 118). ‘Everyone who has seriously studied literature’ he argues ‘knows 
that he is not simply moving from poem to poem, or from one aesthetic experience to 
another: he is also entering into a coherent and progressive discipline. For literature is 
not simply an aggregate of books and poems and plays: it is an order of words. And 
our total literary experience, at any given time, is not a discrete series of memories or 
impressions of what we have read, but an imaginatively coherent body of experience 
{FI, pp. 126-7). On this level of response the symbol, the image which seems to come 
up time and time again in our reading of literature, is the archetype. He states ‘I mean 
by an archetype a symbol which connects one poem with another and thereby helps to
unify and integrate our literary experience’ {AC, p. 99). In Anatomy o f Criticism Frye i
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speaks of the ‘repetition of certain common images of physical nature like the sea or 
the forest’ {AC, p. 99), and goes on to identify such images as ‘conventional 
archetypes of literature’ : ‘A symbol like the sea or the heath cannot remain within 
Conrad or Hardy: it is bound to expand all over many works into an archetypal 
symbol of literature as a whole {AC, p. 100). This view of literature is suggestive of a 
Blakean apocalyptic vision of literature. In Ulro objects are characterised by
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‘discreteness and opacity’: ‘all classes or societies are aggregates of similar but 
separate individuals’ {BTA, p. 52). The ‘human form’, however, ‘includes its relation 
to its environment as well as its self-contained existence’ (ibid.). The stones that make 
a city cease to be separate stones. In the human world ‘the individual thing is there, 
and the total form which gives it meaning is there’ {BTA, p. 53); what is not there is 
the shapeless collection or mass of similar things. The inference is clear: the 
archetypal view of literatui e is the Edenic view of literature.
In Anatomy o f Criticism Frye speaks of the mythos, or narrative, and dianoia, or 
meaning of a poem, and of the levels on which we encounter mythos and dianoia, 
and we might begin with a preliminary consideration of Frye’s view of the mythos 
and dianoia of literature as a whole. Oppositions such as ‘success and decline, effort 
and repose, life and death’ {AC, p. 12) point to the fact that we think in teims of a top 
half of the natural cycle and a bottom half. The top half is in Frye’s theory ‘the world 
of romance and the analogy of innocence’; the bottom ‘the world of “realism” and the 
analogy of experience’. Beginning with mythos, Fi-ye argues that literature is 
characterised by four types of mythical movement: ‘within romance, within 
experience, down, and up’ (.^C, p. 162). The ‘within romance’ movement is, 
naturally the narrative of romance; the ‘within experience’ movement, that of satire 
and irony. The ‘downward movement’ is ‘the tragic movement’; the corresponding 
‘upward movement’ is the ‘comic movement’ (ibid.).
If we put all this together, we arrive at Frye’s conception of literature’s ‘central 
unifying myth,’ this being the ‘story of the loss and regaining of identity’ {El, p, 21). 
The ‘within romance’ aspect of the cycle corresponds to the ‘adventures’; the 
downwards movement represents tragic death; the ‘within experience’ aspect refers to 
the disappearance of the hero; and the upward movement his reappearance and the 
development of a new society around him. For Frye the story of literature is not a 
tragedy as it is in the account of Blake we considered in Chapter 2. Using his
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preferred Greek terms, Frye associates romance with agon, tragedy with pathos, 
sparagmos with “realism”, and anagnorisis with comedy:
The four mythoi that we are dealing with, comedy, romance, tragedy, 
and irony, may now be seen as four aspects of a central unifying myth.
Agojt or conflict is the basis or the archetypal theme of romance, the 
radical of romance being a sequence of marvellous adventures. Pathos 
or catastrophe, whether in triumph or in defeat, is the archetypal theme 
of tragedy. Sparagmos, or the sense that heroism and effective action 
are absent, disorganized or foredoomed to defeat, and that confusion 
and anarchy reign over the world, is tlie archetypal theme o f irony and 
satire. Anagnorisis, or recognition of a newborn society rising in 
triumph around a still somewhat mysterious hero and his bride, is the 
archetypal theme of comedy.
{AC, p. 192)
For Frye this is the central story that literature tells. The story is the ‘story of the loss 
and regaining of identity’; it is the story of the ‘hero with a thousand faces’ and tells 
the tale of his ‘adventures, death, disappearance and marriage or resurrection’ {El, p. 
21). In The Educated Imagination Frye speaks of this story as one which deals with 
‘how man once lived in a golden age or a Garden of Eden or the Hesperides, or a 
happy island kingdom in the Atlantic, how that world was lost, and how we some day 
may be able to get it back again’ {El, p. 20).
We can make a similarly preliminary survey of the dianoia of literature as a whole, 
too. For Frye the meaning of literature is a stmcture of imagery, or rather structures of 
imagery, just as the meaning of Blake’s poetry is. As we have seen these structures of
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imagery represent Blake’s Eden and Ulro in the context of that poetry; in the context 
of literature as a whole, literary imagery relates to what Frye terms the apocalyptic 
and demonic worlds.
Literary meaning for Frye is bound up with metaphor, especially archetypal metaphor. 
In his discussion of conceptions of metaphor in ‘Theory of Symbols’ he speaks of the 
nature of metaphor on the archetypal level. Ai'chetypal metaphor effects the 
identification between two dissimilar things and insists on the identification between 
the individual and the collective:
Archetypally, where the symbol is an associative cluster, the metaphor 
unites two individual images, each of which is a specific representative 
of a class or genus. The rose in Dante’s Paradiso and the rose in 
Yeats’s early lyrics are identified with different things, but both stand 
for all roses -  all poetic roses, of course, not all botanical ones.
Archetypal metaphor thus involves the use of what has been called the 
concrete universal, tire individual identified with its class,
Wordsworth’s “tree of many one.”
{AC, p. 124)
Again we come across identification as and identification with: the identification of 
the rose with all poetic roses is identification as; its identification with different 
things represents identity with.
The concrete miiversai leads us to think not just of the city, the garden and the 
sheep fold and other allied forms, but of a reality in which all categories are ‘identical 
with the others and with each individual within it’ (^C, p. 141). Consequently, the 
divine world is both a ‘society of gods’ and ‘One God’; the human world a ‘society of
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(AC, p. 141)
Crucially, each of these worlds is identical with all the others. In some cases the 
identity is of an individual with an individual or a group with a gi'oup, but it can be a 
matter of an individual with a class and vice versa. The Trinity is a familiar example 
of the individual which is identical with its class. Similarly, we are used to metaphors 
which sees human society as ‘members of one body’ (AC, p. 142). Transubstantiation
men’ and ‘One Man’; the animal world a sheep fold and ‘One Lamb’; the vegetable 
world a garden or park and ‘One Tree (of Life)’; and the mineral world a city and 
‘One Building, Temple, Stone’ (AC, p. 141). In each category the individual and the 
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One Tree (of Life)
One Building, Temple, Stone
Frye adds two more categories of reality to his argument, making the levels of reality 
the same as those in his theory of Blake. ‘Heaven’ Frye explains, ‘in the sense of the 
sky, containing the fiery bodies of sun moon and stars, is usually identified with, or 
thought of as the passage to, the heaven of the apocalyptic world’ (AC, p. 145). 
‘Water, on the other hand,’ he goes on, ‘traditionally belongs to a realm of existence 
below human life, the state of chaos or dissolution which follows ordinary death, or 
the reduction to the inorganic’ (AC, p. 146).
: v |
62
identifies all of these worlds with one another. ‘The animal and vegetable world are 
identified with each other,’ writes Frye, ‘and with the divine and human worlds as 
well, in the Christian doctrine of transubstantiation, in which the essential human 
forms of the vegetable world, food and drink, the harvest and the vintage, the bread 
and the wine, are the body and blood of the Lamb who is also Man and God, and in 
whose body we exist as a city or temple’ {AC, p. 143). On the level of the animal 
world, identifications of human society with animals are also familiar. Each of the 
categories is identifiable with ‘fire or thought of as burning’ {AC, p. 145); 
additionally, they can be understood in ternis of identity with water. The metaphor is 
‘the conception “Christ”’, which ‘unites all these categories in identity’;
Christ is both the one God and one Man, the Lamb of God, the tree of 
life, or vine of which we are the branches, the stone which the builders 
rejected, and the rebuilt temple which is identical with his risen body.
{AC, pp.141-2)
The divine world is almost identical to the world of Ulro in Frye’s exposition of 
Blalce’s imaginative cosmos. The demonic divine world presents us with ‘the world as 
it is before the human imagination begins to work on it and before any image of 
human desire, such as the city or garden, has been solidly established; the world also 
of perverted or wasted work, ruins and catacombs, instruments of torture and 
monuments of folly’ {AC, p. 147). ‘The demonic divine world’ states Frye ‘largely 
personifies the vast, menacing, stupid powers of nature as they appear to a 
technologically undeveloped society’ (ibid.). On the divine level it is inhabited by ‘a 
set of remote invisible gods’ who ‘demand sacrifices, punish presumption, and 
enforce obedience to natural and moral law as an end in itself (ibid.). On the human 
level the demonic society is one ‘held together by a kind of molecular tension of egos’
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(ibid.). The tyrant represents the collective ego of his followers; the sacrificed victim 
is the other individual pole of this world, and in the most condensed fomi of the story 
the two figures are one. The demonic animal kingdom is populated by beasts of prey: 
the tiger, wolf, vulture, dragon. In contrast to Arcadian imagery, we have the sinister 
forest or heath or wilderness or enchanted garden. Deserts, rocks and waste land 
characterise the mineral world of the demonic universe. ‘Cities of destruction and 
dreadful night belong here,’ argues Frye ‘and the great ruins of pride, from the tower 
of Babel to the mighty works of Ozymandias’ (AC, p. 150). Again Frye adds the 
categories of fire and water: ‘The world of fire is a world of malignant demons like 
the will-o’-the-wisp, or spirits broken from hell, and it appears in this world in the 
form of the auto da fe, as mentioned, or such burning cities as Sodom. [...] The 
world of water is the water of death, often identified with the spilled blood, as in the 
Passion and in Dante’s symbolic figure of histoiy, and above all the “unplumbed, salt, 
estranging sea,” which absorbs all rivers in this world, but disappears in the 
apocalypse in favour of a circulation of fresh water’ (AC, p. 150).
In this context we again come across the identification of the one with the numerous, 
though here it is in a context of demonic parody. In contrast to the tree of life, we 
have the tree of forbidden knowledge: ‘In the Bible the waste land appears in its 
concrete universal form in the tree of death, the tree of forbidden knowledge in 
Genesis, the barren fig-tree of the Gospels, and the cross’ (AC, p. 149). Frye also 
provides us with a glimpse of the concrete universal form of the demonic mineral 
world: ‘Corresponding to the temple or One Building of the apocalypse, we have the 
prison or dungeon, the sealed furnace of heat without light, like the City of Dis in 
Dante’ (AC, p. 150). And just as the categories of reality are identifiable with one 
another in the apocalyptic world, so they are brought into identification in the 
demonic world, too, though the context is, again, ironic. In ‘the Eucharist symbolism 
of the apocalyptic world, the metaphorical identification of vegetable, animal, human 
and divine bodies, should have the imagery of cannibalism for its demonic parody’.
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and Frye cites Dante’s hellish vision of ‘Ugolino gnawing his tormentor’s skull’ (AC, 4
Ap. 148) as an example of this imagery. In the demonic world we also come across the 
identification of the human society with the animal world. ‘In the Bible, where the 
demonic society is represented by Egypt and Babylon’ Frye explains ‘the rulers of
each are identified with monstrous beasts: Nebuchadnezzar turns into a beast in ;
Daniel, and Pharaoh is called a river-dragon by Ezekiel’ (AC, p. 149).
Literature as a whole, then, is characterised by the same unity and variety, clarity and
intensity that Blake’s poetry is, its unity deriving from the bread and the wine being :
identified as themselves, its variety, clarity and intensity from the bread and the wine 
being identified with ‘the body and blood of the Lamb who is also Man and God, and 
in whose body we exist as in a city or temple’ (AC, p. 143). Moreover, apocalypse 
points to the achievement of identity with and identity as on equal terms, so in this 
world of literature, unity, on the one hand, and variety, clarity, and intensity, on the 
other, are again achieved on equal terms.
iReflections
■I
Thus far we have identified the aesthetic dimension of Frye’s understanding of 
literatui'e. The mythos of literature is myth. In other words it is pure ‘stylisation’ with 
no concessions to ‘realism’; it is form at the expense of content; structure rather than 
representation; it is a condensed form where concessions to plausibility are 
urmecessary. In Frye’s view he is identifying everything about literature that is 
analogous to music. In other words he is focusing exclusively on form. In terms of 
meaning literature is similarly disengaged with respect to social context.
Were we to stop at this stage, we would have to conclude that Fiye’s literary theory is 
every bit as purely aesthetic and therefore conservative as that of the New Critics.
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However, we view narrative and imagery of the central myth as purely fictional 
because of our common sense conceptions of subject and object. And for Frye subject 
and object are the result of ordinary descriptive language, and literature establishes 
new categories in opposition to those suggested by purely descriptive modes of 
thought. Our next task is to uncover a second dimension of Frye’s literary theory 
paralleling his view of the social reference of Blake’s poetry.
The Mythos and Dianoia of Literature as a Whole Revisited
i) Narrative
In Frye’s view ‘the clear separation of subject and object’ starts with what he terms 
‘the third phase of language’ (GC, p. 13). In Frye’s view literature, and in particular 
metaphor, transforms ordinary life utterly. ‘The purest form of metaphor’ he asserts, 
‘is the god, who is an identity of some kind of personality or consciousness and some 
aspect of the natural world, as with a sea-god or sky-god or love-goddess’ (NFR, p. 
102). The metaphor, then, is the figure in which a man is identified with an aspect of 
natui'e, and it effects an identification between the world of the subject and that of the 
object. ‘It is one of the functions of literature in our day,’ states Frye, ‘more 
particularly of poetiy, to keep reviving the metaphorical habit of mind, the primitive 
sense of identity between subject and object which is most clearly expressed in ‘the 
pagan “god,” who is at once a personality and a natural image’ {NFR, p. 78).
The process of identification can be explained in another way. It can be viewed as the 
identification of the object with the subject. To use the language o f Fearful Symmetry, 
‘the universal perception of the particular’ {FS, p. 122) applies to natural objects as 
well as human forms. As soon as an aspect of nature is possessed by the human mind, 
it becomes identical with an aspect of human life. In Wordsworth’s ‘I wandered 
lonely as a cloud’ the daffodils are transformed into the personal possession of the
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poet. ‘The flowers become poetic flowers as soon as they’re identified with a human 
mind. Here we have an image from the natural world, a field of daffodils: it’s 
enclosed inside the human mind, which puts it into the world of imagination’ {El, p.
28). Speaking of images such as a ‘flock of sheep or a field of flowers,’ Frye states, 
‘There’s always some literaiy reason for using them, and that means something in 
human life they correspond to or represent or resemble’ {El, p. 25). Frye illustrates 
his point with reference to Blake’s ‘The Sick Rose’. The poem is not an allegory; nor 
is it allusive: ‘To understand Blake’s poem [...] you simply have to accept a world 
which is totally symbolic: a world in which roses and woims are so completely 
surrounded and possessed by the human mind that whatever goes on between them is 
identical with something going on in human life {El, p. 30). And just as the ‘god’ 
ultimately identifies a man with everything in creation, so this type of metaphor 
results in the identification of everything in creation with human life.
The writer is neither a watcher nor a dreamer. Literature does not 
reflect life, but it doesn’t escape or withdraw from life either: it 
swallows it. And the imagination won’t stop until it’s swallowed 
everything. No matter what direction we start off in, the signposts of 
literature always keep pointing the same way, to a world where 
nothing is outside the human imagination [...] a universe entirely 
possessed and occupied by human life, a city o f which the stars are 
submhs.
{El, p. 33).
(The reader may hear the echo of I  Corinthians 15: 54: ‘Death is swallowed up in 
victory.’)
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We see here a link between the practices of primitive human societies and our own. 
Primitive human societies habitually identify the human and the non-human worlds 
with one another in various ways:
The commonest [...] is the god, the being who is human in general 
form and character, but seems to have some particular connexion with 
the outer world, a storm-god or sun-god or tree-god. Some peoples 
identify themselves with certain animals or plants, called totems; some 
link certain animals, real or imaginary, bulls or dragons, with forces of 
nature; some ascribe powers of controlling nature to certain human 
beings, usually magicians, sometimes kings.
{El, p. 13)
And what we find is that the process of identification is carried forward into literature. 
To return to the passage from The Educated Imagination, Frye continues
You may say that these things belong to comparative religion or 
anthropology, not to literary criticism. I'm saying that they are all 
products o f an impulse to identify human and natural worlds; that 
they're really metaphors, and become purely metaphors, part o f the 
language of poetry, as soon as they cease to be beliefs, or even sooner.
(ibid.)
Of course subject and object exist in time. In the world created by descriptive 
language man lives a cyclical life and all around him he sees similar cycles. The sun 




in winter; new life appears in the animal world in spring. Usually man also has some '1conception of the life of his gods, who also get bom, mature and die before rebirth.
■!Man himself understands that his own life is subject to two forms of cyclical %
development. Like the sun, he rises in the morning and enters a shady underworld at 
night. In line with plant and animal life, he grows, matures and dies. But ordinary life
'Iis characterised by a clear distinction between subject and object. Man’s life-cycle 
may be Tike’ that of the sun or the creatures of the animal kingdom, but it is always 
distinct from them. The categories of reality are clearly demarcated: man’s life cycle 
is the subject in time; everything else is the object in time.
2?To Frye this is suggestive of a clear connection between ritual and narrative. Tn human life’ he 
observes, ‘a ritual seems to be something of a voluntary effort (hence the magical element in it) to 
recapture a lost rapport with the natural cycle’ {FI, p. 15). Harvesting is not a ritual because it must 
take place at a particular time. Ritual is ‘a deliberate effort of a will to synchronize human and natural 
energies at that time’ and rituals include ‘harvest songs, harvest sacrifices and harvest folk customs’ 
(ibid.). For Frye ‘the narrative aspect of literature is a recurrent act of symbolic communication: in 
other words a ritual’ (AC, pp. 104-5). ‘The naiTativepatterns o f literatuie’ he states elsewhere, 
‘represent tire absorption o f ritual action into literature’ (NFWE, p. 461).
-■fBut while in life these cycles are discrete they are not necessarily separate from the Ipoint of view of literature. Rather than describing these life cycles, literature 
transforms the world of ordinary experience. Ultimately, what metaphor identifies are 
life cycles, that of a man with that of nature and the animal world and so on. The story 
of literature is a narrative which deals with ‘a figure who is partly the sun, partly 
vegetative fertility and partly a god or archetypal human being {FI, p. 16). This
"1central story is concerned with four episodes corresponding to the four phases of the 
natural cycles: the first that of maturity, noon, fountains, and summer; the second, 
age, evening, rivers, and autumn; the third, death, night, sea or snow and winter; and 
lastly, youth, morning, rains, and sp rin g .^^  The hero’s maturity is identified with noon, 
fountains, and summer; and his age and death are identified with evening, rivers, and 
autumn, and night, sea or snow and winter, respectively. The narrative ends with a 
figure who is morning, spring, its rains, and a youth. The phases are of course 
romance, tragedy, satire and irony, and comedy in that order.
II
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Interestingly, Frye made a crucial change to this central unifying myth as his thinking 
developed. In its initial form, laid out in ‘The Archetypes of Literature’ (FI, p. 16), 
the narrative has a much darker hue. It begins with romance, which in this rendering 
of the myth is the mythos of spring, moves on to comedy (summer), before tragedy 
(autumn) and finally satire and irony (winter). Originally, then, Frye stuck to the order 
he found in Spengler, where the focus is the steady decline of the West in four stages 
corresponding to the seasons: medieval (spring), Renaissance (summer), eighteenth- 
century (autunni), and contemporary (winter) {NFMC, p. 203). The fonn he decided 
upon, however, is an optimistic or comic one, ending with a happy resolution, where 
romance is the mythos of summer and the beginning of the central unifying myth, 
while comedy is the mythos of spring, and the joyful conclusion of the narrative.
Symbols such as morning and noon, youth and maturity, rain and fountains, spring 
and summer represent a higher order of nature. Evening and night, rivers and sea or 
snow, age and death, and autumn and winter as symbols belong to a corresponding 
lower dimension. The upper half is in Frye’s theory ‘the world of romance and the 
analogy of innocence’; the bottom ‘the world of “realism” and the analogy of 
experience’ {AC, p. 162). Literature, then, deals with a figure who starts out in the 
world of romance, falls towards experience, and passes through an underworld of 
symbols of death and decline, before rising into the world of innocence from where he 
stalled.
hi literature subject and object are one, and literature tells the story of the hero figure 
in whom the two are united. Literature is an invitation to quit what Blake calls ‘the 
same dull round’, the world where heavenly bodies follows their paths, where all life 
burgeons and then goes into decline, where empires rise and fall, and so on. Progress 
in this other world of literature involves the same fearful elements of experience as 
ordinary life: decline and death, winter’s ‘iron car’, frost, and night. The difference is 
that here they have become aspects of one identity. But literature invites us see this
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darkest hour as an episode in a longer narrative. We must brave the loss of identity to
■
;pass on to its recovery. Needless to say the recoverable identity has nothing to do with y
that of ordinary waking consciousness. It is a figure who, as in Blake’s lyric ‘To 
Spring’, is a youth with ‘dewy locks’ who is also spring and morning as well as the 
‘pearls’ he scatters upon the ‘love-sick land’ mourning for him. ‘Much of my critical 
thinking,’ Frye explains, ‘has turned on the double meaning of Aristotle’s term 
anagnorisis, which can mean “discovery” or “recognition,” depending whether the 
emphasis falls on the newness of the appearance or on its reappearance’ (WWP, p. 
xxiii). Frye describes the regaining of identity most powerfully when discussing 
Milton. ‘The recovery of identity’ he states, ‘is not the feeling that I am myself and 
not another, but the realization that there is only one man, one mind, and one world, 
and that all the walls of partition have been broken down forever’ {RE, p. 143). (Once 
again Frye derives his turn of phrase from Scripture: ‘For he is our peace, who hath 
made both one, and hath broken down the middle wall of partition between us’
{Ephesians 2. \A).) %
Ïii) Meaning
Similarly, the meaning of literature is not simply a pattern of purely ‘literary’ imagery, 
which is free of engagement with human society. In The Educated Imagination Frye 
hits upon the charming idea of consigning his reader to a shipwrecked life on an 
uninhabited island in the South Seas. In this situation one takes a long look at the 
world around oneself, ‘a world of sky and sea and earth and stars and trees and hills’:
: ’ VYou see this world as objective, as something set over against you and 4
not yourself or related to you in any way. [...] It’s full o f animals and 
plants and insects going on with their own business, but there’s 
nothing that responds to you; it has no morals and no intelligence, or at
■4*
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least none that you can grasp. It may have a shape and a meaning, but 
it doesn’t seem to be a human shape or a human meaning.
(Æ:/, pp. 2-3)
Faced with an alien environment, one would go to work to begin the slow 
transformation of this world into a human one:
The world you want to live in is a human world, not an objective one: 
it’s not an environment but a home; it’s not the world you see but the 
world you build out o f what you see. You go to work to build a shelter 
or plant a garden, and as soon as you start to work you’ve moved into 
a different level o f human life.
(Æ:/, p. 4)
This is life on the level of practical skill. Of course animals also go to work on the 
natural environment. ‘In this island’ Frye quips, ‘probably, and certainly if you were 
alone, you’d have the ranking of a second-rate animal’ {El, p. 5). What distinguishes 
man, Frye argues, is a third level of the mind, ‘a vision or model in your mind of what 
you want to construct’ (ibid.). Man is characterised by the desire ‘to bring a social 
foim into existence’; in contrast to animals ‘man knows he has [a social human 
foim]’ and habitually makes the comparison between ‘what he does with what he can 
imagine being done’ (ibid.). This third level is identical with the imagination, and to 
Frye it is ultimately connected to apocalyptic thinking.
What Frye is introducing is the conception of civilisation, and he associates 
civilisation with desire. In his view ‘desire’ drives civilisation. The following passage.
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marked by Blake-inspired poetics rather than the Aristotelian doctrine of mimesis, is a 
key declaration of Frye’s world-view:
Civilization is not merely imitation of nature, but the process of 
making a total human form out of nature, and it is impelled by the 
force that we have just called desire. The desire for food and shelter is
not content with roots and caves: it produces the human form of nature j
that we call farming and architecture. Desire is thus not a simple 
response to need, for an animal may need food without planting a 
garden to get it, nor is it a simple response to want, or desire ybr
;
something particular. It is neither limited to nor satisfied by objects, 
but it is the energy that leads human society to develop its own form.
(AC, pp. 105-6)
For Frye literature, more specifically poetry, provides all models for genuine human 
work. ‘The efficient cause of civilization is work,’ he states, ‘and poetry in its social 
aspect has the function of expressing, as a verbal hypothesis, a vision of the goal of I
work and the fonns of desire’ (AC, p. 106).
Literature also provides mankind with a corresponding order which represents a 
projection of fear rather than desire. As Frye says, ‘there is a moral dialectic in desire’ 
(ibid.):
The conception o f a garden develops the conception “weed,” and 
building a sheepfold makes the wolf a greater enemy. Poetry in its 
social or archetypal aspect, therefore, not only hies to illushate the 
fulfilment o f  desire, but to define the obstacles to it.
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(ibid.)
‘Literature’ Frye explains, ‘not only leads us toward the regaining of identity, but it 
also separates this state from its opposite, the world we don’t like and want to get 
away from’ {El, p. 6). But this second world is not simply the natural environment 
facing the reader on his far flung island. Literature deals with extreme worlds:
Sometimes, as in the happy endings of comedies, or in the ideal worlds 
of romances, we seem to be looking at a pleasanter world than we 
ordinarily know. Sometimes, as in hagedy and satire, we seem to be 
looking at a world more devoted to suffering or absurdity than we 
ordinarily know.
{El, p. 40)
We have seen that Frye thinks in terms of a lower order of cyclical nature and a higher 
order. Clearly, such a two level cosmos is suggestive of human desire, the symbols of 
the higher order being manifestations of desire. In addition to this, literature provides 
us with a vision of a world of fulfilled desire. In the apocalyptic world we have the 
categories of reality ‘in the forms of human desire’ {AC,-p. 141), ‘The city, the 
garden, and the sheep fold’ (ibid.). In the demonic world the same forms reappear in 
an ironic context: corresponding to the city, garden and sheepfold we have ‘deserts, 
rocks and wastelands’ {AC, p. 150), the sinister forest {AC, p. 149), and monsters 
and beasts of prey’ (ibid.).
The nature of the apocalyptic world is of course stranger and more wonderful, than 
that of the world of common experience. What Frye says in the context of Blake about
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the world of desire undoubtedly holds for literature. Once again, in fallen experience
I'one man is one man and not all men; animals are themselves and not a single
?■sheepfold; and buildings are separate and distinct and not One Temple. Moreover, we ÿ
do not habitually identify one category of reality with another. To say that the bread 
and wine of harvest and vintage are the body and blood of One Lamb, is similarly 
untrue. But if the distinction between singular and plural is characteristic of the |
ordinary world, in the world of desire, the distinction breaks down, and the society of 
gods is One God, the society of men One Man, the sheepfold, One Lamb, the garden 
or park One Tree, and the city One Building, Temple or Stone. And though the 
ordinary world is hierarchical, in the world that is shaped by human desire the great 
chain of being is dispensed with, and all categories of reality, the divine, human,
'?animal vegetable and mineral, are equal and identical, so that ‘the essential human 
fonns of the vegetable world, food and drink, the harvest and the vintage, the bread 
and the wine, are the body and blood of the Lamb who is also Man and God, and in 
whose body we exist as in city or temple’ {AC, p. 143). The demonic imagery we 
already looked at represents this world of fearful foims. The imagery we initially 
viewed as literary, we now recognise as powerful ethical instruments. Just as the 
apocalyptic images indicate an order of desire, demonic imagery is much more than a
Literature as a whole in Fi*ye’s view deals with worlds in which there is no change, 
worlds beyond innocence and experience. These are the apocalyptic and demonic 
worlds, corresponding to Eden and Ulro respectively. Metaphorically, these worlds 
are ‘up’ and ‘down’. ‘In literature,’ Frye states, ‘we always seem to be looking up or 
down. It’s the vertical perspective that’s important, not the horizontal one that looks 
out to life’ {El, p. 40). The images of literature are not simply literary, figures from 
which we derive aesthetic pleasure. The authority of literature is entirely a matter of 
its capacity to reveal heaven and hell, the world we want to live in and the work we 
want to escape from:
set of literary images: they are the very forms of human fear.
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Literature as a whole is not an aggregate of exliibits with red and blue 
ribbons attached to them, like a cat-show, but the range of the 
articulate imagination as it extends from the height of imaginative 
heaven to the depth o f nnaginative hell. Literature is a human 
apocalypse, man’s revelation to man [...].
{El, p. 44)
For Frye literature shows us that man stands between a better world and much worse 
one, the former world above him, the latter below him. ‘In this perspective what I like 
or don’t like disappears,’ Frye states, ‘because there’s nothing left of me as a separate 
person: as a reader of literature I exist only as a representative of humanity as a 
whole’ {El, p. 42). But the ideal response to literature is not idolatry; the reader of 
literature does not live a life of enlightened quietism. Literature provides us with ‘a 
vision of the goal of work’ and what is supposed to follow vision is an effort to realise 
that goal through work.
In the previous section we saw that literatm*e is pure form or structure. At the end of 
our second discussion literature is still pure form, but it is no longer pure aesthetic 
object; it is at once an aesthetic creation and an artefact with a possible social 
function.
Conclusion
For Frye literature is self-sufficient. Rather than offering socially concerned 
commentary, it presents an independent vision of the progress of ‘a figure who is 
partly the sun, partly vegetative fertility and partly a god or archetypal human being’
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{FI, pp. 15-6), as well as the visions of the apocalyptic and demonic worlds above 
and below this figure’s level of action. At the same time, literature, like Blake’s 
poetry, possesses an important social function. Rather than being an ‘autonomous 
verbal structure’ {AC, p. 74), literature is from this point of view a work-inspiring 
vision, a mythical account of the possible deliverance of mankind from bondage. i
Frye’s theory of literature, we could say, is profoundly dialectical, encapsulating
radically opposed ideas about the nature of literature. The opposing tendencies in 
question are highly political, and, like his Blake criticism, Frye’s literary theory is
Like Blake’s poetry, the whole of literature is a source of authority in society, and for 
Frye this authority, like that of Blake’s poetry, was a real power in society in his life­
time. Once again, however, literature is one element within a yet greater authority, 
that authority being the university.
both radical and conservative at once.
I
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Chapter 4: Frye’s Theory of Education and Work
Frye’s theory of education begins with the humanist conception of education, which 
can be seen as a focus for diverse figures. Overlooking the considerable differences 
between Arnold and Newman, he associates this line of thinking with them, referring 
to both as ‘liberals’. Though T. S. Eliot is better characterised as a social 
conseiwative, he espouses much the same view of education and within this context 
Eliot can be spoken of in the same breath as Arnold and Newman (NFWE, p. 269). 
Introducing the humanist conception of education, Frye discusses the distinction 
between labour and leisure with reference to Plato, though he is prepared to read the 
story of Adam and Eve in terms of the opposition, too. ‘Plato divides knowledge into 
two levels:’ he obseiwes, ‘an upper level of theoretical knowledge [...], which unites 
itself to peiinanent foims or ideas, and a lower level of practical knowledge, whose 
function is to embody these fonns or ideas on the level of physical life’ (NFWE, p. 
265), hi Frye’s view the humanist conception of education, developed in the 
Renaissance period, ‘envisaged a roughly Platonic society on two levels’ (NFWE, pp. 
267-8), the upper level of which is labour free:
On the lower level were the producers and artisans, the workers and 
tradesmen, and those who were concerned with the practical and 
technical arts. On the upper level was an aristocracy or leisure class, 
freed from the necessity of contributing to social production.
(NFWE, p. 268)
For humanists, education is the process whereby the ruling class are trained in the arts 
of leadership:
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The function of education, on this higher social level, was to transform 
a leisure class into a responsible ruling class, trained in the arts of 
peace, the knowledge of Plato’s guards and o f his philosopher-king.
(ibid.)
IFrye contrasts this theory of education with late nineteenth century left-wing 
conceptions of society which challenged this humanist view of education. The new 
conception of society ’regarded the relation of the upper to the lower level of society
!as essentially predatory and parasitic’ (NFWE, p. 268). ’In its fully developed form’
he explains ’society would be identical with productive society: it would consist
entirely of workers and producers’ (ibid.). Frye associates this shift in thinking with :l
Carlyle, Ruskin, and especially William Morris, who provides us with the most vivid
picture of the desirable society where liberal education is demoted:
:In Morris’s ideal world of the future, everybody is engaged in 
cultivating the minor arts of carving and drawing. They also do a 
certain amount of heavier work but the sense of reflection, of 
contemplation, of the whole speculative side of education, is quite 
deliberately minimised in Morris’s vision.
(NFWE, p. 501)
Those three thinlcers, however, are in Frye’s view not realistic about working 
conditions, the nature of what labour produces and the larger political significance of 
hard work. Carlyle might almost seem to be guilty of idealising work, though 
‘drudgery, that is, servile, exploited, and alienated work, is not what he means by 
work’ (MM, p. 327). Ruskin, similarly, adopts a highly critical view of work while
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identifying it as the most important value in life. Machine production makes man in 
its image, turning men into machines. ‘Such pseudowork’ explains Frye ‘illustrates 
two interrelated social facts: that the process of mechanizing human labour is a form 
of penal servitude, and that its product is therefore both ugly and unnecessary’ (MM, 
p. 328). hi Frye’s view ‘Morris took over Ruskin’s method and reversed it’ (ibid.):
He began with purely aesthetic judgments about the hideousness of 
most Victorian industrial products, and in attempting to replace at least 
some of them with better-designed work he saw increasingly the 
social, then the moral, and finally the political significance of what he 
was doing.
(ibid.)
Frye is interested in moving beyond the humanist and nineteenth-century proto- 
socialist positions while preserving something of both of them. He articulates an 
integrated theory of education and work which goes beyond these two opposed points 
of view. The notion that education is the process whereby the ruling class are trained 
in the arts of leadership is clearly a broadly conservative one. Morris’s vision of the 
perfect society is equally clearly a radical vision of the just society. Conservatives 
have a theory of education; radicals have a theory of work. Once again, Frye’s 
combination of dialectically opposed theories points to a highly individual theory 
which is liberal or both conservative and radical at once.
The Unity of Education and Work
When discussing the experience of education, Frye felicitously juxtaposes the images 
of the Lord’s Day and Jesus’ Lenten sojourn in the wilderness. The Christian calendar
80
begins with a day of leisure, and Frye sees an analogy between the Lord’s Day and the 
experience of being a university student and postponing one’s taking on the extra­
university responsibilities of life. A parallel with Lent also suggests itself. Frye 
compares Jesus’ withdrawal into the wilderness with a period of study. For Frye 
education is genuine leisure, but The elements of temptation and distraction are 
always there’ (NFR, p. 369). But what does a university education do for the 
individual and society?
The university is composed of two parts, humanities and sciences (NFWE, p. 81), and 
during different historical periods the fortunes of the two aspects of the university 
vaiy; in one period we see the ascendancy of science, in another the ascendancy of the 
humanities {NFWE, pp. 51-2). Mathematics represents the centre of the natural 
sciences and English literature and language - owing to a considerable extent to the 
visionary power of literature we considered in Chapter 3 - the centre of the humanities 
{NFWE, p. 72). According to Frye, ‘science is primarily the study of the order of 
nature, the world that is there’; and ‘the form of the world man wants to live in is 
revealed by the world he keeps trying to build, the world of cities and gardens and 
libraries and highways that is a world of art’ {NFWE, p. 274). However, we have to 
be careful with the inference we draw from this. Education is concerned with ‘the 
world man lives in and the world he wants to live in’, but ‘It would [...] be nonsense 
to say that the former was the business of the sciences and the latter the business of 
the humanities and arts’ (ibid.). hi Frye’s view ordinary society is characterised by 
two ‘vices’: indifference and anxiety. Indifference is ‘the feeling that one’s immediate 
concern is separable from the total human concern -  that man can be an island entire 
of himself {NFWE, p. 276). Anxiety is bound up with aggressive social mythologies. 
If charges of monolithic structuring are sometimes brought against Frye, his rejection 
of such thinking is unequivocal. ‘We have anxiety’ states Frye, attacking mono-myth 
making, ‘when a society seizes on one myth and attempts to pound the whole of 
knowledge and truth into a structure conforming to if  {NFWE, p. 277). The best way
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of understanding education is to focus on the fact that education promulgates 
answering virtues which are intellectual virtues. Science promulgates the virtue of 
detachment, ‘the objective consideration of evidence, the drawing of rational 
conclusions from evidence, the rejection of all devices for cooking or manipulating 
the evidence’ {NFWE, p. 276). The arts encourage concern, the negation of anxiety, 
involving human factors not relevant to science: ‘emotion, value, aesthetic standards, 
the portrayal of objects of desire and hope and dream as realities, the explicit 
preference of life to death, of growth to petrification, of freedom to enslavement’ 
{NFWE, pp. 274-5). The problems stem once more from dichotomy instead of than 
unity and dialectic: indifference is clearly, detachment without concern, and anxiety is 
concern without detachment. Detachment is therefore concerned detachment, concern 
detached concern.
It is, however, what the arts and sciences form together that is most important. A 
university education, in Frye’s view, represents the culmination of a three stage 
process, where each stage involves ‘a conservative and a radical aspect’ {NFWE, p. 
145), and ‘the imagination’ is a ‘third faculty’. In the initial stage of education ‘the 
consolidating or conservative power is memory’ (ibid.), and the corresponding radical 
element something called ‘sense’, Frye’s term for ‘the power of apprehending what is 
presented to us by experience, the recognition of things as they are’ {NFWE, p. 145). 
The imagination is a third faculty involved in the education process, but at this early 
stage it operates on the level of ‘fancy’, defined by Frye as ‘a stylizing and modifying 
of the conditions of the child’s life, a kind of primitive realism’ (ibid.). Memory is 
concerned with content; sense with structure. In Frye’s view ‘the natural shape of 
elementary education is deductive in shape’ {NFWE, p. 146). As significant patterns 
emerge out of facts, the student begins to exercise his ‘sense’. The radical and 
conservative dimensions of education are ‘more conceptual’ {NFWE, p. 152) in the 
secondary phase of education. In this phase education circles ai'ound the nature of 
symbolism: ‘In the secondary phase the radical side of the mind wants to know what
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good or what use an idea or institution is, whether we could get along without it, what 
it has to say for itself even if it is generally accepted. The conseiwative side wants to 
loiow why the idea or institution exists, why it has been accepted if wrong, what 
significance is in the fact that it has existed’ {NFWE, p. 153). The purpose of this 
phase of education is political: ‘the formation of a critical intelligence, the 
intelligence of a responsible citizen in a complex democracy’ {NFWE, p. 153). In this 
phase Frye’s sympathy lies with the conservative side of education for he associates it 
with the suspension of disbelief and the radical one with Philistinism. This phase sees 
a growing sympathy between the imagination and the conservative aspect of learning, 
for the reason that the radical dimension becomes militant and can be anti- 
imaginative. Now the radical aspect is fascinated by the present, whereas the 
conservative side finds the present thoroughly inadequate. The imagination is 
maturing in certain respects during this phase: ‘The imagination is no longer fanciful, 
and it is not yet a fully constructive power, but moves freely among the monuments of 
its own magnificence. It is bound intellectually to tradition, and emotionally to 
nostalgia’ {NFWE, p. 153).
Before turning to Frye’s theoretical account of tertiary education, we might stand back 
from his theoretical work and consider the social context of his thinking on education. 
Frye produces an unflattering picture of the twentieth centuiy university, every bit as 
pessimistic as the late Allan Bloom’s The Closing o f the American Mind. Frye’s 
starting point is the development of universal education. The education system had 
been anti-democratic in that it had sought to keep class distinctions on a permanent 
basis. Universal education, then, was a profoundly democratic cause, ‘For once in his 
long, stupid, muddled history,’ Frye argues in a pessimistic tone, ‘man could be 
reasonably sure that in adopting universal education he was heading in the right 
direction’ {NFWE, p. 318). However, in Frye's view the development of universal 
education resulted in some unforeseen changes in society. Universal education came 
with the notion that ‘there ought to be a period of life, between puberty and voting
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age, in which young people should be, to some extent, segregated from what’s going 
on’ {NFWE, p. 408). For Frye, the conception of the ‘adolescent’ was a construct 
dreamed up by society in a spirit of benevolence, but the end result of it was 
‘benevolent segregation’ (ibid.). Furthermore the notion of the adolescent was not 
simply a mind-set. In Frye's view this protective instinct also led to changes in the 
education system in the United States, essentially a ‘dumbing-down’ process. In the 
1920’s and 30’s, he argues, ‘optimism combined with the lazy good-natured anti- 
intellectualism of American life to produce a kind of education that prolonged the 
play period and postponed all serious study as long as possible’ {NFWE, p. 319). 
Citing Robert Hutchins, Frye comments that a good deal of American university 
education was a ‘vast playpen designed to keep young people off the labour market’ 
(ibid.). According to Frye, his generation had created a ‘social proletariat’, ‘a group of 
people excluded from the benefits of society to which their efforts entitle them’ 
{NFWE, p. 329), analogous to that of women in the nineteenth century. A social 
policy oriented towards the weakening of the class structure served to develop a new 
kind of social stratification
In Frye’s view it was this process of segregation which led to student protest in the 
late sixties in North America, hi Frye’s view the 1957 Sputnik led Americans to the 
conclusion that education in the United States had to be improved if the Cold War 
was to be won. The new recognition of the importance of education in the United 
States on the part of the political establishment led students to conclude that their 
presence in society was of the greatest importance, that they ‘were participating fully 
in society by being students’ {NFWE, p. 320), and that consequently should not be 
treated like children and segregated. Unlike those associated with the New Left, Frye 
did not support the aims of the Students for a Democratic Society or the form the 
protest took. But he did sympathise with the situation of the students, Frye admitted 
that teachers and an entire older generation had consigned students to a life bereft of a 
social function.
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is the total body of human achievement in the arts and in the sciences.
The arts are perhaps more concerned with what humanity has done, the 
sciences perhaps more concerned with what it is about to do, but the 
two together form the pennanent model of civilisation which our 
present society approximates. This model is our cultural environment, 
as distinct from our social environment. The educated man is the man 




Frye’s writings, then, provide us with an uncompromising account of the state of the 
twentieth century North American university. However, in his writings on education 
his focus is not on the state of institutions. ‘My own view of an ideal system of 
education is a Utopian one’ he states in ‘Education and the Rejection of Reality’ 
{NFWE, p. 426) and in ‘The Developing Imagination’ he emphasises that the tertiary 
phase of education is ‘more of an ideal than a fact’ {NFWE, p. 158). In this phase the 
conservative impulse is the student’s awareness of society, ‘the knowledge of its 
institutions, conventions, and attitudes’ (ibid.). ‘Over against this,’ writes Frye, ‘in the 
ideally educated mind, is the awareness that the middle-class mid-twentieth North 
American society we are living in is not the real form of human society, but the 
transient appearance of that society’ (ibid.). The radical aspect, then, is concerned 
with a world of desire. For Frye the world of ordinary perception is largely an illusion. 
‘For one thing,’ he argues, ‘it changes very rapidly [...]. If Canada in 1962 is a 
different society from the Canada of 1942, it can’t be the real society, but only a 
temporaiy appearance of real society’ {El, p, 66). ‘The real society’ he goes on 'I
85
Frye’s argument is suggestive of a secular version of the Golden Rule. Just as the 
Golden Rule asks the individual to act in accordance with an ideal rather than the 
social norm, so a university education sets up a high standard for the working 
individual. In the final phase of education ‘the imagination moves over to the 
exploring or radical side of the mind, and comes into its own’ {NFWE, p. 158):
It is now a fully developed constructive power: it is what Whitehead 
calls the habitual vision of greatness, and its activity in the world 
around it is to realize whatever it can o f that vision. It operates in 
society in much the same way, working from conception to realization, 
that the artist works on his art, which is what Blake meant by saying 
that the poetic genius of man is the real man.
(ibid.)
For Frye the conceptions of our social environment and cultural environment descend 
from the figures of the prince and courtier, as they appear in Castiglione’s II 
Cortegiano, as well as the principles they represent, the principle of will, on the one 
hand, and the principle of ‘grace’ or love on the other. ‘Each of us [...] has a prince 
and a courtier within himself {MM, p. 321); or better, education generates an 
individual thus composed.
What education furnishes the individual and society with might be deseribed as higher 
intelligence and senses. It is conventional, Frye argues, to think of education in 
society in connection with the human body, but if it was once possible to associate a 
leisure class in society with ‘the brain, with its eyes and ears’, a favourite conceit of 
humanists, that analogy no longer applies. Rather, we should associate the social 
mental power with ‘the infonning vision of action’, a key principle of Frye’s:
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What really occupies the place of the brain, the seat of judgment, the 
ultimate source of authority, is a kind of informing vision above 
action. For example, a social worker trying to work in Toronto 
obviously has all his or her activity motivated by an inner vision of a 
healthier, cleaner, less neurotic, and less prejudiced Toronto than the 
one which he or she is actually working in. Without that vision, the 
whole point of work being done would be lost; hence it is in the 
infoiming vision o f action that the real source of authority in education 
is to be found.
{NFWE, p. 502)
For Frye education creates in society a group whose role it is to work, though they do 
not constitute a working class in the standard sense. What distinguishes this group 
from an ordinary working class is that their work is redeemed by vision. Frye takes a 
low view of work divorced from leisure: work bereft of an educated imagination is 
drudgery. ‘The more alienating and less creative it becomes,’ he explains, ‘the more 
completely it becomes an observance of time, a clock-punching and clock-watching 
servitude’ {NFR, p. 46). But vision transforms work into a more creative enterprise. i
Now our endeavours represent a part of an attempt to bring the ideal society we can 
see into existence.
The university goes to work in society thmugh those who have been taught its vision 
of society, and Frye often provides us with an illuminating description them. In 
‘Convocation Address, University of British Columbia’ Frye speaks of the ‘real elite’.
Though we are still in the secular realm, this group is suggestive of the 
Protestantism’s Invisible Church: they are ‘an invisible group, and nobody but God
knows who they are’ {NFWE, p. 181). Mainly, they do not hold positions of 
conventional power. He offers an affectionate, lightly humorous portrait of this group:
They include the quiet self-effacing people who are busy teaching 
school or fixing teeth or saving money to send their own children to 
university, who sit through endless dull committees and board 
meetings because it’s a public service to do so: in short, the people 
who devote as much of their lives as possible to keeping up the 
standard of culture and civilization, both for themselves and their 
communities.
(ibid.)
Like Newman before him, Frye finds it impossible to keep religious questions out of 
his meditations on secular concerns and education especially. Speaking of ‘St. Paul’s 
exemplar of the Christian in his external relations’, Newman argues that ‘the school 
of the world seems to send out living copies of this typical excellence with greater 
success than the Church. At this day the “gentleman” is the creation, not of 
Christianity, but of civilization’.^  ^Just as Newman came to the conclusion that formal 
education rather than the church proved capable of encouraging the development of 
aspects of Christian sensibility, so Frye, an equally religious thinker, concludes that a 
secular community reproduces many of the characteristics of the ideal Christian one.
For Fiye the standard of society descends from the presence of this elite. This is true 
for all periods. In one occasional piece from 1960 Frye speaks about the need for 
society to educate its citizens:
John Hemy Newman, The Idea o f a University (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 142.
You can imagine how dangerous it would be to have in a complex 
society like ours any large group o f highly intelligent people who 
could not read or write. Whatever else they may be, they would 
certainly be political dynamite. And by the year 2000 I venture to say 
that it will be equally dangerous to have any large group in society 
who are not educated up to the limit o f their capacities.
{NFWE, p. 104)
On occasions Frye speaks of the possibility of this minority growing to a majority. 
‘Society depends heavily for its well-being on a handful of people who are 
imaginative [...]. If the number became a majority,’ he goes on, ‘we should be living 
in a very different world, for it would be a world that we should then have the vision 
and the power to construct’ {NFWE, p. 159).
We must be careful here, however, for the easy inference is that this elite ensures a 
steady march to a better society, but this is not what Frye has in mind. What is crucial 
is that there is a group of people in society who act in the light of vision. The value of 
their efforts does not depend on results; acting in the light of vision is an end in itself. 
Frye is deeply sceptical about our attempts to judge the value of our own lives, and 
significantly the clearest articulation of such considerations is in his religious 
occasional writings, such as a Baccalaureate sermon firom 1967:
If you look forward to the future, with the expectation of identifying 
your lives with a definite body of work achieved, you are doomed to 
the bitterest disappointment. The future is too slippery to rely on: other 
things over wliich you have no control frustrate your intentions and 
twist everything you do into unrecognizable shapes. The morrow takes 
thought for the things of itself. [...]
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What you get from your college education, ultimately, is something 
that cannot be directly taught. It is really a vision of society, a vision 
derived fr om the best that humanity has done: die concepts of 
philosophy, the imagination of the aits, the accuracy and the 
discoveries of the sciences. This vision is not knowledge itself, but 
practical wisdom, which you take with you into society, which you 
apply as a criterion to society, and which is the source of your 
expertise and special abilities. This means that what is important about 
your life is not that you should achieve something, but that you should 
manifest something. For example, a social worker does her work with 
a vision, in her mind, of a more just and equitable Toronto than the 
Toronto she is working in. She does not feed herself on the delusion 
that her efforts will bring this better Toronto into existence in the 
future. But the light o f vision that shines through what she does, and it 
is that light, not the consequences of what she does, that makes her 
work effective.
(NFR, pp. 285-6)
The radical attitude to education, like the humanist one, is based on the idea that 
leisure and work belong to different classes. For humanists, leisure is the preserve of 
the dominant class; work that of the working class. For radicals work would be the 
proper activity for a class which ideally would include every member of society, 
which to Frye’s mind would be a parody of the apocalyptic society where all are 
members of one body; leisure consists of the pursuits of a decadent class that should 
be squeezed out of society as quickly as possible. In Frye’s view this association of 
work and leisure with different classes is outdated:
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Today, the machinery of production appears to be steadily declining in 
the proportion of time and attention this requires. I am not speaking of 
automation, which is not a cause but an effect o f this process: I mean 
simply that the proportion of work to leisure which according to the 
Book of Genesis was established by God himself on a ratio of six to 
one is rapidly changing in the direction of one to one. [...] We appear, 
then, to be entering a period in which work and leisure are not 
embodied in different classes, but should be thought of as two aspects, 
nearly equal in importance, of the same life.
(NFWE, p. 271)
For Frye education in a working society creates neither a working class nor a leisure 
class. It creates a group or class that works in the light of vision, whose labours could 
be summed up in the phrase visionful work. If we had to label this group, we would 
have to class it an ‘imaginative class’. Frye believes in maximising both work and 
leisure in society so that everybody acquires as much of both as possible. Work 
should be a part of one’s younger years. He speaks approvingly of students who ’pick 
up various interests which involve them in the community around them’ (NFWE, p. 
427). At the same time, he wants adults to constantly return to university. ‘I should 
like to see’ he states ’all educational institutions open for people to return to as 
frequently as possible in adult life’ (ibid.).
At times Frye speaks as if a worker could acquire a vision of society without having 
been exposed to university education:
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Every person with any function in society at all will have some kind of 
ideal vision o f that society in the light of which he operates. One can 
hardly imagine a social worker going out to do case work witliout 
thinking of her as having, somewhere in her mind, a vision of a better, 
cleaner, healthier, more emotionally balanced city, as a kind of model 
inspiring the work she does. One can hardly imagine any professional 
person not having such a social model -  a world of health for the |
doctor or o f justice for the judge -  nor would such a social vision be 
confined to the professions.
{NFWE, p. 175)
I suggest that the simplest way to characterize that informing vision of
{NFWE, p. 175)
The social group pictured by Frye illustrates the tliree ideals of the French revolution, 
or more generally, the theory of the Left: equality, liberty and fraternity. For Frye 
equality is the The conviction that a social function is essential to every human
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;
ÎOf course, were he to take this line of argumentation too far, he would end up with 
nothing more than a radical view of society: work is all society needs. For this reason 
Frye almost always insists on the connection between social vision and formal 
education:
society is to identify it with the university itself, with that total body o f I
the arts and sciences which, in their totality, are the real foim of 
society and into which the student is initiated.
A
Conclusion
111 Frye’s view leisure is a crucially important aspect of society. For him, leisure is not 
dandyism or idleness but the cultivation of a vision of the real society which is the 
goal of work. At the same time, work is a meaningful activity and not a burden best 
left to lower orders. Work is not drudgery but a manifestation of the vision of leisure 
possessed by the educated citizen or worker with a social function. Frye’s attitude to 
education and work, then, like his attitude to literature, represents dialectical thinking.
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being’s life, and that to deprive any individual of a social function is a kind of 
murder’ (NFMC, p. 278). Freedom is The power to do what one has learned to do’
(NFMC, p. 280); what Frye has in mind is not freedom from external compulsion but 
the internal compulsion which results from practice and leads to the state where the 
dancer cannot be distinguished from the dance. And The genuine fraternity, the 
genuine social group, is a group united by some kind of common knowledge or skill’ Ï
(ibid.). Frye argues that the three revolutionary ideals are the creations of different }. s: :social classes: laissez-faire capitalism emphasises liberty, State Socialism stressed 
equality, and Fiye is prepared to connect fraternity with the aristocracy {MM, p. 333).
For him, the imaginative class embodies the values of all social classes. Because its 
members are possessed of a vision of society, they are free. Because they work, their 
vision informing that work, they are equal. And because the vision in question is a 
shared vision, their society is fraternal.
Within this secular context, Frye goes on to make great claims for the fraternity. 
Education and leisure are synonymous with each other in Frye’s criticism, and Frye’s 
conclusion is that fraternity stands out as especially significant within the context of 
leisure. ‘Fraternity’ he says ‘is perhaps the ideal that the leisure structure has to 
contribute to society’ {NFMC, p. 58).
1
A;
And like those other areas of thought, his theory of leisure and work is both 
conservative and radical at once.
Taking a step back from Frye’s career, our consideration of Frye’s secular thinldng 
has brought us as planned to the three ideals of the French revolution. Were Fiye’s 
trajectoiy to stop here, what I have said would be highly paradoxical in nature: Frye 
moves beyond Left and Right, yet the terminus ad quem of this thinking is the ideals 
of the French revolution. As we shall see in Chapter 7, however, Frye completes his 
dialectical thinldng by turning to the Clrristian Bible. With this shift in focus he 
completes his move beyond the two sides of the political divide by complementing his 
dialectical views of each of his individual concerns with an overarching dialectical 
manoeuvre.
To return to education, as we shall see in the next chapter Fiye thinks of education as 
an authority strong enough to make a dramatic effect on history at this time, 
specifically within the context of the Cold War.
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James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution (London; Wyman & Sons, 1942).
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Chapter 5: Beyond Left and Right; Frye’s Politics
Like George Orwell’s, Frye’s political sensibility was deeply influenced by the work 
of James B u rnham .^®  Although Frye rarely acknowledges it in his writing, his 
argument boiTows from and criticises Burnham’s The Managerial Revolution.
Published in 1941, Burnham’s study argues that an entirely new political ideology,
" I t
managerialism, is on the march, and that laissez-faire is slowly disappearing from the i
3:world. Fascism and Communism are both examples of the new phenomenon.
Crucially, he believes that the U.S. is not untouched by its development. New |
»Dealism, while being superior to German Fascism and Russian Communism, is ' |
another example of managerialism, albeit a ‘primitive’ version. Burnham’s view is 
that it is of the utmost importance to reject this form of managerialism and re-embrace 
laissez-faire. Frye agrees with Burnham up to a point: Fascism and Communism 
represent two types of managerial revolution; but he differs from Bumlaam on the 
subject of New Dealism. For Burnham it is because laissez-faire has been abandoned , I
in favour of different types of ‘statism’ that the managerial revolution has been able to 
talce hold in the U.S. as well as Europe and elsewhere. But for Frye it is laissez-faire 
which causes managerial revolution; New Dealism and other similar movements 
represent a crucial struggle against managerialism. In ‘The Church: Its Relation to 
Society’ Frye refers to the ‘distortion of emphasis’ {NFR, p. 264) in The Managerial 
Revolution. Perhaps he read Orwell’s review of Burnham’s The Struggle for the 
World. In that review Orwell comments that for all the strengths of the argument of 
Burnham’s earlier book, ‘his picture of the world is always slightly distorted.’ What 
Orwell objected to was the Burnham’s fatalism. "The Managerial Revolution [...] 
seemed to me a good description of what is actually happening in various parts of the 
world, i.e. the growth of societies neither capitalist nor Socialist, and organised more 
or less on the lines of a caste system. But Burnham went on to argue that because tliis
was happening, nothing else could happen, and the new, tightly-knit totalitarian state 
must be stronger than the chaotic democracies.
Like Orwell, Fiye accepts Burnham’s idea that, despite occasional alterations to the 
pattern, the world consists of three powerful geopolitical entities - the United States, a 
European super-state and ‘East Asia’, hiitially Bumliam believed Germany would win 
the war and rule Europe and that Japan would take control of Asia. Russia would 
crack apart and its western part would become absorbed into Geimany’s Europe. Of 
course what actually happened was that Russia took control of the Eurasian heartland 
and China became the principal power in East Asia. But Burnham’s errors of 
judgment did not render his analysis obsolete. In ‘You and the Atom Bomb’ Orwell 
argues that, despite his mistakes, Burnham’s argument is full of insight:
When James Burnham wrote The Managerial Revolution it seemed to 
many Americans that the Germans would win the European end of the 
war, and it was therefore natural to assume that Germany and not 
Russia would dominate the Eur asian land mass, while Japan would 
remain master of East Asia. This was a miscalculation, but it does not 
affect the main argument. For Burnham’s geographical picture o f the 
new world has turned out to be conect. More and more obviously the 
surface of the earth is being parcelled off into three great empires, 
each self-contained and cut off from contact with the outer world, and 
each niled, under one guise or another, by a self-elected oligarchy. The 
haggling as to where the frontiers are to be drawn is still going on, and 
will continue for some years, and the third of the super-states - East 
Asia, dominated by China - is still potential rather than actual. But the
George Orwell, The Collected Essays and Journalism and Letters o f  George Orwell, Vol IV 'In 
Front o f Your Nose’ 1945-50, ed. by Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (London; Seeker & Warburg, 1968), 
p. 324. Further references are abbreviated to Orwell and are incorporated parenthetically within the 
text.
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general drift is unmistakable, and every scientific discovery of recent 
years has accelerated it.
{Orwell, pp. 8-9)
The Chinese domination of East Asia was only potential at this stage, and it was the 
United States and the Soviet Union, fighting for capitalism and democracy and 
Communism respectively, which confronted one another. In ‘The Church: Its Relation i
to Society,’ an essay written at the beginning of the Cold War, Frye provides us with a 
comprehensive account of the nature of laissez-faire and its relation to other 
ideologies. Taking on Max Weber, he argues that we should not think in terms of the 
compatibility of Protestantism and capitalism; rather, Protestantism seeks to 
extinguish laissez-faire. One of the great dangers in this cuiTent political world is that 
the status quo will remain unchallenged. (Frye possesses an outstanding capacity for 
moving at a level of historical generalization that simplifies but simplifies usably and 
even fruitfully, without lapsing into an ossifying or evaporating generality, something 
which is exemplified in the following quotation, and all the subsequent ones in this 
chapter):
The defences of laissez-faire offered today usually assume that the i j
political form o f it is democracy. This is nonsense: its political form is 
an oligarchic dictatorship. Every amelioration of labor conditions, 
every limitation of the power of monopolies, every effort to make the 
oligarchy responsible to the community as a whole, has been forced 
out o f laissez-faire by democracy, which has played a consistently 
revolutionary role against it. The Russians today interpret laissez-faire 
precisely as we do Communism, as a unified conspiracy to conquer the 
world emanating from a single nation, America having disposed of or
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absorbed all its rivals. We may feel tlrat this is considerably 
oversimplified for propaganda purposes, that democracy in America 
has the oligarchy too well in hand to peimit a repetition of the bid for 
power that produced Hitler. We may even feel that the Marxist ideal o f  
the withering away of the state is closer to realization in America, for 
all the forces working against it, tlian it will ever be under 
Communism in Russia. Nevertheless, the Russian case contains part 
of the truth, even if  it is the part that we prefer not to look at. The fear 
of the Russian people for America is a real fear with a real basis. It 
may however not be honestly shared by their rulers. It is good Mai'xist 
doctrine that despots are often inspired by the fear of then own 
subjects to make common cause with tyranny in other countries, and 
two anti-Russian Marxists may be cited as having raised the point. The 
essential identity of interest between the tendency to dictatorship in 
America and the achievement of it in Russia has been stated, though 
with some distortion of emphasis, in James Bumliam’s well known 
book. The Managerial Revolution.
{NFR, p. 265)
In addition to this, there is the danger of partial warfare and what that would lead to: 
Frye concludes his discussion of the dangers of managerialism with a nightmarish 
prospect, an image of the world desire rejects, partly inspired by Orwell’s 1984:
How such a revolution could make its power absolute and permanent 
by a not-too-letlial form of permanent war is shown with great clarity 
in George Orwell’s terrible satire 1984, perhaps the definitive 
contemporary vision o f hell.
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(NFR, pp. 264-5)
However, the principal danger is that the two powers will engage in hot war with one 
another. ‘In my student days’ Frye commented in ‘Repetitions of Jacob’s Dream’, 
‘given as an address at the National Gallery in Ottawa in connection with an 
exhibition entitled “Ladders to Heaven: Our Judeo-Christian Heritage’” (NFR, p. 91), 
‘it was generally accepted that socialism, whether of the type envisaged by Marx or by 
gradualists, represented a higher state of social evolution than capitalism, and that it 
was the duty of all right-thinking people to help in the general move to the next 
upward step. However,’ he continues ‘Communism established itself in largely pre­
industrial societies, and Communism and capitalism settled down to an adversary 
relationship ’ (NFR, p. 101). Danger stems from the fact that both sides are deep in 
denial about the reality of this confrontation:
One side says the world is divided between the democratic and the 
totalitarian state, and the other side says that it is divided between the 
socialist state and the tools of capitalist imperialism. We can get no 
further on this basis.
(NFMC, p. 275)
Their inability to see the failings of their own systems means that both systems look 
forward to the spread of their system of governance throughout the world, especially 
in the lands where the opposing system has taken hold. Thus the two become ‘foreign 
dangers’ and tlrreats to the indigenous way of life.
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Fiye views the gi'eat ideologies of the twentieth century as parodies of the Judeo- 
Chi’istian religions. He has in mind an elaborate framework of reference which ties in 
those ideologies with the major religions of the West:
From the religious point of view, Fascism in its pure form of German 
Nazism looks very like an atheistic parody of Judaism, preseiving its 
sense of ethnic pur ity and its expectancy of a temporal Messiah but 
throwing away its God. From the religious point o f view, Communism 
looks very like an atheistic parody of Roman Catholicism, preserving 
its sense of an inefutable and world-conquering dialectic and setting 
up at Moscow an imitation of its central infallible church, but again, 
throwing away its God. It is possible that laissez faire, the doctrine of 
the individual liberty o f the natm al man, is similarly a godless parody 
of Protestantism.
(NFMC, p. 239)
Looking forward in time in ‘The Church: Its Relation to Society’, Frye speculates on a 
‘third struggle’ which could ensue after the struggle between capitalism and 
Communism: ‘The possibility of a third struggle between managerial dictatorship and 
democracy, with Protestantism supplying the blind good will of the latter, looms up 
already in the background. Such a conflict, however ferocious, could hardly be a 
genocidal war or a war of excommunication, but would have to be primarily 
evangelical and prophetic’ (NFR, p. 266). But for the time being the focus is rightly 
on the Cold War. Frye had described the Second World War as a ‘hideous necessity’ : 
‘A human covenant of blood’ he states ‘leads to a war of blood’ (NFR, p. 266). The 
struggle with Communism is a very different case in that it need not lead to such a 
‘war of blood’; indeed the cold wai' can be brought to an end tlirough peaceful means. 
Nevertheless, the greatest danger facing the world is full-blown conflict between the
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democratic West and the Communist East, a ‘third world war’ (NFMC, p. 254). Frye, 
as we know, saw the new age as one in which ‘the effective nations are huge land 
masses extending over most of a continent’ {NFMC, p. 250), but weaponry was 
keeping up with the pace of other developments. ‘The development of long-range 
destructive weapons such as the atomic bomb’ he explains, ‘is designed to make 
warfare on a full continental scale a military possibility’ (NFMC, p. 250).
Toward the end of the first section of ‘Trends in Modem Culture’ Frye focuses on this 
prospect in a passage, which, in its incisive sketch of fundamental issues, and in the 
dryly colloquial conditional clause with which it ends, reminds us of Orwell’s 
writings:
If the struggle with Communism reaches the stage of a third world war, 
that war, like its predecessor, will have, to begin with, a right and a 
vaong side. The right side - ours - will derive its rightness, not from 
the value o f what it fights for, but Jhom the evil o f what it fights 
against. War only destr oys, and there is no good in war except in the 
destruction o f evil. At the end of a war there is no good ready to 
replace evil, but only a disorganized situation that a surviving power 
may be able to take some advantage of, if it is not too exhausted and 
has any idea what to do.
(NFMC, p. 254)
Frye is resolutely anti-war. His fundamental perception is that war is an enoimous 
exercise in bad faith. Nations’ real enemies are always aspects of their own societies. 
On one occasion he objectifies the enemies within, and, in contrast to the totalitarian 
bureaucracies which loom up in Orwell’s writings, Frye focuses on the mob and
101
demagogic politics, a focus which is suggestive of his specifically North American 
cultural context, with its recent history of McCarthyism, and legacy of Salem 
Puritanism and the original witch-hunts:
We have outside us nations with different political philosophies, and 
we think o f them as dangers, or even as enemies. But our more 
dangerous enemies, so far, are within. I spoke a moment ago o f the 
difference between a mob and a democratic society. Our effective 
enemies are not foreign propagandists, but the hucksters and hidden 
persuaders and segregators and censors and hysterical witch-hunters 
and all the rest of the black guard who can only live as parasites on a 
gullible and misinformed mob.
{NFMC, p. 133)
But what interests Frye is an even more insidious inimical force. Speaking on 
Remembrance Day on ll/^ November 1969, he reflects on the futility of war and the 
lies that it depends upon:
It is significant that our memorial service commemorates two wars, 
both fought against the same country. In all wars, including all 
revolutions, the enemy becomes an imaginary abstraction o f evil.
Some German who never heard of us becomes a “Hun”; some 
demonstrator who is really protesting against his mother becomes a 
“Communist”; some policeman with a wife and family to support 
becomes a “fascist pig.” We know that we are lying when we do this 
Idnd of thing, but we say it is tactically necessary and go on doing it.
But because it is lymg, it cannot create or accomplish anything, and so 
all wars, including revolutions, take us back to the square one of
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frustrated aggression in which they began. Cuba is Communist today. 
South Africa has apartheid today, Africa and Asia seethe with unrest 
today, because the Spanish-American war, tlie Boer war, and all the 
imperialistic wars fought two generations ago have to be fought over 
again.
(NFR, p. 398)
War is the result of our continually projecting our own ‘demons’ onto others. ‘This 
state of things will continue without change,’ he argues, ‘until we realise that our only 
real enemies are the legions of demons inside us’ {NFWE, p. 398). In his most 
revealing comment on this subject Frye identifies the nature of the real ‘enemy’. 
Marxism, he argues, conceives of alienation in terms of ‘the feeling of the worker 
who is cheated out of most of the fruit of his labour by exploitation’ {NFMC, p. 11). 
But in bourgeois societies ‘the conception of alienation’ becomes psychological 
{NFMC p. 12). What this means is that the conception returns to something more like 
its original Christian context: ‘In other words it becomes the devil again’ (ibid.). In 
the Marxist context ‘the alienated are those who have been dispossessed by their 
masters, and who therefore recognize their masters as their enemies’ {NFMC, p. 11), 
but in this new context ‘the master or tyrant is still an enemy, but not an enemy that 
anyone can fight’ {NFMC, p. 12). In short, the enemy is ‘our own death-wish, a 
cancer that gradually disintegrates the sense of community’ (ibid.).
If after a war the quality of human life improves, we must not attribute this to war. 
Rather it is the fruits of peace. In ‘The Present Condition of the World’ he speaks of 
‘the outburst of “post-war plamiing,” the promises made to labour, the teclmological 
Utopias and social secmity schemes’ {NFLS, p. 208). He continues:
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But these, if  they are to be of any use, must be regarded as rewards of 
peace, not war, A corrupt tree can only bring forth corrupt fruit, and 
the notion that some good can be salvaged from this evil and 
monstrous lioiror is, however, pathetic and wistful, a pernicious 
illusion. In temporal terms, peace is an economic system functioning:
Nazism stands for, we shall have cast out one of the most dangerous of devils: if it 
involves the acceptance of it, and it is still possible that it may, our last state will be 
monstrously worse than our first’ (NFLS, p. 217). Similarly, Frye was convinced that
i:.
war is the economic system breaking down. When we recover peace 
we shall recover the benefit of peace; but to regard them as benefits of 
war is at best a case of post hoc propter hoc. And that such benefits
"Iwill be “worth” the blood and misery and destruction of the war is 
nonsense, unless posterity are insanely cynical bookkeepers.
(ibid.) 1
i
In line with his anti-war stance, Frye was sceptical of the war effort at the time of the 
Second World War. He was ambivalent towards the war effort as late as spring 1943 
when he wrote the essay ‘The Present Condition of the World’. The essay is actually 
focused upon North America, and though it is unfinished, its occasion and theme 
might lead us to consider it to be a North American counterpart of Orwell’s wartime 
meditation on the United Kingdom, ‘England, Your England’. Like Orwell, Frye 
takes upon himself the task of defining his nation at a time of war, though he focuses 
on the United States rather than Canada. For Frye, the war represents a struggle 
against ‘an objectification of our own worst impulses’ (NFLS, p. 217), but it may not 
result in the defeat of those tendencies: ‘We stand before them like Ebenezer Scrooge 
at his own grave [...] What is confused and sporadic in us is logical and systematic in i




a third world war could never be justified. War has no power to resolve conflict; it 
simply exacerbates it;
There is at present a feeling, in which we hardly as yet dare to indulge 
ourselves, that another war is no more inevitable Üian any other evil 
produced by human fear. Some of us think of a struggle between 
democracy and Communism carried on at other levels. But if  the entire 
Communist world were annihilated tomorrow all our enemies would 
still be with us, in many respects stronger than ever.
{NFWE, p. 101)
Capitalism and Communism 
a) Freedom and Equality
We might begin with some textbook-type observations about capitalism and 
Communism. The capitalist system, we can say, prioritises, according to its 
supporters, freedom in society. It is easy to create freedom in society; all that it talces 
is for the government to leave people alone, for it is ‘the state’ that circumscribes 
individual liberty. For this reason ‘small government’ is always preferable to ‘big 
government’. This system does not stress equality in the way that it emphasises 
freedom, but attempts to reduce inequality are frequently made in capitalist societies. 
One could say that if and when it does so reduce inequality, capitalism pursues 
equality through freedom. Laissez faire is based on the assumption that if society is 
left well alone, individuals in society will use their freedom to quickly establish a 
‘temporal Utopia’ {NFMC, p. 239).
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The argumentation of the Left runs contrary to this. The freedom of laissez faire 
creates chaos in society. Unchecked, capitalism creates a vast dispossessed and 
alienated working class; at the other end of the social hierarchy it gives rise to
V''oligarchy. Society is thus characterised by the most egregious inequality. Moreover, 
the only people in society who stand a chance of enjoying freedom are those who by
-Ihook or by crook have managed to insinuate their way into the ranks of the oligarchy. IEquality, then, must be made a priority. By creating equality, by which we mean
' Iequality in terms of standard of living, or at least ironing out some of the most 
heinous manifestations of inequality, the right conditions for freedom in society can 
be created. And when we say society, we mean of course the state, which for a time 
must play a cmcial role in the workings of society if chaos is not to become total.
To begin with Frye’s attitude to Communism, there is no ‘Communism was not as 
bad as Fascism’ line of thinking in his framework of political ideas. William Morris 
may have been an example of ‘that very rare bird, a Marxist uncorrupted by 
Leninism’ {MM, p. 331), but Communism relies on a revolutionary proletariat led 
and directed by a unified, revolutionary party. This is viewed as a temporary 
necessity, but the fact remains that this creates in society a group every bit as powerful 
as a capitalist oligarchy. But in ‘Stalinist’ Communism power is further concentrated 
in an inspired leader. (Frye’s thinking is suggestive of the figure of Stalin rather than 
Lenin, or indeed the cabals -  latterly the collective gerontocracies -  that follow 
Stalin’s death.) Communism, like Fascism, involves a cult of personality. Despite 
their surface differences, these movements are in Frye's view merely two aspects of 
the same thing and equally contemptible. Communism, like Nazism, is a 
revolutionary movement which leads to ‘an act of will in a crisis’ {NFMC, p. 249). 
Such a critical act involves a complete suppression of enquiry. ‘In all critical acts,’ 
asserts Frye, ‘whether social or individual, there can be no division of attitude: the act 
implies that argument, objection, and doubt of the issue have ceased’ (ibid.). For this 
reason these types of revolutionary movement necessitate ‘heroic leadership’ (ibid.)
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which is ‘inspired and infallible’ (ibid.). While the ‘Nazi hero catches the historical 
moment’, ‘the Communist hero incarnates the dialectic of history’ (ibid.). For the 
democrat, however, ‘the essential identity of Fascism and Communism as cults of the 
divine leader or conquering Messiah is far more significant than these differences’ 
(ibid.).
At the same time the Marxist analysis of capitalism is largely accurate. Using the 
language of the illiberal James Burnham in a liberal and democratic context, Frye 
argues that laissez faire brings about ‘managerial revolution’. ‘Many Americans still 
believe,’ argues Frye, ‘that laissez faire is the economic aspect of democracy, but 
there is a growing realization that laissez faire by itself does not lead to democracy, 
but to oligarchy, and thence to managerial dictatorship’ (ibid.). Moreover, laissez faire 
is, paradoxically, conducive to Communism. In the following section Frye explains 
how both Fascism and Communism are latent forces within democratic societies:
Democracy attempts to contain its class conflict, and prevent 
separating tendencies - oligarchy and pressure-group organization - 
from making a breach of the social contt act. From the democratic 
point of view, Fascism is an oligarchic conspiracy against the open 
class system, deriving its real power from the big oligarchs, and its 
mass support from would-be oligarchs, the “independent” (i.e., 
unsuccessful) entrepreneurs. Communism is the corresponding 
conspiracy at the other end, addressing itself to those most likely to 




The same point is ciystallised in ‘Tenets of Modem Culture’. Laissez faire is potential 
Fascism and potential Communism:
The axioms and postulates of laissez-faire [...] are anti-Christian, and 
lead in the direction, not of democracy, but of managerial dictatorship.
Such a dictatorship may be established in either of two ways: (a) 
through the consolidation o f the power of the oligarchy (Fascism); (b) 
through the seizure of power by a revolutionary leadership established 
within the tiade unions (Communism).
{NFMC p. 238)
In ‘Trends in Modem Culture’, an essay which grew out of Frye’s work for the 
Culture Commission of the United Church and was published in 1952, Frye 
contemplates the possibility of America becoming Fascist or Communist, and 
concludes it is the former possibility which is the greater danger: Fascism is ‘a more 
immanent domestic threat’ {NFMC, p. 253). He goes on:
The unquestioned supremacy of civil over military power, and of 
public law over sealed orders, is o f course a vital organ of democracy, 
and its functioning is greatly hampered by the essential nuisances of 
war. Unfortunately the Marxist claim that capitalism can in the long 
run only function under wartime conditions has not yet been 
disproved. The rise, both in power and in popularity, of a militaiy 
autocracy and a secret police, and the standard features of wartime 
hysteria: purges, trials that are publicity stunts, and the use of frivolous 
political jockeying to protect the sin of bearing false witness - all these
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are signs of the possibility, however, remote of America’s becoming 
what the Soviet press asserts her to be now.
(ibid.)
To return to the conceptions of freedom and equality, fr om our present position in 
history, the notion that capitalism has the power to create a more egalitarian society is 
simply Sartrean bad faith or self-delusion , and, similarly, the hope that communism 
can create the conditions for freedom also goes against the record of historical 
experience. It seems that in pursuing freedom one automatically demotes equality, and 
that by making equality a priority one compromises fr'eedom:
A totalitarian society may perhaps be reminded that it can pursue 
equality to the point of forgetting about liberty. A society like ours can 
be reminded that we can pursue liberty to the point o f forgetting about 
equality.
{NFMC, p. 278)
Frye’s critique of capitalism and Communism is yet more trenchant, however. Not 
only are these systems incapable of creating the value they think of as their second 
biggest priority, they are actually largely incapable of nurturing the living condition 
they hold most dear, freedom for capitalism, equality for Communism. The freedom 
enjoyed by those who live in capitalist countries is not genuine freedom at all. Laissez 
faire is nothing more than ‘the doctrine of the individual liberty of the natural man’ 
{NFMC, p. 239). By the same token, material equality is an equality not worth 
having. Sueh a conception of equality derives from the degeneration of the word
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‘charity’, which, in Frye’s view, has degenerated to the stage where it is a ‘class word’ 
{NFMC, p. 277).
Beyond Capitalism and Communism
Frye’s sympathies lie not with capitalism or Communism but with democracy, which 
he defines as ‘The belief that men can be and have a right to be equal and 
independent’ {NFMC, p. 251). Recent history has seen a fairly widespread 
development of democracy, the form of government which Frye views as superior to 
totalitarianism as well as to laissez faire. One factor distinguishing democracy from 
totalitarianism is its view of human nature. In Frye’s view “‘faith in human nature’” 
{NFMC, p. 252), is conducive to totalitarianism, which, in contrast to Orwell, for 
whom totalitarianism is synonymous with bureaucracies and their power-worshipping 
intellectuals, Fiye associates with the ‘mob’:
The nauseous adulation of dictators is the feature of life most shocking 
to a democrat, and this kind of adulation o f dictators is the narcissism 
of the mob. The position of general leadership, in contrast to the 
position of specific responsibility, is always a projection of the mob’s 
unconditioned will, and means that man has begun to worship himself.
(ibid.)
Similarly, laissez faire is cleaiiy based on an optimistic view of human nature: 
American society is underpinned by Rousseau’s arguments about human nature which 
suggest that ‘man is by nature good, and has been corrupted by institutions’ (ibid.). 
But democracy has progressively distanced itself from such assumptions. ‘It is 
gradually becoming clearer,’ states Frye ‘that the real principle of democracy is ‘not
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“faith in human nature,” but the limitation of human power’ {NFMC, p. 252), a 
principle which is derived from the unequivocal acceptance of original sin. This view 
represents a line of thinking which is neither a part of the theory of Left or Right, 
neither rationalist not anti-rationalist. Frye starts out with the Christian conception of 
original sin, but rather than proceeding to the authoritarian correlate of this, which 
states that no social experiment aimed at the just society can be attempted, he argues 
for circumscribed political power and the improvements in society which can be 
achieved through this strategy, a conclusion which with its emphasis on the possibility 
of improvements in social justice is suggestive of the programme of the Left,
Democracy, however, remains a work in progress: it is more an ambition than a 
political reality, rather like the ideal tertiary level of education. Just as it is for 
Marxism, the goal of democracy is ‘a classless society consisting entirely of workers, 
and a self-controlling administrative structure replacing the old “state,” or government 
by rulers’ {NFMC, p. 252). In such a classless society everyone would belong to an 
elite:
Democracy is a society of specific and decentralized, in other words 
skilled workers, people particularly good at certain jobs, and whenever 
anything is taught it creates such an elite.
{NFWE, p. 237)
Democracy is an aspiration at this point in time, and such a prospect is a pipe dream 
at this stage:
I think if  the Russians, let us say, were not issuing propaganda 
statements, they would say that they were living through a proletarian 
revolution which is trying to become a socialist state. And we, I think,
111
might veiy well say, not tliat we are living in a democracy, but that we 
are living in something much more like a bourgeois oligarchy trying to 
become a democracy.
{NFMC, p. 275)
Frye’s desire is to move beyond capitalism and Communism, and democracy as 
defined above is the goal, but what Frye argues for in the post-war period is a new 
politics beyond the left-wing and right-wing orientations of his day, one that would 
ultimately lead to an authentic development of democracy. His thoughts about the 
politics of the future are centred on the United States, which is ‘not necessarily the 
best or most mature of contemporary democracies, but it is the only geopolitical 
champion of democracy’ (ibid.).
A Primary Dialectic: Towards the Free and Equal Society
We have seen that in ‘Preseiwing Human Values’ Frye associates all three 
revolutionaiy values with education and work, but in other contexts he views the 
struggle to instil these values in society as a more gradual process, beginning with the 
right conditions for liberty. (In later writings Frye comments on the fact that 
‘fraternity’ is a rather misunderstood conception - ‘Neither political democracy nor 
trade unions have developed much sense of the third revolutionary ideal of fraternity’ 
{NFMC, p. 57) -  and it is noteworthy that considerations of fraternity are absent from 
earlier political writings such as ‘Trends in Modem Culture’.) In ‘Trends in Modem 
Culture’, Frye’s most comprehensive statement on politics and society, he thinks in 
teims of a two stage intellectual revolution, the first stage of which is cultural and
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involves human freedom. Merging Blakean and New Testament resonances,he 
defines liberalism as
the doctrine that society cannot attain freedom except by 
individualizing its cultm e. It is only when the individual is enabled to 
form an individual synthesis of ideas, beliefs, and tastes that a 
principle of freedom is established in society, and this alone 
distinguishes a people from a mob. A mob always has a leader, but a 
people is a larger human body m which there are no leaders or 
followers, but only individuals acting as functions of a group.
{NFMC, p. 257)
If he fails to discuss fraternity in this context, it is clear that the ‘larger human body’ 
is one which is held together by fraternity. The focus here is liberty only, however. As 
we saw in Chapter 4, freedom is the result of a sustained process of practice and 
discipline, or education. ‘I know of no conception of freedom that means anything at 
all except the promise held out at the end of the learning process’ {NFWE, pp. 98-9). 
And in ‘Trends in Modem Culture’ Frye argues that freedom is largely a question of 
establishing the university in the centre of society:
The draft that draws the fire of freedom is liberal education, the 
pursuit of the truth for its own sake by free men. This pursuit o f truth 
is an act o f faith, a kind o f potential or tentative vision of an end of 
human life. Without this tentative vision, all activity can only be the 
implementing of the greedy passions produced by a will that can only 
see what it thinks it can reach.
‘For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, 
are one body: so also is Christ.’ I Corintliians 12: 12.
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except the physical world and the order of nature, and that our' senses 
alone afford direct contact with it. As this is the only real world, 
religion can provide no revelation of another, and to believe that it can
(NFMC, p. 259) I
Such freedom depends on the independence of the university in society. ‘Academic ;f
freedom is the only form of freedom, in the long run, of which humanity is capable, 
and it cannot be obtained unless the university is free’ {NFWE, p. 421). Academic 
freedom points to the fact that ‘ideas and works of the imagination must be studied as 
far as possible without reference to ordinary society’s notions of their moral or 
political dangers’ {NFWE, p. 111). In the mid-twentieth century, however, this kind 
of freedom may prove elusive in North America, for in the United States of America 
such freedom is severely compromised by religion. It is a commonplace that the 
intellectual life of eighteenth century England was animated to a considerable degree 
by the desire to reconcile reason with religion. The main religious development of this 
tendency was ‘deism,’ the ‘religion without revelation,’ championed by Pope and 
Bolingbroke. Occasionally, it is also argued deism represents a powerful force in 
contemporary American society. ‘The Church of Deism or natural Religion’ is the 
‘established church in America today’ {NFLS, p. 210), Frye argues.Outlining the 
main characteristics of this faith, he states: !The essential principle of this religion is that there is no real world
In his ‘How Jefferson Honored Religion’, for example, Joseph Koterski suggests that deism is the 
main religious movement in the United States. Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, and 
Thomas Paine, argues Koterski, ‘were all deists, not Christians’ (p. 35). ‘The God o f deism’ writes 
Koterski ‘is a First Cause who has created the world and instituted its immutable and universal laws.
But the deist insistence on conceiving o f this God as an absentee landlord intentionally precludes any 
hint of divine immanence or divine intervention into history. Many of the Enlightenment philosophers 
who took deism to heart were quite critical o f even the possibility of divine revelation, let alone 
Christianity’s claim about the necessity of such revelation’ (ibid.). According to Koterski, a ‘softer 
theistic form of deism’ (ibid.) took root in the United States. Joseph Koterski, ‘How Jefferson Honored 




represents a flight from reality. Nature being red in tooth and claw, we 
must not look for God there, but in man. The essence of religion,
. ■
therefore is morality, dogma and ritual alike being parasites that settle Ion it in decay. The chief end of man is to improve his own lot in the j
natural world, and the noblest thing he can do (this is for wartime) is to 
lay down his life for posterity. The essential meaning of human life is Ithe progressive removal of the obstacles presented by nature, including 
the survival within man himself of atavistic impulses harking back to 
an earlier state of greater bondage to it. This is done chiefly through 
the advance o f science. By the advance of science is meant the 
increase in the comfort of the body, the mind being regarded as a 
bodily function. Mental education is a revelation of the natural world, 
including of course its fossilized form of the history and literature of 
the past.
Virtually all of the clergy are deists; indeed the whole of American society is behind 
its official church: Tt is implicit in the American constitution, a completely deist 
scripture; it is expounded in university classrooms and in drug stores; it is defended 
by Communists and by millionaires’ {NFLS, p. 211).
Frye insists on a connection between eighteenth century England and France and 
twentieth century North America, and such a basic fact about twentieth century 
American society is of the gieatest significance. Frye derives his understanding of 
deism and its implications from Blake, and for Frye the most worrying point about 
deism is that it leads to what Blake calls Druidism. In an endnote in Fearful Symmetry 
Frye makes the crucial point that “‘Deism” (Urizen exploring his dens) is potential
:7
and imminent “Druidism” (crucifixion of Ore)’ {FS, p. 443). In his commentary on 
Blake’s Jerusalem Frye speaks of the return to human sacrifice as ‘an effort to 
express the ascendancy of nature and reason in society’ {FS, p. 399). In one of the 
most startling passages in his study he brings out the full nature of the Druidism 
which develops out of Deism, providing us with an account which is meant to suggest 
the identity of Druidism with German Nazism:
All we need to do is to persist in natural and reasonable tendencies, 
and in a very short time we shall get the society we want: the society of
the Roman empire which crucified Jesus all over again, only much i
more so. We shall get a church-state ruled by a divine Caesar; a ■
religion which is a tyranny of custom as pervasive as atmospheric ;
pressure; a government organized for imperial war without any real
purpose beyond waging it, and an increasingly obvious desire for the |: !
extermination of all human life within reach. When we get to that ;
Ipoint, the stage of the crucifixion of Ore will be arrived at, and we ;
shall find ourselves again in firont of the icon which represents the full I
integrity of nature and reason, the body of a flogged, mocked, 
bleeding, crucified, naked Jewish wretch.
{FS, pp. 399-400)
Perhaps surprisingly, Frye is prepared to consider a similar development of deism in 
North America in the twentieth century. Deism, he argues, represents a potential for 
Fascism in North America. He has in mind the activities of the Ku Klux Klan; the 
‘sneaking sympathy’ in America for Nazi persecution of the Jews; the ‘American 
tendency to stampede under mass emotional pressure’; the atrocious labour record of 
Ford and the steel and coal oligarchs; warfare in the workplace and ‘gangsterism and 
thuggery in politics’; a ‘frightened and bamboozled middle class’; and the fact that
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American democracy is in a sense ‘a rationalization of oligarchy’ (NFLS, p. 216). 
‘Given the right conditions,’ asserts Frye, ‘we could develop on this continent a 
Nazism of a fury compared to which that of the Germans would be, in American 
language, bush-league stuff (ibid.).
Frye chooses not to explore this horrendous possibility in ‘Trends in Modem Culture’. 
For Frye the cmcial fact about this ‘church’ is that it stands in the way of the kind of 
freedom that democracy needs if it is to develop to the next stage of its evolution. Of 
particular interest is his assertion that the ‘strongest point’ in deism is ‘liberalism’ 
(NFMC, p. 256): despite the dark warnings about deism in this context and others, 
deism is ‘a hopeful, liberal, and active belief (ibid.); it is this side of deism that leads 
to the belief that it is ‘the true faith of democracy’ (NFMC, p. 257). It is Frye’s view, 
however, that in the case of American deism, liberalism is founded on nothing more 
than ‘the relaxing of the social order’ (NFMC, p. 258). Consequently, deism actually 
jeopardises the chances for freedom in society. In Frye’s view deism insists that 
‘There is no real world except the physical world and the order of nature’ (NFMC, p. 
236). ‘The criterion of reality, in deist theory,’ explains Frye, ‘is what present man, 
say a normal American middle-class adult, thinks to be real’ (NFMC, p. 258). The 
individual who goes through the educational system that deism controls simply learns 
to meet the ‘social norm’ (ibid.). ‘This recurrence of a social norm,’ he explains, ‘is 
marked in deist educational theories, which usually begin with the individual and his 
interests, then go on to “education for today” - or tomorrow, depending on taste - and 
finally become absorbed in participation, adjustment, integration, orientation, and 
other benevolent euphemisms for mass movement’ (ibid.). Like Fascism and 
Communism, deism interferes with academic freedom:
It has been proved over and over again that it is only from such free 
discussion that real social benefits come. This is true even of dubious 
benefits: the Nazi conception of “target knowledge,” reducing science
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to military strategy, not only mined German science but helped 
materially in losing the war. The Marxist conception o f the social 
reference o f all knowledge was a far better theory to begin with, but its 
application has been very similar. And in American Deism too, one 
wonders if the conception of reality is subtle enough to include tire 
university [...] as above defined.
(NFMC, p. 258)
Freedom, however, must be nurtured in American society. If proper freedom can be 
encouraged, a revolution is political culture may follow on from it. Liberty, in Frye’s 
view, creates the right conditions for democracy. ‘A democracy, even in the mind, 
must have freedom, and by learning to use his intelligence the student is learning the 
secret of freedom’ (NFWE, p. 98), If Frye’s view was simply an argument concerning 
how to create freedom in society, we would only have one half of a dialectic, and his 
theory could easily be appropriated by the Right. But freedom in his view creates the 
right conditions for the next stage of the democratic evolution. Tt is only in a 
condition of fr eedom’ he argues, coming to the heart of the matter, ‘that democracy 
can make the evolution that will save it’ (NFMC, p. 259). hr ‘Trends in Modem 
Culture’ Frye reveals that his hopes for future peace rest on the new political culture 
of his times, which has been shaped by the experience of the Great Depression and 
the Second World War. In contrast to Orwell’s nostalgia for mid-nineteenth century 
life in the United States, where men ^were free and equal’^ ,^ Frye looks forward;
Up to 1929, American democracy to a great extent depended passively
on the automatic stimulus of prosperity. The crash of that year brought
George Orwell, The Collected Essays and Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, Vol I, ‘An 
Age Like This’ 1920-1940, ed. by Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1968), p. 
499.
118
to an end the Utopian illusion in American life, the hope of raising the 
standard o f living to a classless level in America alone. The 
scrambling treasure hunt of laissez faire is still a conspicuous feature 
of the American economy; but in the last two decades the rise of social 
seiwices, social sciences [...], a civil service nurtured by long periods 
of unchanged goveiument in the United States and Canada, and the 
first major efforts at integrating the political and economic structures 
have brought about a silent and gigantic revolution.
(NFMC, p. 253)
Both democracy and Communism conceive of their next phases in terms of a 
‘transitional phase’. For Communism it is the ‘Marxist proletarian dictatorship’
(ibid.). For democracy it is the ‘open class society’ (ibid.). The principle behind this 
latter is ‘equality of opportunity’ (ibid.). ‘All democrats agree’ explains Frye, ‘that the 
main threat to democracy from within arises, not from disparities of wealth, but from 
disparities of opportunity’ (ibid.). The new politics Frye promotes is a politics aiming 
to take democracy forward to this stage of development, where the objectives of both 
Left and Right are (partly) achieved. This revolution would not lead to the classless 
society; but it might lead to a society based on the principle of equality of opportunity, 
which could seiwe as a stepping-stone towards a more just society.
To return to the question of war, in Frye’s view the political revolution that would be 
precipitated by greater freedom in society would also be sufficient to extinguish the 
threat of war. Frye has faith in what political scientists now call ‘soft-power’, where a 
political model leads by example rather than force, impressing alien systems through 
tangible successes. Canada is often spoken of, perhaps somewhat inaccurately, as if it 
were synonymous with ‘soft-power’, and Frye’s argumentation is very much in this 
vein. As he sees it, the next possible phase of democracy may have such integrity that
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it might prove to be the most desirable form of modem culture, achieving recognition 
as such. If democracy attains the next stage of its evolution,’ he states optimistically, 
‘it may soon gain control of the world without a major war’ (NFMC, p. 254).
hi contrast to the at best partial successes of capitalism and Communism Frye 
envisages the achievement of the aims of the both Left and the Right. For such a 
cultural and political development would create real freedom in society, iron out 
inequality as it is manifest in the lack of equality of opportunity, and nullify the threat 
of war. With the benefit of Frye’s other writings, it is safe to draw the inference that 
this would also be a world of unbounded fraternity, too. It would lead to the spread of 
democracy throughout Communist countries, and so the world. Ultimately, it would 
lead to a new world order, distinct from the one envisioned by Fascists and 
Communists.
A Second Political Dialectic
To Frye’s mind the Fascist and Communist world-views are articulated most clearly 
in the works of Spengler and Marx respectively. Spengler’s central argument is that 
all cultures go through the phases of ‘rise, growth, decline, and fall’ (NFMC, p. 266):
Spengler sees history as a series of quasi-organic developments or 
“cultures,” which are at first agricultural and feudal, then urban and 
oligarclûc, and finally become industrial and totalitarian. The last 
stage is one o f huge cities, nomadic population, profiteering and 
dictatorships, mass wars, the impoverishing of agriculture and the 
exhaustion o f the arts, and the growth of technology.
{NFMC, p. 248)
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For this reason, it is always possible to anticipate to an extent the spirit of the times to 
come. With Napoleon our culture reached a point in its history coiresponding to the 
time of Alexander the Great in Classical culture. What the future holds is warfare 
between gigantic power blocks, one of which will eventually gain the upper hand:
{NFMC, p. 267)
The rationale for Nazism is that at such times in histoiy one nation must place the
Communism seems to derive from a more linear conception of history, where the 
dialectic which is at work tlrroughout history moves things forward, hi Decline o f the
on the ‘uniqueness of the same event’ {NFMC, p. 249). For Marx ‘productive power’ 
(ibid.) supports the class system, for it determines that there are producing classes and 




We’re about a century later than Napoleon, so we’re about where IClassical civilization was around two hundred years before Christ,
■5'when the great empires, Macedonia, Rome, and Carthage, were
'
fighting for supremacy. What’s ahead of us is something like the i;
Roman Empire. One of our great nations will grow to a world 
empire— Spengler hopes it will be Gemiany. Cecil Rhodes the empire 
builder is typical, Spengler says, o f the kind of Caesars we’ll be 
getting in the next few centuries. a
I
world under martial law. ‘The Rome of the future’ he goes on, outlining Spengler’s 
.thesis, ‘will be whatever nation has enough organization, discipline, leadership, ethnic 
integrity and historic sense to impose its will on the rest of the world’ {NFMC, pp. 
248-9).
West Spengler wishes to emphasise the fact that the Industrial Revolution and the Imodem world are a repetition of previous developments. By contrast, Marx focuses
in ‘a technique for producing new inventions at will’ (ibid.). The effect of the 
Industrial Revolution, accordingly, was to intensify exploitation to such an extent that 
the dispossessed are virtually identical with society itself. ‘Such a dispossessed 
society could, by seizing its own producing power,’ states Frye, ‘recover its balance in 
a revolutionary act that would not only destroy its class structure but put an end to 
history as we know it, history as we know it being essentially the mutation of class 
struggles’ (ibid.).
In Frye’s analysis these two movements represent aberrant phases of state 
development. Nations begin the modem period as ‘relatively small’ (ibid.). Again 
moving into a Bumliam mode, Frye states that the inevitable next phase is the 
geopolitical one, in which whole continents are the agents. The period of colonial 
expansion which followed on from the Industrial Revolution was a ‘transitional 
phase’ between the first two of these stages. The final stage of this development is 
alluded to as a ‘world federation’ (NFMC, p. 250). ‘What is now taking shape’ he 
explains ‘is a new “geopolitical” configuration, in which the effective nations are 
huge land masses extending over most of a continent’ (NFMC, p. 250). This 
framework allows Frye to further characterise Fascism and Communism:
The nations that went Fascist, we notice, were those which were too 
late to compete in the stmggle for colonies, and too early to succeed in 
transforming themselves into continental powers, as Germany and 
Japan tried so hard to do. The nations that went Communist were those 
that had inherited vast geopolitical resources and territories exploited 
by a corrupt and demoralized administration. Thus Fascism is 
evidently an aberrant phase o f the transition from colonial to 
geopolitical power, and Communism similarly appears to be an 




In a Communist world warfare would be unending. ‘A little study of the relations of 
Russia with other Communist countries makes it clear [...] that in a completely 
Communist world there would be as much war, as sharp boundaries, and as constant 
suspicion and intrigue as ever. The terrible clarity of this fact has wiped out nearly all 
the intellectual sympathy with Communism in the democracies’ (NFMC, p. 254).
Democracy holds out the promise of something vastly superior: the world federation 
alluded to above. Frye makes only a passing reference to this prospect, but we can 
infer a certain amount about it. Such a world federation would consist of at least tlrree 
geopolitical units. The United States (along with Canada) would co-exist with a 
democratic west European Union and a democratic East Asia centred on China. In 
this world we would not have warfare between rival types of Communism; nor would 
it be necessaiy for one comitry to place the others under martial law. As democracies, 
these continental powers could potentially co-exist peacefully. Power would be shared 
rather than wielded by the most powerful. This would not be a world of ‘three great 
empires, each self-contained and cut off from contact with the outer world, and each 
ruled, under one guise or another, by a self-elected oligarchy’ {Orwell, pp. 8-9). hi 
this world the struggle between labour and management would the focus of conflict, 
as it has been in democracies. Paradoxically, Marx is the prophet of this era: while 
Frye is anti-Communist, he accepts the Marxian analysis of society to a significant 
degree:
The factors which are the same throughout the world, such as the 
exploitation o f labour, have always been, if  not less important, at any 
rate less powerful in history than conflicts of civilizations. Now they 
are more hnportant, and growing in power.
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{NFMC, p. 313)
In this world it would be possible to gradually eradicate exploitation. Perhaps this 
would be achieved through the same ‘cold civil war’ {NFMC, p. 251) that has taken 
place between capitalists and labour until now in non-Communist countries.
However, as it is achieved, the condition of man throughout the world would improve 
steadily, freedom and equality burgeoning.
Conclusion, with Reflections
Originally, Frye believed that the kind of freedom created in society by the university 
would be insufficient for freedom proper, and therefore for the development of 
democracy. His early willingness to think in terms of the church and university as the 
two sources of freedom in society, led him to think in terms of Christian liberty as the 
fulfilment of the kind of the freedom derived from education. In ‘Trends in Modem 
Cultui'e,’ after having considered the need for university education, he goes on to 
consider the church. ‘The draft,’ Frye continues ‘to complete its work, needs a 
chimney reaching to the sky. Liberal education by itself he goes on ‘cannot envisage 
the end of human life except as a vague future: the revolutionary’s claim that 
liberalism is only a lazy way of postponing social action is so far tme’ {NFMC, p.
259). What liberal education must be supplemented with is, of course, the eternal 
perspective:
Man does not lose his claustrophobia and panic, and the process of  
liberty does not function, until the ideal of partial improvement 
expands into the ideal o f infinite regeneration. This does not sacrifice 
a specific improvement to a muzzy benevolence: it merely replaces the 
tantalizmg future goal with a real presence which extends over life and
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death, and so guarantees the present value of every act of charity.
.1
When Ave act in this light, we find that we are not members of a social 
group, but of one body. Without this infinite expansion of the liberal
1
ideal, liberalism cannot avoid either returning to a criterion of
immediate usefulness or getting lost in an impossible objectivity. Such
an infinite expansion includes, of course, God as well as man, and
I-must be based on a definitive revelation of the way in which God and |
man are united.
(ibid.)
However, Frye’s faith in the ability of the church to supplement the university was not 
strong. Writing the essay in connection with the United Church’s Commission on 
Culture proved to be a thoroughly laborious endeavour. As Jean O’Grady suggests, 
the responsibility was ‘accepted inwardly with poor grace’ (FW, p. 178). ‘The 
diaries’ she explains ‘were full of such remarks as “cut the goddam Commission on 
Culture, which is a hell of a waste of time” (D, 129) and “diddled with the Culture 
Commission nonsense” (D, 363)’ (ibid.). As we shall see in Chapter 7, scepticism 
about the church does not entail the abandonment of Christianity. But as O’Grady
iargues in her essay, Frye is interested in the church in proportion as it approaches the I‘condition of a university’ (FW, p. 180). Frye’s main interest throughout the best part 
of his career was in secular institutions. Principally, he thought purely in terms of the 
value of free education; pursuing a secular career, it was the importance of the 
university that became his primary concern for many years. When he offers a solution 
to the stand off with Russia, it is simply educated citizens that he pins his hopes on:
The motive for getting an education is not masochism, but simply self- 
preservation. Although America is a peaceful nation, peacetime 




There are many things that can happen to the human race before the 
end of the twentieth century. One of them is extermination: another, 
according to many tlieologians, including, as I remember, Isaac
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James called a moral equivalent of war. It has reached the final 
dilemma o f laissez-faire, in which the highest qualities of real 
civilization, cooperation, sacrifice, and heroic effoid, are now only 
brought out by wartime conditions. Hence we must either accept war 
as the noblest condition of man, like the fascists, or improve the 
human quality, as opposed to the material quality, of our peacetime 
civilization. The hundred per cent American will have to do at least 
fifty per cent better or America (and of course Canada with it) will go î
fthe way of all muscle-bound empires which nowadays collapse rather ...
more quickly than they used to do. The danger is there, but danger is 
not fate, and even a very small minority of educated neurotics might Iturn the scale. The Bible tells us that ten righteous men would have isaved Sodom from destruction [Genesis 18:32].
As we have seen, in his writings Frye attempts to work out the conditions that might 
lead to the creation of a better society rather than a world of unending war. Frye 
believed that by far the most likely outcome was neither total annihilation nor the 
millennium. In 1964 in his ‘Education - Protection Against Futility’ he provides us 
with a frank commentary on the Cold War which, with its parenthetical remark at the 
end of the passage quoted, seems to undercut the apocalypticism of his analysis in 
‘Trends in Modem Culture’:
Newton, is the milleimium. (We may perhaps assume that what will 
actually happen will fall somewhere between these two extremes.)
{NFWE, pp. 212-3)
But in ‘Trends in Modem Culture’ he presents the reader with an apocalyptic vision 
of the end of history. In Frye’s view the organising image of modem thought is the 
humorous picture of ‘the young lady who smiled as she rode on a tiger’ {NFMC, p.
260), but if society develops in the way he has outlined, this will change:
If this age really does see the decisive stmggle of liberty and teirorism 
for the fate o f the world, the pattern of thought will make the necessary 
change—unless teirorism wins, in which case there will be no pattern 
at all. If liberty wins, we shall have, instead of the complacent and 
doomed young lady on the tiger, the image of a conquering hero with a 
dead dragon at his feet. As we continue to look at the hero, we shall 
see in him the image of a consciousness that has absorbed the 
unconscious and defeated all the dark powers of our present thought: a 
man armed with the power of God extending through all the eons and 
light-years o f nature, the conquered territory of death annexed to his 
life, fulfilling the desire and liberating the oppression of all men. As 
we continue to look at the dragon, we shall see in him the rotting body 
of what is now laying waste the world: the body of eternal bondage, 
the endlessly postponed vision of peace and leisure, the endless 
intrusion o f temporary necessity to thrust us away from real life, the 
endless massing of lynching mobs to transfer oiu self-contempt to 
another scapegoat, the reduction of individual life to a hopeless 




On other occasions Frye views the future in terms of a different framework, which, as 
a more plausible scenario, may be closer to his actual view. Frye thinks in terms of a 
new era, of which the growth of science and technology is the determining factor. 
‘Perhaps our science and technology’ states Frye ‘will bring in a new phase of human 
life, which will supersede the history of cultures just as the history of cultures 
superseded the Stone Age’ {NFMC, p. 272). He continues: ‘Perhaps that’s the whole 
point about science: that it’s a universal stmcture of knowledge that will help 
mankind to break out of culture-group barriers, and get rid of war by moving into a 
higher area of conflict’ {NFMC, pp. 272-3):
If the death-to-rebiith transition from Classical to Western culture 
happened once, something similar could happen again in our day, 
though the tr ansition would be to somethhig bigger than another 
culture. This would imply three major periods of human existence: the 
period of primitive societies, the period of organic cultures, and a third 
period now beginning. Spengler [...] attacks and ridicules the three 
period-view o f ancient, medieval, and modem ages [...]. But he also 
remarks that the notion of three ages has had a profound appeal to the 
Faustian consciousness, from Joachim of Fiore in the thirteentli 
century onward. It is possible what is now beginning to take shape is 




Part 2: The New Left and Frye’s Defence of His 
Theoretical Thinking; His Liberal Thinking 
Continued
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Chapter 6: The Rise of the Cultural Left in North America and 
Frye’s Defence of His Theoretical Thinking
In the late fifties and early sixties Frye must have experienced a quiet optimism of 
both the intellect and the will. His Fearful Symmetry, after receiving a rapturous 
response from reviewers, had achieved a status as unquestionably the most 
sophisticated commentary on Blake’s Prophetic Books. More importantly, Blake 
criticism seemed to be getting started ‘after a very slow start’. ‘Blake’s total range 
of interests’ Frye explains ‘is so enormous that nobody can cover more than a small 
comer of it: there will never be any such person as the world’s greatest authority on 
Blake’ (ibid.). By the time he came to write his introduction to Blake: A Collection o f 
Critical Essays, published in 1966, it was possible for Frye to present a catholic 
range of essays on Blake’s whole output, even if there was a sense in which such a 
collection was ‘premature’ owing to the newness of serious Blake criticism, and the 
fact, following on from this, that contributors had produced better work since their 
contributions. Of further satisfaction to Frye would have been the essays in the 
collection which were examples of archetypal criticism of Blake’s poetry.
If his Blake book was met with praise. Anatomy o f Criticism was a revolution. 
Looking back to its publication Terry Eagleton sums up the staggering power of the 
study. ‘Nortlirop Frye,’ he states, ‘in what appeared for a while an almost unbeatable 
synthesis, joined the methods of a ‘scientific’, relentlessly taxonomizing criticism to a 
religious-humanist vision of literature as the mythical configuration of transcendental 
desire’.35 In ‘Elementary Teaching and Elemental Scholarship’ (1963) Frye speaks 
with a sense of urgency of the need for ‘a new theoretical conception of literature’
3^  Northrop Frye, ‘Introduction’ in Blake: A Collection o f Critical Essays, ed. by Nortlirop Frye 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 1-7 (p. 1).
35 Terry Eagleton, The Function o f Criticism (London: Verso Editions and NLB, 1984), p. 84. Further
references are abbreviated to FOC  and incorporated parenthetically within the text.
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{NFWE, p. 194). Crucially, he pinpoints the interconnectedness of good teaching and 
good scholarship, laying his stress as usual on the practice of teaching;
The only thing that is practical now is to gain a new theoretical 
conception of literature. The source of this new theoretical conception 
is contemporary criticism; the application of it to an articulated 
English programme still awaits us. Most of our difficulties in teaching 
English result from an immature scholarship that has not yet properly 
worked out its own elementary teaching principles: most of the 
difficulties in our scholarship result, even more obviously, from the 
deficiencies of tire teaching programme. The establishing of a coherent 
curriculum for literature, and for English in particular, would give us a 
fully revived art of rhetoric, corresponding to humanistic and Classical 
training that most of our- great poets have had in the past. I hardly need 
to emphasize the benefit this would be to writers, in making them more 
secure in their techniques and more readily communicable to their 
public. Its effect on criticism itself will be even happier, as it will 
make rather less of it necessary to read.
{NFWE, p. 194)
On the surface it seems that Frye is simply making one or two points about teaching 
and scholarship, but he goes on to state that a highly serious preoccupation about the 
future of scholarship and the ramifications this will have upon teaching lie behind his 
well-tempered analysis. ‘This last is not altogether a joke’ he continues.
c
The coming population explosion of students is a serious problem, 
certainly, but it is trifling compared to the real horror that awaits us in
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the immediate future: the population explosion in scholarship. With 
the greatly increasing numbers of university presses developing, of 
critical journals being subsidized, o f bright young people eager to 
■write for both, a growing number of elementary and secondary school 
teachers taking a more academic interest in their subject, it will be 
essential to develop a literary education which can deal with this more 
selectively.
{NFWE, p. 194)
Given the success of Anatomy o f Criticism, Frye must have been hopeful of the 
prospects for such a theory.
On the subject of work and leisure he was also optimistic, especially on account of the 
prospect of a new balance between work and leisure in public life in North America 
brought about by new respect for leisure and education. As we have already seen, in 
the sixties Frye felt that the work and leisure ratio was moving in the ‘in the direetion 
of one to one’ {NFWE, p. 271). He continues:
Every citizen may not be only a Martha, troubled about many things, 
but a Mary who has chosen the better part [Luke 10:38-42], and the 
question, “What does he know?” becomes as relevant to defining one’s 
social function as the question, “What does he do?”
(ibid.)
Discontent with the war in Vietnam had reached a first high point in 1967, but one 
could also afford to be cautiously optimistic about developments in politics on the
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North American continent up to and indeed beyond that time. Eisenhower’s 
govennnent had respected the fundamentals of the New Deal: Keynesian economic 
policy was largely unchallenged. As Will Hutton observes, the experience of the 
Second World War and the New Deal led to support for federal government:
It had been government contracts that had underwritten the immense 
increase in US production and scientific leadership during the war; and 
it was the government’s GI bill of rights that guaranteed every 
American serviceman the chance to acquire the skills and education 
necessary to succeed in civilian life. Laissez-faire and free markets 
meant depression, unemployment and lack of opportunity of all; 
government meant growth, work, new life-chances.^^
When Kennedy took office, Americans were better off than ever before. The 
continuing progressivism of the era would seek to improve things further, tackling the 
poverty of those areas and constituent parts of the population which were finding it 
impossible to access the nation’s social mobility and escape poverty, true equality of 
opportunity having remained beyond the scope of New Deal achievements.
Kennedy’s administration fastened on the idea of equality and hoped to extend it to 
the black community, too. Kennedy spoke of a ‘New Frontier’ and his administration 
oversaw a whole raft of liberal reforms, amongst which a rise in the minimum wage 
and new affordable housing for the less well off were two of the most significant. 
Following on from Kennedy, Johnson amrounced the age of the Great Society,
‘setting out to achieve the elimination of poverty, the genuine enfranchisement of all 
American citizens regardless of their race, the extension of medical protection to 
every American, the championing the environment, massive training of the unskilled 
and the establishment of model cities’ (WWT, p. 87). And of course it was in the
3^  Will Hutton, The World We’re In (London: Little, Brown, 2002), p. 91. Further references are
abbreviated to WWI and incorporated parenthetically within the text.
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second year of Johnson’s time in office that the landmark Civil Rights Act (1964) was 
introduced.
From our present standpoint we should no doubt adopt a healthy critical view of the 
achievements of the two presidents’ administrations. Kennedy was a stickler for 
balancing the budget, which meant holding back on welfare programmes, and the 
robustness of his administration’s response to racism has been questioned. Such were 
the failures of Johnson’s time in office that social unrest, largely on account of the 
economic situation of minority groups, burgeoned in the mid-sixties -  but the 
achievements of his administration as well as Kennedy’s are nonetheless 
umnistakable. Such was the impetus of progressivism in post-war politics that when 
Nixon came to office he had no choice but to set up the Environmental Protection 
Agency and act to ensure minimum standards of health and safety at work. In 1972, 
when he was still in power, Congress passed the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), 
which outlawed sexual discrimination.
In the culture field, however, the divide between Left and Right which characterises 
North America and Europe today was starting to appear in public life. The sixties was 
about to see the rise of new trends in thinking about education and the study of 
literature, a gamut of ideas which taken together would come to be spoken of as the 
New Left. And partly as a result of this development, a new conservatism towards 
cultural matters was to burgeon also. ‘How’ asks Gitlin in his Twilight o f Common 
Dreams ‘could the palpable breakdown of authority in the 1960s, and the centrifugal 
identity motion that followed, fail to generate a countermovement, a conservative 
consolidation. [...] With dialectical elegance,’ he continues ‘a new radicalism aroused 
a new conserva t ism G it l in  argues that political correctness was the precise target. 
Public intellectuals such as Allan Bloom, Roger Kimball, and Dinesh D’Souza
3^Todd Gitlin, Twilight o f Common Dreams (New York: Holt, 1996), p. 82. Further references are
abbreviated to TCD and incorporated parenthetically within the text.
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discussed the dangers of political correctness. The political Right deteimined that the 
time had come to put up a fight against the universities and media, both of which
The easiest mistake to make in relation to Frye’s attitude is to conclude that in the 
context of the New Left, he is a cultural conservative. Needless to say, his response to
3^ James Davidson Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York: BasicBooks ,
1991). Further references are abbreviated to CW and incorporated parenthetically within the text.
were perceived to be bastions of subversiveness. Gitlin identifies William E. Simon,
Iwho had been Nixon’s Secretary of the Treasury, as an instrumental figure in the 
turnaround. “What is happening in this country is a fundamental assault on 
America’s culture and its historic identity”’ {TCD, p. 183) stated Simon. As President 
of the Jolin M. Olin Foundation, he called for ‘nothing less than a massive and 
unprecedented mobilization of the moral, intellectual and financial resources which 
reside in those [...] who aie concerned that our traditional free enterprise system, 
which offers the greatest scope the for the exercise of freedom, is in dire and perhaps 
ultimate peril’ (ibid.).
The result of this is that the United States is experiencing ‘culture wars’, a 
phenomenon anatomized in James Davidson Hunter’s Culture Wars: The Struggle To 
Define America (1991).3s In his book Hunter argues that the United States is a 
bitterly contested terrain, where two elites, both of which contain a variety of types of U
influential people, are vying for control of American public life. In Hunter’s view ‘the 
cleavages at the heart of the contemporary culture war’ have been generated by ‘the 
impulse toward orthodoxy and the impulse toward progressivism’. The orthodox 
include both the religiously oriented and the secular: the former may operate within 
the traditional Christian framework, but the latter appeal to Natural Law. The 
numbers of the orthodox are made up o f ‘traditional intellectuals’, who see 
themselves as the guardians of heritage; the progressivists are ‘organic intellectuals’, a | |
new vanguard who prize a break with the past for an improved future {CW, p. 63).
.
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the changes was not a conservative one. Frye had a very different agenda from the 
student radicals; similarly, he knows all about the pitfalls of a reactionaiy or 
conservative response to a situation of change. Frye, as we have seen, tried to rise 
above the Left-Right distinction in cultural matters, and express a point of view that 
we might think of as a cultui'al liberal one. I have shown that Frye defined his own 
views in relation to what we might call the traditional Left and traditional Right, hi 
this later period he finds himself in a situation where new highly political orientations 
are asserting themselves. At this stage Frye does not provide us with a second large 
scale articulation of dialectical liberalism. Frye, however, remains a ‘dialectical 
liberal’ and his responses ai'e expressions of this kind of outlook. In his responses to 
the evolving situation he perfoims a very neat balancing act, holding back from 
endorsement of a radical agenda, yet accepting change, and, in the last analysis, 
finding ways of reasserting his conclusions.
A New Radical Idea of Education Asserts Itself
As we have seen, throughout his writings on society Frye sought to develop a theory 
of education and work which transcended a conservative idea of education and a 
radical idea of work. What came to the fore in the sixties at the time of student unrest 
in universities was a radical view on education which challenged the norms and 
values of education in society.
hi his Culture Wars: The Struggle To Define America Hunter pinpoints the radicals’ 
view of the education system;
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The existing curriculum is politicized by virtue of the fact that its 
principal works have been composed almost entirely by dead white 
European males. White male llteraiy critics canonize white male 
novelists; elite white male historians document elite male history;
Î
white male psychologists test white male sophomores; and so on.
Thus, progressivists argue, only a small part of human experience has 
really been studied -  a part intrinsically contaminated with racism, 
sexism, heterosexism, and imperialism. Knowledge, in a word, is 
hilierently biased.
(CfK p. 21)
One possible solution to this problem was a greater emphasis upon ‘relevance’, the 
notion that studies are made more cognizant of the ‘real world’ beyond the walls of 
the university.
The solution today, therefore, is to be more inclusive of different 
experiences, perspectives, and truths, particularly those who have been 
ignored or silenced in the past -  the voices of women, the poor, 
minorities, and others disenfranchised from the prevailing power 
stmctures.
(CIK p. 21)
In ‘The Battle of the Books at Berkley: In Search of the Culture Wars in Debates over 
Multiculturalism’ David Yamane, a cultural critic who has sought to constructively 
adapt Hunter’s paradigm, sums up Hunter’s ideas in this specific area, stating:
Briefly put, the movement for multiculturalism in higher education is a 
movement by progressivists for a curricular recognition of the 
pluralism and diversity which characterizes America racially. From its 
founding, according to this view, America has been a multicultural
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society. A curriculum dominated by writings and history of “dead 
white European males” is, therefore, a biased reflection o f the 
American experience.
{Yamane, p. 9)
Yamane provides us with glimpses of interventions in the Battle of the Books episode 
at the University of California, Berkley. In her speech at the May 1988 Academic 
Senate meeting at Berkley, Jewelle Taylor-Gibbs, professor of Social Work at 
Berkley, provided an account of the original ‘progressivist’ view of the curriculum at 
the university;
The University should educate students to adapt to the changing 
American society as we approach the 2U‘ century. The demographic 
imperative in the United States predicts that early in the 2U‘ century, 
one-third o f Americans will be non-white or Spanish speaking. Thus it 
is essential that the University’s cuniculum and general ethos should 
educate all o f  its students to live in a society which is becoming 
increasingly interdependent economically and politically. The major 
way to implement this is to include information about the contributions 
of mmority ethnic groups in this country and in all spheres, as well as 
the contributions of their original countiies to the heterogeneity o f the 
American culture. Unless students can gain some understanding of the 
vitality and the richness of other non-European cultural groups they 
will never develop positive attitudes and an interest in mutual 
interactions with these groups [...] How many [Berkley students] are 
aware of the contributions made by blacks, Hispanics, and American 
Indians? Most of these contributions have in fact been minimized by
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historians, misinterpreted by social scientists, and misrepresented by 
the mass media. So students are not given at any educational level in 
this countr y a broad perspective on the history and cultures of minority 
groups in America.
{Yamane, p. 22)
The American Cultures Requirement at Berkley was designed by the Special 
Committee on Education and Ethnicity. In their final report they summed up their 
conclusions:
We intend that each racial or ethnic group be studied in the larger 
context of American history, society, and culture. Such courses should 
substantially consider at least three of the five main racial/cultural 
groups in American society: African American, American Indian,
Asian American, Chicano/Latino, and European American. To be 
adequately comparative, no one of these groups may be the focus of 
the greater part of the course.
{Yamane, p. 17)
‘Advocates of the ACR at UC-Berkeley’ states Yamane ‘[...] clearly articulated a 
progressivist cultural vision which takes as its central value diversity'' {Yamane, p. 
23).39
39 Of course the question o f  the extent to which things have changed is open to debate. One analysis 
suggests that no such capitulation had taken place. Gerald Graff argued against the claims of those 
fighting the rear-guard action. In response to the observation by the chairman o f the English department 
at Pennsylvania State university that Alice Walker’s The Color Purple was being taught more than 
Shakespeare, Graff conducted empirical research. He examined the extent to which the two authors’ 
works were studied in the department between 1986 and 1990. ‘Over this four years period I located 
two courses in which The Color Purple was taught, while I found eight courses that required at least 
six plays by Shakespeare and eight that required at least two. Shakespeare’s dominance became even
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Frye on the Pull Towards a Radical Curriculum
It was not ‘tenured radicals’ who Frye had to contend with in these decades. It was the 
student movement, which was as active in Canada as it was in the United States. We 
might begin with The Port Huron Statement, published in 1962 by an association of 
college students known as Students for a Democratic Society. In essence the writers 
of the statement complain that universities in North America are bulwarks of the most 
efficacious conservatism. ‘The collaborators’ explains Jonathan Hart in his chapter on 
the theme ‘argue that scientists and social scientists serve coiporations and the arms 
race, that, like television, the university passes on stock truths, and that the university 
is a socialization to accept minority elite rule and comfort’ {Hart, p. 167). The 
university fails to offer a robust critique of society. ‘Foundations and private-interest 
groups [...],’ he continues, articulating the main ideas of the statement, ‘help finance 
the university and make it more commercial and less critical of society’ (ibid.). 
Students, in short, ‘are separated from the social reality they study’ (ibid.).
The solution is obvious. ‘Social relevance,’ state the authors, ‘the accessibility of 
loiowledge, and internal opemiess -  these together make the university a potential 
base and agency in a movement of social change’. I n  language that may remind the 
reader of Frye himself on account of its engagement with social context, they 
demanded that universities hear the call to arms and fulfil their role as a ‘source of 
social criticism and an initiator of new modes and moulders of attitudes’ {A and A, 
pp. 184-5).
more visibly one-sided when I totalled the number of students in these courses. [...] For every reading 
of Walker there were approximately eighty-thiee readings of Shakespeare.’ Gerald Graff, Beyond 
Culture Wars: How Teaching the Conflicts Can Revitalize American Education (New York: Norton, 
1992), p. 21. And Graff cites national surveys o f university literatuie to the same effect.
The Port Huron Statement in The Sixties Papers: Documents o f a Rebellious Decade ed. by J. C.
Albert and S. E. Albert (New York; Praeger, 1984), p. 195. Further references are abbreviated to A and
A and incoiporated parenthetically in the text.
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The Port Huron Statement set the tone for the whole movement which became a 
nationwide phenomenon. In her Introduction to Northrop Frye’s Writings on 
Education Jean O’Grady identifies the main arguments of the radicals. Firstly, 
radicals’ discontent was focused on the content of the existing curriculum. Students’ 
own instincts about what they should study should be respected. What could be more 
reasonable than the argument that students choose their own study programme? The 
existing curriculum came to be seen as not only highly political but as politically 
specious. The second main area of radicals’ engagement is on the level of the political 
character of the university as an institution. ‘On a level of university policy,’ writes 
O’ Grady, ‘they wanted to co-opt the university for a socially worthy aim’ {NFWE, p. 
xlv).
Frye respects the need for change, especially when seen in the history of the study of 
English literature in universities, but he is also sensitive to the fact that progress is 
always a mixed blessing. Looking back to the time of change, he is aware of the 
continual need for reform of the curriculum. Frye terms the process whereby new 
literature becomes canonical as ‘the liberalizing of a curriculum’, a phrase which 
suggests that in the last analysis he supports it. In ‘Foreword to English Studies at 
Toronto' (1988) he charts the history of such liberalizing in the twentieth centuiy, 
wittily expressing his support for the inclusion of twentieth-century literature and 
popular culture:
At every step in the liberalizing o f the curriculum, some academics 
will say: “Why should we set up courses and examinations in that?
Shouldn’t students be reading that sort of thing on their own? W e’ve 
got a libraiy haven’t we?” In one generation people like Edmund 
Blunden’s colleague would have applied this to the whole of English
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literature; in the next it would be applied to contemporary literature; in 
the next to the study of films, television, and pop culture.
{NWFE, p. 597)
But if this attitude goes too far Fiye is prepared to meet it with defiance. The 
liberalizing of the cumculum should not result in the hegemony of those categories of 
literature which the liberalizing process admits; it should not represent a 
radicalisation of the cumculum, one might say. Throughout the radical decades the 
demand for relevance betrayed precisely this predilection. Speaking of what he tenns 
the ‘utilitarian’ dimension of the students’ demand for relevance ‘in relation to 
personal as distinct from social life’ Frye speaks passionately of the need to resist:
The utilitarian one is for subjects of education to conform to what the 
student thinks to be his present relation to society, so that, for instance, 
twentieth-century literature would be more relevant than medieval 
literature. This is, of course, an immature demand, and should be met 
with massive and uncompromising resistance.
{NFWE, p. 374).
‘Frye defended the central tradition of English literature, even though most of its 
authors were what would later be described as dead white males’ (NFWE, p. xlv). 
What this amounts to is a gradualist position within the debate, Frye by temperament 
being sceptical with regards to revolutionary acts. ‘While Frye welcomed the 
inclusion of neglected women or minority authors,’ explains Jean O’Grady, ‘he felt 
this should not be done to the extent of obliterating a core of classics which have 
pemieated later literature’ (NFE, p. xlvi).
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At the University of Toronto’s English Department great changes were made to the 
curriculum on Frye’s watch. Interestingly, in the first instance changes were prompted 
by the abolition of the Honour Course, which was prompted by the report of the 
Presidential Advisory Committee on Undergraduate Instruction in the Faculty of Arts 
and Science (the Macpherson report), published in 1967. In 1933 Frye had published 
an unapologetic polemic against the distinction between Honour and Pass courses,
‘The Pass Course; A Polemic’. His solution was to exhort students to depopulate the 
Pass Course, which he argued, ‘aims at being general [but] succeeds in being only 
superficial’ {NFWE, p. 36). ‘The Honour Course gives unity’ he argues {NFWE, p.
37). ‘In an Honours Course’ Frye comments ‘the subjects are all grouped around a
Irestricted and clearly defined area of knowledge. Once this area is so defined, there is
more of an impetus to conquer it’ (ibid.). And ‘No matter what an Honours student I
"4
studies, if he is dealing with a limited aspect of knowledge he is almost certain to :
emerge with a trained mind and a point of view’ {NFWE, p. 38).
■si:
‘Ironically’ states Jean O’Grady ‘the distinction [Frye] complained of between Pass f
and Honour Courses was abolished, at the University of Toronto, by the sweeping 
away of the Honour Course’ {NFWE, p. xlv). The alteration of the curriculum at the 
University of Toronto may have been started not by multiculturalism but by the desire 
to improve teaching. ‘The committee recommended the abolition of the Honours 
Courses in the interest of improving the quality of instruction for all undergraduates’
{NFWE, p. xxxiii), and consequently the sweeping away of the distinction between 
three-year General Course and four-year Honour Course was accepted in ‘a great 
wave of exuberant hysteria’ {NFWE, p. 419). (The connection between hysteria and 
radicalism is well-established in Frye’s mind.) The issue was the quality of 
undergraduate teaching, but radicals were delighted by the changes. As Jean O’Grady 
explains, ‘the radicals called for an end to ‘mechanical requirements and invidious 
distinction’ {NFWE, p. xliv).
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In his introduction to Northrop Frye’s Writings on Education Goldwin French states 
that ‘From 1971 onward the process of curriculum adjustment lurched ahead in the 
university’; the year is interesting for it was in 1971 that the Liberal Prime Minister 
PieiTe Trudeau declared Canada bilingual and multicultural. (This move was 
consolidated in 1988 by The Multiculturalism Act.) But the continued liberalisation of 
the cumculum is suggestive of the influence of multiculturalism. Of course student 
protest resulted in an ‘increase of student representation on curricular and 
administrative bodies in the university’ {NFWE, p. 418). In her section of the 
introduction to Northrop Frye on Education Jean O’Grady explains that the 
‘sweeping away of the Honour Courses mean that ‘a Toronto student could be 
certified a specialist in English without having taken (apart from one initial survey 
course) a course covering any of Shakespeare, Spenser, Dome, Milton, Diyden, Pope, 
Swift, Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Byion, Keats, Shelley, Teimyson, Browning, 
Arnold, Eliot, or Yeats’ {NFE, p. xlvi).
In ‘Foreword to English Studies at Toronto' Frye goes on to address the issue of the 
core cuniculum directly: ‘What I am saying implies what was certainly true: the 
Honours Course in English was practically all “core curriculum,” covering the entire 
area from Beowulf to Virginia Woolf {NFWE, p. 598). Frye is unapologetic in his 
support of this model of education, even as he admits the inevitability of change. As 
we listen to Frye, we are reminded more and more of his own discussions of progi'ess 
and the emblematic ‘Juggernaut’ {NFMC, p. 18):
I think the advantages of this greatly outweighed the disadvantages, 
but of course there had to be expansion and consequently more 
options. When I was an undergraduate there were no courses in 
twentietli-century literature, largely because there was not much 
twentieth century, but that obviously was not a stable situation, nor at
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that time was there much likelihood of, say, a Nobel Prize in literature 
going to a writer in Nigeria.
{NWFE, p. 597)
Frye connects our cultural heritage in with ‘our real and repressed past’ (NFR, p. 42), 
and then ‘the vision of what humanity might conceivable do, and what human life 
could conceivable be’ (NFR, p. 43). Such a vision is one which ‘breaks with 
everything that man has done and is projected on the future’, and represents a ‘social 
vision of a future discontinuous with history as we have known it, turning history, in 
Joyce’s phrase into a nightmare from which we are trying to awake’ (ibid.). At times 
the ‘claims of the past’ are experienced as a burden which becomes the object of 
impatience.
Black students reading a wliite man’s literature, women bored by 
heroines presented as models of virtue because they conform to male 
codes, radicals of all persuasions, often develop an anticultural streak 
that wants to scrap the past, including its greatest imaginative 
achievements, in order to start doing something else and something 
better. A friend of mine traveling in China during the cultural 
revolution wanted to see some ancient frescoes in Peking: her guide 
took her there, but said impatiently that if  she had her way she would 




Despite changes, the university aims to connect students with their cultural past, and 
‘leisure informed work’ is still being facilitated by the university in North America, 
the University of Toronto included. In 1988 Fiye is prepared to state that despite 
changes to the cuniculum, Toronto ‘still has a first-rate English department’ {NFWE, 
p. 598).
Literature and Blake: The Radical View
In Richards, Frye and the New Criticism, the desirable balance which 
might have legitimated criticism both within and beyond the 
academies was not appropriately maintained. Richard’s bloodless neo-
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Of course multiculturalism led to a radical rethink of the curriculum, but this was only
stage one of the revolution. In another context approaches to literature were also to be 
revolutionised. What we now refer to as ‘literary theory’ burgeoned in France in the Iseventies and eighties, leading to a radical questioning of common sense assumptions 
surrounding the teaching and study of literature and the seemingly definitive rejection 
of New Criticism nonn and values. In the view of Terry Eagleton, ‘Richards, Frye and 
the New Criticism’ were insufficiently social in their scope: Î
Benthanism, New Criticism’s cloistered aestheticism and Frye’s 4
hermetic systematicity had all tipped that balance dangerously in the 
direction of a critical technocracy which thr eatened to oust the
assorted humanisms (liberal, Christian, conservative) it officially
subserved. It was this situation which the social and academic turmoil a;
of the sixties was starkly to expose. As long as academia maintained 
its traditional legitimating image, as an institution at once set 
somewhat apart from society yet of vaguely humanistic relevance to it,
icriticism was unlikely to be interrogated for its credentials, since this 
institutional ambiguity matched its own condition exactly. It was at
-
once a somewhat esoteric, self-involved pursuit, as befitted a 
university discipline, but could at a pinch muster some sort o f general 
case for its socially finitful effects. In the 1960s, however, the 
academic institutions, unusually, became the focus of pervasive social 
discontent; unable to sustain their habitual self-image as tolerable 
enclaves of disinterested enquiry, they were exposed instead as both 
locked into and paradigmatic of wider stinctures o f dehumanizing 
bureaucracy, complicit with military violence and technological 
exploitation.
{FOC, pp. 85-6)
(111 his essay Eagleton discusses the social function of literary criticism. For Eagleton, 
the Golden Age of criticism was the eighteenth century: the ‘public sphere’ of that 
time was envigorated by ‘The Tatler and Spectator [...] whose capacious, blandly 
homogenizing language is able to encompass art, ethics, religion, philosophy and 
eveiyday life’ {FOC, p. 18). Within literaiy criticism we see the rise of the tendency 
to attend to the historical and cultural conditions of literary production. ‘The argument 
of this book’ he states in his ‘Preface,’ ‘is that criticism today lacks all substantive 
social function’ {FOC, p. 7). From his point of view, a point of view which a liberal 
might take issue with, Arnold’s notion of ‘disinterestedness’ is a thoroughly insidious 
conception which ultimately leads to what Eagleton describes as the ‘academicization 
of criticism’ in the twentieth century, the effect of this process being that criticism is 
‘effectively inaudible to society as a whole’ (FOC, p. 66).)
Over the last two or three decades a number of schools of criticism which lay great 
stress on literature and society have come to the fore. The main concern of these 
schools of criticism is ideology, the assumption underlying them being that criticism 
concerned with society is of a necessity criticism focused on ideology. Focusing on
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ideology, Imre Salusinsky distinguishes between the Marxist understanding, 
exemplified by Teny Eagleton, and the less overtly Marxist but nevertheless 
materialist interpretation of the conception:
‘Ideology’ is a notoriously slippeiy term, but according to Teny 
Eagleton, one of its foremost students, its sense always has to do with 
the legitimatmg of society’s power-structure through a variety of 
strategies of signification: through promoting the society’s values; 
tlrrough natur alizing those values into apparently commonsensical 
presuppositions; tlrrough marginalizing rival forms of thought; and 
through mystifying the tnie power-relations that obtain in society 
{Ideology, 5-6). Softer, by which I mean less overtly Marxist, 
accounts of ideology than Eagleton’s teird to emphasize ideology as a 
contestive space of signification, rather than as a mechanism serving 
the exclusive interests of the dominant social group. Nevertheless, 
everyone seems to agree that ideology is the place where social belief, 
social value, and social power are inculcated in, and then expressed 
by, social subjects as meanings and interpretations.
{LNF, p. 77)
Ideology is the main interest of a group of diverse schools: in Salusinsky’s words ‘the 
new historicists, the Foucauldians, the gender-studies and subaltem-studies people, 
the ‘polite’ Marxists, the British cultural materialists’ {LNF, p. 81). New Historicism 
is perhaps the most influential of these, and what it represents is a new hegemony for 
the radical approach to literature.
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There is a sense of ‘another turn of the cycle’ about this phenomenon, though it is of 
the utmost importance to understand the crucial differences between this approach 
and the Old Historicism. As A.C. Hamilton has argued.
In Frye’s generation, those involved in the academic study of English 
literature were mainly historical scholars who engaged in source 
studies because they held that a literary work being the product of its 
author’s life and times reflected its background o f ideas, beliefs, 
reading, and events.
(RF, p. 103)
Hamilton goes on to identify the main characteristics of contemporary cultural 
criticism, distinguishing it from the Older Historicism:
As expressed by Louis Adrian Montrose: the newer historical criticism 
is new in its refusal o f an unproblematized distinction between 
“literature” and “history,” between “text” and “context”; new in 
resisting a prevalent tendency to posit and privilege a unified and 
autonomous individual -  whether an Author or a Work -  to be set 
against a social or literaiy background’ (Renaissance,’ 6). With such a 
program, the New Historicism has succeeded in transforming the 
academic study of English literature; or, as Montrose declares, its 
theory together chiefly with ferninist theory, ‘has shaken the 
foundations of literary studies’ (‘Professing,’ 25). It has done so [...] 
in the simplest but most profound way possible: it changed the 
dominant master-metaphor of the Old Historicism, ‘Earlier a literary 
work was held up as an artefact that reflected some particular 
historical context; now it is taken to be inextricably embedded in the
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culture of the age -  no longer aesthetically transcendent, or even 
distinguishably literary, but culturally specific’ (The Renaissance of 
the Study,’ 373).
(RF, p. 104)
It is interesting to contrast Frye’s fortunes as a theorist with his success as a Blake 
critic. Frye continues to command remarkable authority within the world of Blake 
studies, even if he shares it with other Blake scholars such as S. Foster Damon and 
David Erdman. In his foreword to Damon’s A Blake Dictionary Morris Eaves states 
that when he started to study Blake his three guides were Frye, Erdman and Damon, 
and comments: ‘But today I’d still endorse my own experience; if Blake is where 
you’re going, Frye Erdman, and Damon should be your guides’ (Damon, p. ix). And 
one could cite scores of other examples where Frye is identified as an illuminating 
Blake critic. Even in cases where the interest is in Blake and ideology, the attitude is 
usually one of great respect, if not reverence. (Of course it is the Frye-Erdman axis 
that is particularly influential."^^) It is no doubt true to say that debunking literaiy 
theories is one thing, and that finding fault with practical criticism is another, 
especially when the practical criticism in question is as magisterial as Fearful 
Symmetry.
But despite the respect for Frye’s Blake criticism, the same revolution took place in 
this context. In 1987 there was a call for a ‘new eighteenth century’. Felicity
In ‘William Blake’ Frye speaks o f ‘moral’ and ‘historical’ allegories. As we would expect, Fiye 
speaks o f his Fearful Symmetry as ‘the most sustained attempt at a critical translation of Blake’s
moral allegory’ (WB, p. 22); in Frye terms, Erdman’s study is characterised by an interest in ‘historical 
allegory’. In his bibliography of Blake criticism entitled ‘William Blake,’ Frye states ‘The study of 
Blake since 1933 may be divided into two main parts, dealing respectively with what in the criticism of 
Spenser would be called the moral and the historical allegory.’ The latter category includes Jacob 
Bronowski’s A Man Without a Mask (1943) and Mark Schorer’s William Blake: The Politics o f Vision 
(1946), but Erdman’8 book is identified by Frye as the most powerful study of Blake’s poetry in the 
tradition o f historical allegory.
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Nussbaum and Laura Brown identified eighteenth-century literature as a particularly 
recalcitrant area. In their A New Eighteenth Century they argue that ‘approaches to 
literature infonued by recent theoretical and political criticisms enable powerful new 
modes of reading and writing about eighteenth-century literature and culture’ {NEC, 
p. 7). The mood of the volume was sanguine: ‘the historical moment of this volume 
[...] is possible only because a number of eighteenth-century scholars are begimiing 
to believe that contemporary theory is now particularly productive for their work’ 
{NEC, p. 9). And from our vantage point it seems that the revolution has reached 
Blake studies. A number of monographs in the field are indicative of the search for a 
new B l a k e . A  recent collection of essays on Blake edited by David Punter represents 
an assemblage of theory-based responses to Blake’s work. Having entered a caveat, 
Punter goes on to state that ‘in or about 1970 there was, nonetheless, a revolution in 
literary c r i t i c i s m H e  goes on to identify six aspects of this development: Marxism, 
psychoanalysis, structuralism, deconstruction, feminism, and the new historicism. 
These revolutions appear in Blake criticism, albeit in a ‘muffled form’ {Punter, p. 7).
Frye on Ideology Criticism
Fiye’s engagement with the new schools of criticism came in Words With Power, 
which he identified as a follow-up volume to Anatomy o f Criticism {WWP, p. xii). In 
Part I Fiye argues that ideology critics attend to just one dimension of a poet’s 
meaningful context. As well as its relation to its times, the writer’s work is bound up 
with the legacy of literary conventions and genres. Frye imagines the ideological as a 
horizontal bar and the literary genealogy as a vertical one:
Examples include Robert N. Essick and Donald Pearce (eds.), Blake in His Time (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1978); Michael Philips (ed.), Interpreting Blake (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978); Hilton and Thomas A. Volger (eds.), Unnam’d Forms: Blake and Textuality 
(Berkley, CA; University o f California Press, 1986).
David Punter, William Blake (London: Macmillan Press, 1996). Further references are abbreviated
to Punter and incorporated parenthetically within the text.
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I think of the poet, in relation to his society, as being at the center of a 
cross like a plus sign. The horizontal bar forms the social and 
ideological conditioning that made liim intelligible to his 
contemporaries, and in fact to lirmself. The vertical bar is the 
mythological line of descent from previous poets back to Homer.
(WWP, p. 47)
Taking this insight one step further, Frye invokes Hopkins’s distinction between 
underthought and over thought. (Overthought is ‘the ideological content (WWP, p. 
59)):
The overthought is the surface meaning of the poem presented; it 
covers most of what the poet’s contemporary readers took in and 
probably, as a mle, most of what the poet himself thought he was 
producing. This is mainly the syntactic or conscious meaning o f the 
poem. The underthought consists of the progression o f imageiy and 
metaphor that supplies an emotional counterpoint to the surface 
meaning, which it often supplements, but also contradicts.
(WWP, p. 57)
Frye illustrates his point with reference to Henry V. On one level the play is 
characterised by ‘a patriotic theme about a heroic English king who invaded and 
conquered France’ (WWP, p. 57); at the same time its concerns also cover ‘the 
injustice and hon*or of war, the misery to be inflicted on both France and England by a 
spoiled child of fortune, and above all, of the ultimate futility of the whole enterprise’ 
(WWP, p. 58).
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Frye has little sympathy for those who ar e solely focused on the ideological relations 
of literature to society. Writers are not embedded in ideology. Returning to the image 
of the plus sign, he states This historical dimension of ideology constitutes the 
“historicity” which surrounds a writer as a womb does an embryo, and which many 
critics think makes up the entire area of criticism’ (WWP, p. 48). But the dangers of 
such practices are manifest:
Critics caught up in a new ideological trend may feel oppressed by the 
burden of the past, and wonder why we should feel obliged to keep 
maintaining a cultural tr adition that practically ignores the interests of 
the trend. The next step is to set up a value system that gives priority 
to whatever seems to illustrate the tr end and devalues the rest, or else 
to devalue the whole cultural tradition of the past in favor of a more 
satisfying culture to be set up in the future.
(WWP, p. 60).
Frye’s first example of such a practice is the Marxist criticism of his generation; 
nowadays that criticism is more commonly refeiTed to as vulgar Marxism on account 
of its heavy-handed ‘let’s abolish the past’ treatment of the cultural heritage. But a 
range of new stock-types have come to the fore: ‘a vulgar Christian, a vulgar 
humanist, a vulgar feminist, and many other forms of what may be called topiary 
criticism’ (WWP, p. 60).
Such a shift in interest is testimony to the continuing ascendancy of logos over mythos 
thinking. Bringing a mythical perspective to bear on contemporary discontents, Frye 
observes that the trial of Socrates ‘symbolized a major and peimanent revolution in 
verbal culture’ (WWP, p. 32). What this revolution represented was ‘the superseding 
of mythos by logos' (WWP, p. 33). ("Logos' states Frye ‘means here an ideological
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rhetoric assumed to be controlled by dialectic and at least at first, identified with 
dialectic (ibid.).) Frye sums up the rationale for this development:
Whatever the limitations of language in reaching reality, it was felt, the 
prose aiTangement of words that advances by propositions and makes 
definite and particular statements gets us further than language bound 
up with stoiy-telling and with the poetic self-containment that can 
neither be refuted nor established, and which is at best only pretends to 
make particular statements.
{WWP, p. 33)
The radical option would have been to embrace ideology criticism. Without opting for 
a reactionary attitude, Frye rejected the notion that ideology criticism should take over 
literaiy criticism. Commenting on the contemporary literary scene, he opines T think 
there should be some critics, however, interested in dealing with literature in terms of 
its own mythical and metaphorical language, for whom nothing is prior in 
significance to literature itself (WWP, p. 27). In Frye’s view cultural studies oriented 
criticism can only foim a ‘reductive approach’ and represent a ‘sub-dialectic’ (NFWE, 
p. 615). Criticism is first and foremost the study of ‘the conception of a total order of 
words’ (ibid.). The best hope for these approaches is that ‘a dialectic between the 
conception of a total order of words [...] and the sub-dialectics of feminism and the 
like’ (ibid.) is developed. ‘Once feminist criticism has understood how much a given 
work owes to patriarchal ideology,’ argues Frye, ‘it can go on to understand how 
much a given work looks like when separated from that ideology, and thereby become 
a positive element within the critical enterprise’ (ibid.). It is at best a ‘half-tmth’ to 
say that every approach is an ideology. For Frye, ‘it is essential to distinguish the 
ideological fi*om the mythological elements in every work of literature’ (NFWE, p.
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ï615). Poets have inherited ‘concerns of food and sex and property and freedom’ from 
myths and folk tales, such interests being concerns that ‘belong to all humanity, and 
are still there whatever their ideological contexts’ (ibid.). The conservative conclusion
■iwould be to fall back on the purely aesthetic approach; without adopting a radical
view Frye argues for the archetypal approach at the time of the New Left. In the |
Introduction to Words With Power he provides another account of the verbal I
universe, reaffirming his view of literature as a verbal universe with a Blakean
.4formulation which distances him from the armchair academic of an older kind or the s
purely spectatorial aesthete: I
I
The critical principle underlying the second part is an inference from 
the principle o f coherence as a critical hypothesis. The poetic 
imagination constructs a cosmos of its own, a cosmos to be studied not 
simply as a map but as a world of powerful conflicting forces. This 
imaginative cosmos is neither the objective environment studied by |
natural sciences nor a subjective inner space to be studied by 
psychology. It is an intermediate world in which the images of higher
and lower, the categories of beauty and ugliness, the feelings of love ;
and hatred, the associations of sense experience, can be expressed only 
by metaphor and yet cannot be either dismissed or reduced to 




Part n  of Words With Power deals with the Bible and secular literature. The ‘poetic 
imagination’ deals with ‘primary human concerns’, of which there are four: ‘(1) 
concerns of bodily integrity (breathing, food and drink), (2) concerns of sexual 
fulfilment or frustration; (3) concerns of property or extensions of power, such as
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money and machinery; (4) concerns of liberty of movement’ (WWP, p. 185). Frye’s 
purpose is to introduce the reader to that dimension of literature which can be studied 
as literature, ‘authentic myth’, distinct from ‘the ideological adaptation of the myth’ 
(WWP, p. 184), and such a purpose distinguishes Frye from radical and conservative 
thinkers once again. Words With Power is to an extent a study of ideology. He 
discusses what he terms ‘four variations’, the mountain, the garden, the cave and the 
furnace, considering ‘ideological adaptation’ in each context: the ideological 
adaptations are ‘the vision of hierarchy, through the chain of being and the like, which 
rationalizes the authority of kings’ (WWP, p. 184), joyless monogamy where ‘a social 
institution dominated by incest-taboo imageiy and metaphors of paternal and maternal 
authority’ (WWP, p. 223), ‘the vicarious continuity of social institutions or 
ideological causes that will survive the individual (WWP, p. 255), and ‘the realization 
that power always corrupts, but that nothing can be done about the ascendancy of such 
coiTUpt power in human society’ (WWP, p. 293). Frye, however, is not primarily 
interested in ideology and does not stop with the analysis of it; in each case he moves 
beyond the radical focus on ideology to the ‘authentic myth’, an interest which once 
again separates and distinguishes him from those of the ideology critics. Again, such a 
critical orientation has nothing to do with conservatism. The ideological adaptations, 
treated with Fiye’s usual contempt for ideology, are suggestive of the four values of 
the theory of the Right: hierarchy, community, authority and property - property is the 
concern of the ‘furnace’ variation, such values being an aggregate which is 
diametrically opposed the values of the French revolution, which are central to Fiye’s 
belief system.
Turning to Blake criticism, everything that Frye says about ideology-criticism applies 
to the new ideology focused criticism of Blake. Frye would have argued in favour of a 
vast, diverse literary culture dedicated to the study of Blake, viewing his own work as 
its centre, and he could only have viewed some of the recent developments in the field 
as once again ‘sub-dialectics’.
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Some of Frye’s commentators have argued that Frye’s theory of literature is not at 
odds with the new radical theories preoccupied with ideology. In ‘Northrop Frye as a 
Cultural Theorist’ A.C. Hamilton draws our attention to Frye’s interest in ‘primary 
mythology which he identifies with literature and a secondary mythology which he 
identifies with ideology’ (RF, p. 114). His conclusion is that ‘Frye is the cultural 
critic of our generation because he is the voice of that primary mythology expressed in 
poetry’ (RF, p. 118), which is strange because it is clearly the case that this is what 
distinguishes Frye from his late contemporaries. His theorisation of ideology points to 
a limited comiection with New Historicist critics and others whose focus is ideology, 
but his principal interest lies elsewhere and so he is at odds with that academic 
culture.
Conclusion
As early as 1976 Frye was ready to say that the mood had changed to such an extent 
that a new conservatism was on the rise. Considering the fact that the radicalism of 
the sixties seems to have melted into air, he expresses his leeriness towards a new 
conservatism;
It would be easy to take a complacent attitude to the relative quiet of 
today and say that the pendulum has swung back. It has, but we should 
look at the whole metaphor: when a pendulum swings back it is always 
later in time. Besides, if a radical reaction includes a good deal of 
hysteria, a conseivative one is bound to include a good deal of inertia.
(NFWE, p. 489)
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Once more, Frye successfully avoided extremes with political overtones, preferring 
instead the Blakean liberal ground he opted for throughout the earlier phase of his
career.
158
Chapter 7: Frye’s Theory of the Bible, and His View of Post- 
Cold War Period
Fiye’s dialectical thinldng continued and concluded with his study of the Bible and 
literature, a project which comprised four books, Creation and Decreation, The 
Great Code, Words With Power, mià. The Double Vision. The Double Vision serves 
the same puipose as The Educated Imagination-, it condenses and presents in an 
accessible form the vision of the longer books; and for this reason it will be of great 
use to us in this chapter. Frye’s wrote these studies against the backdrop of the last 
phase of the Cold War, its end, and its wake, and unsurprisingly considerations of the 
larger geopolitical situation permeate the studies. So extensive are Frye’s political 
writings at this stage that it is again possible to consider his political sensibility at this 
time, as we did in Chapter 5. As we shall see, at this late date, he is still thinking in 
tenns of the transcendence of Left and Right.
In The Great Code Frye comments on the dialectical movement involved in the 
understanding of scripture, discussing it with reference to Dante’s conception of 
polysemous meaning:
The relating o f one’s “literal” understanding of the Bible as a book to 
the rest of one’s loiowledge, more particularly o f the Bible’s 
“background” in history and culture, thus creates a synthesis that soon 
begins to move from the level of knowledge and understanding to an 
existential level, from Dante’s “allegorical” to his “tropological” 
meaning, from Kierkegaard’s “either” or his “or”. Such an 
intensification, whether it has anytliing to do with the Bible or not, 
takes us from knowledge to principles of action, fr om the aesthetic 
pleasure of studying a world of interesting objects and facts to what 
Kierkegaard calls ethical freedom.
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(GC, pp. 228-9)
Our next task is to tlu'ow light on this dialectic. This will lead into the last 
consideration of Frye’s overarching dialectic, and that task complete, I shall turn to 
Frye’s politics once more.
As Frye explains, the mind of the reader moves in two directions. ‘One direction is 
centripetal, where we establish a context out of the words we read; the other is 
centrifugal, where we try to remember what the words mean in the world outside’ 
(NFR, pp. 83-4). Within the centrifugal context, ‘truth’ stems from the success of the 
con'espondence between the structure of words and external nature. The structure is 
true if it is a satisfactory counterpart to the external structure it relates to. This 
understanding of truth is suggestive of one view of ‘literal meaning’, and such 
literalism forais the foundation of the faith of a gi'eat many religious people. History 
in Fiye’s view ‘tells us of real events that we can assimilate to our ordinary 
experience because they are more or less what we should have experienced at the 
time’ (NFR, p. 20). Frye is dismissive of the notion that Scripture is ‘history’ in this 
sense. On the subject of the Exodus he states: ‘Egyptian history Iraows nothing of any 
Exodus, just as Roman history knows nothing of the life of Christ’ (NFR, p. 13). 
When we encounter history proper in the Bible it is ‘didactic and manipulated histoiy’ 
(ibid.). ‘The Bible,’ he argues ‘considered as history, is a baffling and exasperating 
document which the historian has to learn to use, and it creates more problems than it 
solves’ (ibid.). The Exodus is not an accurate historical record. The historical Egypt, 
for that matter, was ’no worse than any other Eastern Nation.’ The accuracy with 
which the Bible records actual events cannot be ascertained. In a sense it is 
unimportant, for ‘the Bible itself does not appear to regard confirming evidence from 
outside itself as really strengthening its case’ (NFR, p. 14). This placing of a literalist 
reading raises a great many moral issues. Distinguishing between varieties of
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‘literalism’, Fiye states that some literalists are ‘extroverted “literalists,”’ and goes on 
to refer to ‘more pathological and racist forais of credal approach’ (NFR, p. 349) in 
language that reminds us of his conception of the ‘real enemy’ as discussed in 
Chapter 5:
In more extroverted “literalists” one may see hysteria in the staring 
glazed eyes, the loud overconfident voice, the forced heartiness, that 
accompany so much expression of conviction on this level. In more 
introverted and speculative types there is a high rate of intellectual 
mortality: a “crisis of faith” frequently occurs sooner or later, and a 
crisis of faith is normally followed by a total loss of it. I pass over the 
more pathological and racist forms of such attitudes, merely saying 
that hysteria, by insisting that an inner state of mind is united when it 
is actually divided, is bomid to project its frustrations sooner or later 
on some outward scapegoat who symbolizes the objecting inner self.
(NFR, p. 349)
So, we move ‘from the historical and doctrinal to the poetic and literary in getting a 
better understanding of the Bible’ (NFR, p. 19). But this step is by no means a 
solution to the question of how one should approach the Bible. ‘It sounds absurd to 
say that the Bible is a work of art or an epic poem like the Iliad or the Mahabharata ’ 
(ibid.). Stories such as that of Samson are folk tales or allegories, and others like the 
story of Job are ‘explicitly poetical’ (NFR, p. 21), but such a solution is ultimately 
reductive. No: the Bible transcends both the literary and the doctrinal.
In a characteristic dialectical manoeuvre Frye introduces a ‘third category’, which he 
identifies as the ‘existential’ (NFR, p. 21). ‘Biblical myths are closer to being poetic 
rather than to being history’ (GC, p. 46), but ’trying to reduce the Bible entirely to the
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hypothetical basis of poetiy clearly will not do’ {GC, p. 47). Here Frye introduces the 
distinction made by Bible scholars between Weltgeschichte and Heilsgeschichte. 
History as we are most familiar with it is represented by the former; the latter is ’the 
history of God’s actions in the world and man’s relation to them’ (GC, p. 47). Frye 
thinks in terms of two levels of reality: the spiritual and the natural. In his view myth 
presents us with an alternative to what actually happens. ‘The assumption is that in 
some events, at least, our ordinary experience does not tell us what is really 
happening’ he states. Scripture, then, does not present us with a falsification of 
history. Rather, it informs us of the spiritual form of events. ‘This may not be what 
you would have seen if you had been there, but what you would have seen would have 
missed the whole point of what was really going on’ (GC, p. 48).
The Bible combines spiritual history and world history, and this dimension of the 
Bible becomes clear when we consider it as spiritual history. The essential mythos of 
Biblical Weltgeschichte is ‘the inverted-U or negative cycle, the rise and fall of the 
aggregates of human power’; that of Heilsgeschichte ‘the U-shaped positive cycle, the 
fall and rise of the representative of humanity itself, Adam or Israel or Job’ (NFR, p. 
16). The former presents us with Joshua’s conquest of Canaan; but the end of the rise 
of the positive cycle is a spiritual event, what we would have missed had we been 
there equipped with our limited powers of perception:
The symbol of the end of the rise is Moses on top of a mountain seeing 
the Promised Land, or Elijah going up in a chariot of fire, or Job 
contemplating God’s leviathan, or Jesus ascending into the sky.
Nobody in history has ever seen the Promised Land.
(NFR, p. 16)
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As we shall see, ‘the U-shaped positive cycle’ is merely a stage in the process of the 
sharpening of spiritual vision -  specifically the stage Frye connects with ‘prophecy’. 
Of course the nanative unit on this level of response is still recognisably an event. It 
may be an event which strikes us as mythical, but an event it remains. But gospel and 
apocalypse follow on from prophecy, and for Frye the focus of Scripture becomes the 
meaning of Scripture in the Book of Revelation. In Revelation narrative is meaning; 
myth becomes metaphor, hi the apotheosis of Scripture the focus is still on what is 
happening, but what is happening is ‘the body of the Messiah, the man who is all 
men, the totality of the logoi who is one Logos, the grain of sand that is the world’ 
(GC, p. 224).
The spiritual form of events is brought out progressively in scripture, and Fiye 
discusses the process in teims of the typology of the Bible. Christianity has always 
read its Bible as a typological structure:
The general principle of interpretation is tiaditionally given as “In the 
Old Testament the New Testament is concealed; in the New Testament 
the Old Testament is revealed.” Everything that happens in the Old 
Testament is a “type” or adumbration o f something that happens in the 
New Testament, and the whole subject is therefore called typology.
(GC, p. 79)
In contrast to secular literature, the content of the Bible is revelation, and Frye thinks 
in terms of seven main phases of revelation. Each phase is the ‘type’ of which the 
next is the ‘antitype’. And it is this fact that points to the dialectical nature of Frye’s 
thinking in this area. ‘There seems to be a sequence or dialectical progression in this 
revelation, as the Christian Bible proceeds from the beginning to the end of its story. 
[...] Each phase is not an improvement on its predecessor but a wider perspective on
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it’ (GC, p. 106). If in the older liberal Protestant tradition, gospel and the gospels 
were often seen as opposed to apocalypse -  certainly apocalypse as manifested in the 
Revelation of Jolin, which could be seen as a lurid and partly sub-New Testament text 
- Frye yokes the two together:
First is the Creation, not the natural environment with its alienating 
chaos but the ordered structure that the mind perceives in it. Next 
comes the revolutionary vision of human life as a casting off to 
tyranny and exploitation. Next is the ceremonial, moral, judicial code 
that keeps a society together. Next is the wisdom or sense of integrated 
continuous life which grows out of this, and next the prophecy or 
imaginative vision of man as somewhere between his original and his 
ultimate identity. Gospel and apocalypse speak of a present that no 
longer finds its meaning in the future, as the New Testament’s view of 
the Old Testament, but is a present moment around which past and 
future revolve.
(GC, pp. 224-5)
We might usefully take a closer look at a number of these phases of Frye’s course 
tlu'ough Scripture. Frye pinpoints a central sequence of revelation spread over the four 
phases of revolution, law, wisdom and prophecy. Wisdom represents an 
individualisation of law, and prophecy an individualisation of revolution. ‘The 
conception of wisdom in the Bible,’ in his view, ‘as we see most clearly in some of 
the psalms, starts with the individualising of law, with allowing the law, in its human 
and moral aspect, to permeate and inform all one’s personal life’ (GC, p. 121), In 
coimection with a degenerate conception of education, wisdom is undesirable, a point 
that Frye refers to with deft irony: ‘Education is the attaining of the right forms of
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Vulgate phrase ludens in orbe terrarum, playing over all the earth.
(GC, p. 125)
suggests the wisdom phase provides us with the key to human freedom:
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I
behaviour and the persistence in them, hence, like a horse, one has to be broken into 
them’ (ibid.). In its second aspect, however, wisdom is prudence, ’a pragmatic 
following of the courses that maintain one’s stability and balance from one day to the 
next’ (ibid.). Frye states that ‘The teaching of [Ecclesiastes] comes to focus on a 
“work ethic” of “whatsoever thy hand frndeth to do, do it with all thy might” (9:10)’
(GC, pp. 125), but Frye wishes to combine work with its opposite, play. ‘Play [is] the 
fulfilment of work, the exhibition of what work has been for’ (ibid.). Such play, 
suggestive of a Blakean celebration of energy as eternal delight, is a human analogy of 
God’s acts of creation:
The point is even clearer in the Book of Proverbs, where Wisdom is 
personified as an attribute of God from the time of creation, expressing
Iin particular the exuberance of creation, the spilling over of life and 
energy in nature that so deeply impresses the prophets and poets o f the 
Bible. The AV speaks of this wisdom as "rejoicing in the habitable
. ipart of his earth” (8:31), but this is feeble compared to the tremendous f
I
Frye concludes with two observations about wisdom. In the secular context he
Iconnects wisdom with education, but the real form of human wisdom is the 
"philosophia or love of wisdom that is creative and not simply erudite’ (ibid.). His 
second point raises wisdom beyond the kind of prudence that was his starting point in 
this section. In his discussion of law Frye paraphrases Sartre’s Being and 1Nothingness: ‘the problem of human freedom cannot be worked out wholly within the
"Icategories of man as we know him and nature as we see it’ (GC, p. 121). Now he I
The primitive form of wisdom, using past experience as a balancing 
pole for walking the tightrope of life, finally grows, through incessant 
discipline and practice, into the final freedom of movement where, in 
Yeats’s phrase, we can no longer tell the dancer from the dance.
(GC, p. 125)
Wisdom is preoccupied with the past. Clearly another process of individualisation is 
required, one which is oriented to the future. ‘Prophecy is the individualizing of the 
revolutionary impulse, as wisdom is the individualizing of the law, and is geared to 
the future as wisdom is to the past’ (GC, p. 125). However, this individualising of the 
revolutionary impulse turns out to be a development of the previous phase of 
revelation, wisdom. ‘[Prophecy] incorporates the perspective of wisdom but enlarges 
it’ (GC, p. 128). Frye here reverts to the primitive conception of wisdom. ‘The wise 
man thinks of the human situation as a kind of horizontal line, formed by precedent 
and tradition and extended by prudence: the prophet sees man in a state of alienation 
caused by his own distractions, at the bottom of a U-shaped cuiwe. [...] It postulates 
an original state of relative happiness, and looks forward to an eventual restoration of 
this state, to, at least a “saving remnant” (GC, 128). Wisdom is characterised by ‘its 
sense of continuity, repetition, precedent, and prudence’ (GC, p. 125), but as Frye has 
already indicated ‘the anxiety of continuity in time has to be superseded sooner or 
later by a break with it’ (GC, pp. 107-8), and it is prophecy that effects this break, for 
prophecy urges us to think of the present as essentially an unmoored entity. ‘The wise 
man’s present moment is the moment in which past and future are balanced, the 
uncertainties of the future being minimized by the observance of law that comes down 
from the past. The prophet’s present moment is an alienated prodigal son, a moment 
that has broken away from its own identity in the past but may return to that identity 
in the future’ (GC, p. 128-9).
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Frye argues that ‘The gospel is a further intensifying of the prophetic vision’
(GC, p. 129). He argues that Jesus’ Incamation and resurrection are suggestive of a 
distinction between ‘those who think of achieving the spiritual kingdom as a way of 
life and those who understand it merely as a doctrine’ (GC, p. 129). Frye focuses on 
the conception of ‘repentance’, though he uses the Greek term "metanoia\ allowing 
greater freedom of interpretation. ‘What one repents of is sin’, he states, but ‘sin’ is 
understood as ‘a matter of trying to block the activity of God,’ which entails the 
‘curtailing of human freedom’ (GC, p. 130). In the context of wisdom he has made 
reference to the visible and invisible order of reality. Our world is a world of vanity, 
meaning that it is a world of emptiness: ‘To put Koheleth’s central intuition into the 
form of its essential paradox; all things are frill of emptiness’ (GC, p. 123). ‘The 
dialectic of metanoia and sin splits the world into the kingdom of genuine identity, 
presented as Jesus’ “home,” and a hell, a conception found in the Old Testament only 
in the form of death or the grave’ (GC, p. 130).
Such a vision marks the beginning of a wholly new experience of time and space, 
where man goes beyond his essentially alienated relation to nature, and these 
considerations take Frye back to the Blakean view of time and space we considered in 
Chapter 2:
As a form of vision, metanoia reverses our usual conceptions of time 
and space. The central points of time and space are now and here, 
neither o f which exists in ordinaiy experience. In ordinary experience 
“now” continually vanishes between the no longer and the not yet. We 
may think o f “here” as a hazy mental circumference around ourselves, 
but whatever we locate in ordinary space, inside it or outside it, is 
“there” in a separated alien world. In the “kingdom” the eternal and 
infinite are not time and space made endless (they are endless already)
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but are the now and the here made real, an actual present and an actual 
presence.
(GC, p. 130)
In one section Frye speaks of the gospel as an antitype of each of the phases preceding 
it. Gospel represents an individualising of the law founded on the category of 
prophecy rather than wisdom (GC, p. 131). Citing Paul, he states that this gospel 
‘sets one free of the law’ (GC, p. 132). Of course thus far Frye has spoken only in 
individual terms, though ‘the gospel also brings in a new conception o f ’’Israel” as the 
citizens of the kingdom of God [...] a possible social resurrection, a transformation 
that will split the world of history into a spiritual kingdom and a hell’ (GC, p. 135). 
The Book of Revelation is densely woven with allusions to the Old Testament; it 
should be thought of as ‘a progression of antitypes’ (GC, p. 135). The vision of St 
John the Divine is a vision of ‘the true meaning of the Scriptures, [...] his dragons and 
his horsemen and dissolving cosmos [...] what he saw in Ezekiel and Zechariah’ 
(ibid.).
The apocalyptic vision has two aspects. ‘One is what we may call the panoramic 
apocalypse, the vision of staggering marvels placed in a near future and just before the 
end of time’ (GC, p. 136). This is essentially the view of traditional Christian 
orthodoxy:
As a panorama, we look at it passively, which means that it is 
objective to us. This in turn means that it is essentially a projection of  
the subjective “knowledge o f good and evil” acquired at the fall. That 
knowledge, we now see, was wholly within the framework o f law; it is 
contained by a final “judgment,” where the world disappears into its 
two unending constituents, a heaven and a hell, into one of which man
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automatically goes, depending on the relative strength of the 
prosecution and defence.
(GC, p. 136)
But a ‘second or participating apocalypse,’ related to the apocalyptic vision of secular 
literature, and opposed to a spectatoiial apocalypse, follows on from the first;
The panoramic apocalypse ends with the restoration of the tr ee and 
water of life, the two elements o f the original creation. But perhaps, 
like other restorations, this one is the type of something else, a 
resurrection or upward metamoiphosis to a new beginning that is now 
present. [...] The panoramic apocalypse gives way, at the end to a 
second apocalypse that, ideally, begins in the reader’s mind as soon as 
he has finished reading, a vision that passes tlu ough the legalized 
vision of ordeals and trials and judgments and comes out into a second 
life.
(GC, p. 137)
Our next step is to look more closely at what Frye means by ‘second life’, though our 
approach must of a necessity be somewhat circuitous, for in order to gain an 
understanding of Frye’s conception of Biblical vision we must first clarify his notion 
of Biblical imagery and meaning.
Frye opted for the term Gcerygma" to designate the idiom of Scripture and sacred texts 
generally. Kerygma is typical of sacred writings generally. (He also points out that 
‘secular kerygma’ (WWP, p. 117) is also a fact of literary experience, but it is sacred 
kerygma he is primarily interested in.) He thinks in terms of a linear arrangement of
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‘modes of language’. The first of these modes is the conceptual; it borders the 
rhetorical, which on the other side borders the poetic. Kerygma lies heyond the 
poetic. It is, he goes on, ‘a mode of language on the other side of the poetic’ (WWP, 
pp. 100-1). Invoking Longinus, Frye associates kerygma with ‘the ecstatic state of 
response’ (WWP, p. I l l ) ,  calling it ‘the proclamation that takes one out of oneself 
(ibid.). Kerygmatic utterances, which may also be thought of as ‘the oracular or 
discontinuous prophetic’ (ibid.), ‘stand out of their context’ and allow us to ‘break 
through into a different dimension of response’ (ibid.). ‘An utterance of this sort’ 
explains Frye, ‘is one charged with such intensity, urgency or authority that it 
penetrates the defences of the human receiving apparatus and creates a new channel 
of response’ (WWP, pp. 111-2), This last is suggestive of the dark side of kerygma. 
Terror is always an aspect of it. When reading we may be ‘confronted by a verbal 
formula that insists on becoming a part of us’ (WWP, p. 114); this is the discovery of 
kerygma. The central theme of all kerygmatic writing is “‘How do I live a more 
abundant life?”’ (WWP. p. 116). Kerygma presents us with a “‘myth to live by,” a 
myth which is a continuous model for action’ (WWP, p. 117). We are in a ‘genuinely 
kerygmatic realm’ where ‘the cleavage between active speech and reception of speech 
merges into unity’ (WWP, p. 118).
Kerygma represents a ‘transforming power’ and it is based on myth and metaphor, or 
‘imaginative literalism’, Fiye’s tenn for the anti-literal approach to Scripture, ‘hi the 
Bible’ he states ’the literal meaning is the poetic meaning, first by tautology, in the 
context in which all literal meaning is centripetal and poetic; secondly, in a quite 
specific sense of confronting us with explicitly metaphorical and other forms of 
distinctively poetic utterance’ (GC, p. 62). Frye has borrowed Aristotle’s distinction 
between poetic universal narrative and the particular historical one, and goes on to 
express regret that Aristotle did not provide us with an account of ‘poetic or universal 
meaning and particular meaning’ (GC, p. 64). Frye’s contention is that there may be a 
unit of meaning which is as universal as myth, contrasting with ordinary meaning in
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exactly the same way as myth contrasts with history. Thus, ‘it has, or rather is, a 
structure of universalisée! or poetic meaning that can sustain a number of discm'sive 
theological interpretations’ (GC, p. 64).
The Bible, we said, has a historical myth that by-passes conventional 
historical criteria: it is neither a specific history nor a purely poetic 
vision, but presents the history of Israel, past and future, in a way that 
leaves conventional history free to do its own work. Similarly, it has, 
or rather is, a structure of universalized or poetic meaning that can 
sustain a number of discursive theological interpretations.
((%:, p. 64)
1
‘Traditionally, the Bible’s narrative has been regarded as “literally” historical and its 
meaning as “literally” doctrinal or didactic’ (GC, p. 64). Meaning in the Bible, then, 
is metaphorical meaning, just as actions are mythical actions. Frye would have us
,1.think in terms of a reading process that, in the first instance at least, ends with 
metaphor rather than discursive meaning. What this means is that the narrative of the 
Bible is thought of in terms of myth; less obvious but equally important, metaphor is 
to be viewed as the meaning of Scripture, a conception which, if it is familiar to the 
Frye scholar, may nevertheless strike a person with a credal approach to faith as 
unusual or indeed bizarre.
What is most interesting for Frye is the fact that the Bible brings out its own meaning 
as it proceeds. He comments that the most striking characteristic of the Bible is its 
capacity for re-creation. The apotheosis of its vision is presented in Revelation, which 
represents an account of the total meaning of Scripture, which as we have said, is ‘a 
single metaphor cluster, the metaphors all being identified with the body of the
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Messiah’ (GC, p. 224). It is this vision that is continuously refined through the seven 
phases of revelation, this ‘meaning’ which the reader who has followed these phases 
comes into the possession of. A reproduction of the Table of Apocalyptic hnageiy and 
Table of Demonic Imagery may be useful to the reader.
Table of Apocalyptic Imagery
Category Class or Group Form Individual
Divine [Trinity] God
Spiritual or Angelic 1) Fire-spirits (Seraphim) Spirit as Flame
2) Air-spirits (Cliembim) Spirit as Dove or Wind
Paradisal Garden of Eden Tree of Life
Water of Life
Human People as Bride (Israel) Bridegroom
Animal Sheepfold or Flock 1) Shepherd
2) Lamb
(Body and Blood)
Vegetable Harvest and Vintage Bread and Wine
(First fruits)
Mineral City (Jerusalem) Temple;
Highway Stone
(GC, p. 166)
Each ‘apocalyptic or idealized image in the Bihle has a demonic counterpart’ (GC, p. 
145). ‘Whatever is not part of the hody of Clnist’ states Frye ‘forms a demonic 
shadow, a parody of the apocalyptic vision in a context of evil and tyranny (NFR, p. 
352), just as in does in Frye’s Blake theory.
Table of Demonic Imagery 
Category
Divine [Satan]











2) Demons of Tempest 
Waste Land and 




Tree and water of 
Heathen Power 
Great Whore” Nero,








Beasts of Prey Deified Animal
or Fertility (Bull, Serpent)
Vegetation Gods and 
Earth-Mothers 
Heathen City Tower of 
(Babylon, Rome) Babel
(GC, p. 167)
In an earlier chapter of The Great Code Frye had introduced the conception of the 
‘royal metaphor’, reworking the thoughts on aspects of metaphor he discussed in 
connection with Blake and literature;
We spoke o f the simple metaphor, of the “Joseph is a fruitful bough” 
type, as an identifying o f A with B, and said that such a metaphor is 
anti-logical. In logic A can only be A, never B, and to assert that A 
“is” B overlooks all the real differences between tlrem. But there is 
another form of identification that we do not think of as metaphorical 
but as the basis o f all ordered categorical thinking. There is 
identification as as well as identification with. We iderrtify A as A 
when we make it an individual of the class to which it belongs: that 
brown and green object outside my window I identify as a tree. When 
we combine these two forms of identification, and identify an 
individual with its class, we get an extremely powerful and subtle 
form of metaphor, which I sometimes call the royal metaphor.
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(GC, p. 87)
In the context of secular literature and the secular analogy of this vision Frye speaks 
of the ’concrete universal,’ stating that ‘there are no real uni versais in poetry’, only 
poetic ones’ (AC, p. 124). But the apocalyptic vision of the Bible is founded on the 
real universal, this being the proper tenn for the royal metaphor. In a crucial passage 
in The Great Code Fi*ye discusses the fact that although it may seem that Clnistianity 
is bound to develop in a centralised fashion, it must not be. Frye begins this line of 
enquiry with reference to totalitarianism and the situation in which ‘the individual is a 
member of a larger body, and exists primarily as a function of that body (GC, p. 99). 
Totalitarian regimes rely on a perennial aspect of human character, ‘loyalty’, which 
represents ‘the result of basing one’s life, or the essential part of it, on the realizing of 
a metaphor, specifically some foim of royal metaphor’ (ibid.), Fiye accepts the idea 
that religion involves the same subjugation of the individual. ‘What is significant 
here’ he writes ‘is that religious bodies do not effectively express any alternative of 
loyalty to the totalitarian state, because they use the same metaphors of merging and 
individual subseiwience’ (GC, p. 100). But what interests Frye is an alternative way 
of foimulating the royal metaphor, one which redeems the Church. He conceives of 
the Church as being characterised by a decentralising tendency:
Paul, for example, says that he is dead as what we should call an ego, 
and that only Chr ist lives within him (Galatians 2:20, and similarly 
elsewhere). This is the same metaphor, but the metaphor is turned 
inside out. Instead of an individual finding his fulfillment within a 
social body, however sacrosanct, the metaphor is reversed from a 
metaphor of integration into a wholly decentralized one, in which the 
total body is complete within each individual. The individual acquires 
the internal authority o f the unity of the Logos, and it is this unity that 
makes him an individual.
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(ibid.)
It is this understanding of the apocalyptic vision which interests Frye. Such a vision is 
one of ‘particularity’ rather than one of ’unity and integration’ (GC, p. 167):
The apocalyptic vision, in which the body of Christ is the
ymetaphor holding together all categories of being in an
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identity, presents us with a world in which there is only one 
knower, for whom there is nothing outside of or objective to ;
that knower, hence nothing dead or insensible. This knower is 
also tlie real consciousness in each o f us.
(GC, p. 166)
Fiye associates different conceptions of the human identity with different phases of 
language. He associates the metonymic phase with a theological standpoint as well as 
a conception of the human subject. ‘In proportion as metonymic thinking and its 
monotheistic God developed, man came to be thought of as a single “soul” and a 
body, related by the metaphor of “in” (GC, p. 19). The demotic phase of language 
alters our conception of the human subject. ‘In the third phase’ argues Frye ‘the 
conception associated with consciousness modulates from “soul” to “mind,” and the 
relation with the bodily world of nature, including one’s own body, becomes more 
horizontal’ (ibid.):
The well-adjusted individual in a primitive society is composed of 
what Paul calls the soma psychikon, or what the King James Bible 
translates as the "natural man” (1 Corinthians 2:14). He has, or thinks,
: i
. T
he has a soul, or mind, or consciousness, sitting on top of certain 
impulses and desires tliat are traditionally called “bodily.”
(NFR, p. 175)
But scripture leads directly to what Frye thinlcs of as a rebirth. Vision leads to the 
development of the ‘spiritual body’:
The genuine human being thus bom is the soma pneumatikon, the 
spiritual body (1 Corinthians 15:44). This phrase means that tire 
spiritual man is a body: the natural man or soma psychikon merely has 
one. The resurrection o f the spiritual body is the completion of the 
kind o f life the New Testament is talking about [,..].
(NFR, p. 176)
Frye speaks scathingly of what he terms ‘professed belief. Belief in this form leads to 
divisions surfacing in religious communions:
The unwillingness of so many religious temperaments to try to grasp 
the reality o f a revelation in any but doctrinal terms recurs in a number 
of religious communions. It accounts for the divergence in emphasis 
between, say, the Talmudic and Kabbalistic traditions in Judaism, the 
scholastic and mystical developments in medieval Catholicism, a 




Professed- belief also leads us to think in tenus of mutually antipathetic religions. 
‘Professed belief is essentially a statement of loyalty or adherence to a specific 
community. To profess a faith’ he continues ‘identifies us as Unitarians or Trotskyists 
or Taoists or Shiite Muslims or whatever’ (GC, p. 229). In addition, ‘professed belief 
in itself is instinctively aggressive’ (ibid.). Worse: ‘professed belief can take the form 
of ‘orthodox’ or ‘fundamentalist’ belief, and fundamentalism reaches for temporal 
power. Speaking of the separation of church and state, Frye states
It seems to be a general rule that the more “orthodox” or 
“fundamentalist” a religious attitude is, the more strongly it resents this 
separation and the more consistently it lobbies for legislation giving its 
formulas secular authority.
(NFR, p. 175)
And the acquiring of temporal power opens the door to warfare:
I have given the example elsewhere of a Spaniard and a Turk facing 
one another at the battle of Lepanto. Neither knows the first thing 
about the other man’s religion, but each is convinced that it is utterly 
and damnably wrong, and would be ready to fight and die for that 
conviction. We may consider this only an example of Swift’s remark 
that men have just enough religion to hate each other but not enough 
for love. But even on a high level of integrity, where theory and 
practice coincide, faith is still militant, still something to be 
symbolized, as Paul does, by armor and weapons.
(GC, p. 229)
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But beyond professed belief ‘there is another level on which our belief is what our 
actions show that we believe’ (NFR, p. 80), and Frye’s dialectical view of the Bible 
points in this direction. ‘Religions, theistic or atheistic, are units which define 
themselves in such a way as to cut off the possibility of their being parts of larger 
wholes’ (NFR, p. 81). But speaking of ‘a level of common action and social vision’ 
Frye states, in a supremely liberal moment, that ‘At this level all beliefs become to 
some degree partial’ (ibid.). In Frye’s view it is possible for man to ‘transcend the 
level of professed belief, and reach the level of a worldwide community of action and 
charity’ (NFR, p. 82).
Drawing on the language of the Epistle to the Hebrews, Frye argues in ‘The Dialectic 
of Belief and Vision’ that ‘faith is the hypostasis of the hoped for and the elenchos of 
things not seen [11:1]’, and argues that the best translation of hypostasis is 
‘substance’, while elenchos should be translated as ‘manifestation’. The first 
observation to make in coimection with this definition of faith is that ‘if faith is the 
substance of the “hoped for” (elpizomenon ), faith and hope, two of the three 
theological virtues named by Paul [1 Corinthians 13:13], are essentially connected’ 
(NFR, p. 350). If in the ‘traditional view’ ‘the visionary model of faith is the 
professed faith’ (ibid.), Frye connects hope with the ideal models we have in our 
minds, and faith with action rather than a declaration of adherence. Knowledge of the 
Bible represents hope, and our faith is the realisation of that vision in our actions. In 
Chapter 4 we saw that for Frye indifference is detacliment without concern, and 
anxiety concern without detachment, and using belief and vision as synonymous with 
faith and hope, he identifies belief without vision, and vision without belief as vices, 
too (NFR, pp. 350-1). Acting faithfully in accordance with a model produced by hope 




Of course there is no guarantee that the model that one’s actions are informed by is a 
good model, and this factor takes Frye on to considerations of the third and most 
important theological virtue. Speaking of ‘Paul’s third great virtue, agape or love’ 
{NFR, p. 359), Frye concludes his consideration by putting agape above the others: 
‘Outside its orbit, faith and hope are not necessarily virtues at all; the same machinery 
of action conforming to a model vision goes into operation when we are embezzling 
funds or murdering our spouses (ibid.). Within the secular context, fraternity is 
especially important in Frye’s thinking. Ultimately, love makes its appearance ‘not as 
a third virtue, but as the only virtue there is’ (ibid.).
In The Great Code Frye seems to connect his own thinking with ‘liberal theology’ 
(GC, p. 44). While considering Biblical literalism Frye refutes the thinking of 
literalistic theology in no uncertain terms:
Someone recently asked me, after seeing a television program about 
the discovery of a large boat-shaped stnicture on Mount Ararat with 
animal cages in it, if  I did not think that this alleged discovery 
“sounded the death knell of liberal theology.” The first thing that 
occurred to me was that the Bible itself could not care less whether 
anyone ever finds an ark on Mount Ararat or not.
(ibid.)
It is clearly Frye’s intention to move beyond this understanding of the Christian Bible 
to something more progressive or liberal in character. As J. Russell Perkin argues, 
Frye was opposed ‘literalism or fundamentalism and the social and personal anxieties
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After struggling for centuries to shape European beliefs and practices, 
the Church was, alas, accustomed to moral hegemony, to its own 
privileged role in society. Even though it carefully refrained from 
employing physical force itself, it had learned to ‘co-opt’ the secular 
aim, and thereby, at times, enforce its own doctrines. In that way, the 
Church violated the ‘Christian liberty’ which many o f its deepest 
thinkers -  even for a time St Augustine -  had always understood as 
mling out coercion in matters of belief. There could only be one result. 
From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, growing numbers of
Î
he associated with the approach’, hoping to foster instead a ‘liberal or liberating 
experience’ {NFAW, p. 152).
j.
!Undoubtedly. Frye’s theory of the Bible strikes the reader as thoroughly liberal, but 
there is a difference between the political backdrop to this area of his thinking and the 
prior ones. In the previous sections in which we have looked at Frye’s thinking we 
have uncovered attitudes to culture which are undialectical and highly political, hi 
each case oppositions bearing left-wing and right-wing alliances form the background 
to Frye’s thinking, and his own thinking is suggestive of how this opposition, along 
with its political sympathies, might be transcended. It is difficult to view his theory of 
the Bible in teims of a dialectic as we did in previous chapters, for we do not start out 
with a clear radical and conservative background. Historically the Left has not 
produced its own version of faith and scripture, preferring anti-clericalism to a 
coherent alternative. In his Democracy in Europe Lairy Siedentop concisely 
summarises the burgeoning of anti-clericalism in Europe:
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European intellectuals turned the moral intuitions generated by 
Christianity against the Church itself.
Such anti-clericalism, according to Seidentop is not typical of American liberalism;
‘in the United States the Church has in the past made a crucial contribution to moral 
consensus. There, what was understood as Christian morality provided a theory of 
justice which has permeated American society’ {DIE, p. 15). However, no coherent 
left-wing typology emerged in that continent either.
What makes an impression on the reader of The Great Code is that Frye wishes to 
move beyond an orthodox or credal approach to Christianity. All religions, he argues, 
traditionally view narrative as literally historical and meaning as literally conceptual. 
And traditional typology is also thoroughly conservative. As Frye explains, the central 
antitypes are the coming of the Messiah and the restoration of Israel. In this version 
real events serve as the ‘types’ of real future events, especially Christ’s Incamation 
and the restoration. Such prophecies were understood literally and so led to the 
expectation of an immanent end of history. The coming of Christ meant that in a 
sense Christianity’s antitype became a thing of the past. This being a contradiction in 
teims, ‘A Second Coming had to grow up along with the doctrine of the Incamation’. 
This led to an introversion of the Church’s typological thinking. Fiye makes his point 
with reference to Newman, and his specifically Catholic observation about Biblical 
typology. (The reader may take issue with Frye’s account of Newman’s theology, but 
our main interest is Frye’s view of Newman.)
As century after century passed without a second coming, the Church 
developed a progressive and forward moving structure of doctrine, one
Larry Siedentop, Democracy in Europe (London: Penguin Books, 2001), p. 197. Fuither references
are abbreviated to DIE and incorporated parenthetically within the text.
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that carries the typology of the Bible on in history and adapts it to 
what we have called second-phase, or metonymic language. This 
structure o f doctr ine became mcreasingly the compulsory means of 
understanding the Bible; and so, as Cardinal Newman remarked in the 
nineteenth century, the function of the Bible, for the church, came to 
be not to teach doctrhre but to prove or illustrate it.
(GC, p. 85)
On another level, however, the very fact that Frye turns to the Bible at this stage of his 
career completes, as I have already suggested, a dialectical manoeuvre which does 
have a political dimension. Having focused on secular themes and reached 
conclusions which point to an affirmation of the ideals of the French revolution, Frye 
affirms the authority of the Christian Bible, and more especially the tlrree theological 
virtues, of which agape is the greatest. If it is clear to us that Fiye’s interest in both 
secular and sacred realms is coherent, we might even say that his secular conclusions 
are derived from his Christian faith; the fact that historically the Left has been anti­
clerical means that his engagement with both the secular world and scripture is 
suggestive of an overarching combination of Left and Right in his work.
Just as Fiye’s view of education was connected to his attitude towards the political 
situation of his times, so his view of scripture belongs within the context of 
contemporary histoiy too, and we should conclude this chapter by turning to the 
dialectic within politics which he connected with this work on the Bible.
Beyond Left and Right II
In Chapter 5 we saw that Frye acknowledged that the Marxist analysis is a veiy 




labour is more significant than ‘conflicts of civilizations’ (NFMC, p. 313). Of course 
in recent times Samuel P. Huntington has promulgated the argument that from the I
1990s onwards it was the clash of civilisations which characterised international 
conflict. In The Double Vision Frye seems to consider the potential for conflict 
created by literalism in religion, identifying literalism as what lies behind the 
shameful historical record of religions. Having spoken of ‘the psychosis of heresy- 
hunting, of regarding all deviation from approved doctrine as a malignant disease that
3,
had to be ruthlessly stamped out’ (NFR, p. 177), he goes on to consider the root of 
such evil. He moves well beyond the end of the Cold War to consider the new dangers 
presented by religious fundamentalism, Islamic and Christian:
I am, of course, isolating only one element in Chiistianity, but cruelty, 
terror, intolerance, and hatred within any religion always mean that 
God has been replaced by the devil, and such things are always 
accompanied by a false kind of literalism. At present some other 
religions, notably Islam, are even less reassuring than our own. As 
Marxist and American imperialisms decline, the Moslem world is 
emerging as the chief threat to world peace, and the spark-plug o f its 
intransigence, so to speak, is its fundamentalism or false literalism of 
belief. [...] In our own culture, Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s 
Tale depicts a future New England in which a reactionary religious 
movement has brought back the hysteria, bigotry, and sexual sadism of 
seventeenth century Puritanism. Such a development may seem 
unlikely just now, but the potential is all here.
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However, at this late stage Frye is still primarily interested in the opposition of 
capitalism and communism, as well as the transcendence of them. In the immediate 
post-war period he hoped that laissez faire would die out. hnprovements in 
democracy would lead to a universal acknowledgement that democracy was superior 
to Communism, as a result, democracy would spread, while Communism would die 
out. Fiye’s hopes failed to materialize, and laissez faire emerged from the Cold War 
with new found confidence, which would have been a deeply ironic development for 
Fiye, given that had he hoped that the defeat of Communism could only come about 
thi'ough abandonment of laissez faire. It was the presidency of Ronald Reagan that 
aggi'essively reasserted the ethos of the free-market. (Interestingly, Reagan’s politics 
had made an impression on Fiye within the context of the student unrest of the late 
sixties. In 1969 unrest broke out at University of California, Berkley, and Reagan, 
who was Governor of California at the time, opted for a high-profile campaign 
directed at the suppression of the students ‘Reagan ‘is visibly admiring his own image 
as a firm and sane administrator’ {NFWE, p. 387) stated Frye in May 1969.). The 
process of rolling back the changes introduced by the Great Society and New Deal 
was started during his time in office. Tax breaks for the rich were accompanied by a 
restructuring of the welfare system. Nixon had introduced New Federalism during his 
presidency, and New Federalism was taken up by Reagan as a means of transforming 
the U.S. from a welfare state to a ‘workfare’ one. New Deal initiatives such as Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) were targets for the new ethos. The ethos 
of the Republican party under Reagan was summed up in the observation 
‘Government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem. ’
Fiye’s view of these developments was unsurprisingly critical:
With the decline o f belief in Marxism, apart from an intellectual
minority in the West that doesn’t have to live with it, the original
Marxist vision is often annexed by the opposite camp. Going back to
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the competitive economy that Marx denounced, we are told, will mean 
a new life for the human race, perhaps even the ultimate goal that 
Marx himself promised: an end to exploitation and class straggle.
{NFR, p. 168)
He goes on: ‘Hope springs eternal: unfortunately it usually springs prematurely 
(ibid.). If we were in any doubt as to Frye’s position he goes on to speak warmly of 
the New Deal and similar movements in the West, and make critical remarks about 
the new faith in laissez-faire:
For all the see-sawing between nationalizing and privatizing, the 
pennanent effects o f the Roosevelt revolution in the United States, and 
parallel revolutions in Western Europe, make it impossible to put any 
faith in back-to-square-one clichés.
(NFR, p. 169)
The philosophy of managerialism has had its hey-day and Frye does not revert to its 
idiom now. However, his analysis remains largely the same. At this point in time, in 
the late eighties, Frye also feels compelled to warn once again, using language which 
reminds us of Burnliam, that ‘In capitalism there is both a democratic and an 
oligarchic tendency, and the moral superiority of capitalism over communism 
depends entirely on the ascendancy of the democratic element’ {NFR, p. 169).
To help him explain what happened and what must now happen Frye introduces new 
conceptions: primary and secondary concern:
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Primaiy concerns rest on platitudes so bald and obvious that one 
hesitates to list them; it is better to be fed than starving, better to be 
happy than miserable, better to be free than a slave, better to be 
healthy than sick. Secondary concerns arise through the consciousness 
of a social contract: loyalty to one’s religion or country or community, 
commitment to faith, sacrifice of cherished elements in life for the 
sake o f what is regarded as a higher cause.
(NFR, pp. 144-5)
History is nothing other than the record of how primary concern is time and time 
again subordinated to secondary concern:
Human beings are concerned beings, and it seems to me that there are 
two kinds o f concern: primary and secondary. Primaiy concerns are 
such things as food, sex, property, and freedom of movement: 
concerns that we share with animals on a physical level. Secondary 
concerns include our political, religious, and other ideological 
loyalties. All through history ideological concerns have taken 
precedence over primary ones. We want to live and love, but we go to 
war; we want freedom, but depend on the exploiting other peoples, o f 
the natural envir onment, even o f ourselves.
(NFR, p. 170)
The West in Frye’s view has had some success in putting primary concern before 
secondary concern. T he United States, Japan, and Western Europe’ he states ‘have 
been much more successful in achieving stage one of primary concern: as compared 
with the formerly Marxist countries, they are more attractive and more comfortable to
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live in’ (NFR, pp. 170-1). This is an achievement, but the fact remains that, as we can 
infer from the previous quotation, primary concern involves two levels. If the 
Communist bloc countries have failed to achieve the first stage of primary concern, 
still emphasising secondary concerns, Western countries have merely facilitated the 
satisfaction of primary concerns on a physical level:
The Cold War gave us a Soviet Union upholding an allegedly 
materialist ideology, at the price of clironic food shortages, sexual 
pmdery, abolition of all property except the barest essentials of 
clothing and shelter, and a rigidly repressed freedom of movement.
The United States offered vast quantities of food and drinlc, 
indiscriminate sexual activity, pilmg up o f excessive wealth and 
privilege, and a restless nomadism -  in other words, full satisfaction of 
primary concerns on a purely physical level.
(NFR, p. 170)
Frye stops short of moral equivalence, but his critique of the West is trenchant. His 
argument at the outset of the Cold War was that the West would only be able to 
triumph by becoming as highly developed as possible; any other way led to war. His 
thinking follows a similar pattern after the Cold War. The confrontation between the 
two powers may be less intense, but the conflict is still with us and will be until the 
West suipasses itself. Frye views Russia as something of a ‘double’ to Western 
countries.
The legacy o f the Cold War is still with us, and not only does an 
adversarial situation impoverish both sides, but both sides catch the 
worst features o f their opponents. We have seen this in the 
McCarthyism that imitated the Stalinist show trials, the McCarran act
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that imitated Soviet exclusion policies, and the interventions in Latin 
America that imitate the Stalinist attitude to the Warsaw Pact 
countries. Something, at the veiy least, is still missing.
{NFR, pp. 170-1)
Manldnd must put primary concerns ahead of secondary ones. In the new situation 
Frye continues to think in tenns of extremes: if we fail to put primary concern before 
secondary concern, as mankind has always done, we face extinction. In The Double 
Vision he states:
In the twentieth century, with a pollution that threatens the supply of 
air to breathe and water to drink, it is obvious that we cannot afford 
the supremacy o f ideological concerns any more. The need to love, 
own property and move about freely must come first, and such needs 
require peace, good will, and a caring and responsible attitude to 
nature. A continuing o f ideological conflict, a reckless exploiting of 
the environment, a persistence in believing, with Mao Tse-Tung, that 
power comes out o f the bairel of a gun, would mean, quite simply that 
the human race cannot be long for this world.
{NFR, p. 170)
Two powers are at loggerheads with one another, and neither power is exemplary in 
the sense of providing a definitive model for the organisation of society. Without such 
a model the danger is that life in both areas will be debased further, perhaps totally in 
war. Again, we can discern the dialectical movement. Frye thinks in terms of an 
opposition between the prioritisation of secondary concerns, on the one hand, and the 
satisfaction of primary concerns on the physical level, on the other. But he also
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Frye’s articulation of a better organisation of life is not extended, and can be dealt 
with briefly. Focusing on the ‘spiritual aspect of primaiy concern’ and ’secondary or 
ideological concerns’, he states that these correspond to two different types of society, 
the mature and primitive:
A primitive or embryonic society is one in which the individual is 
thought of as primarily a function of the social group. In all such 
societies a hierarchical structure of authority has to be set up to ensure 
that the individual does not get too far out of line. A mature society, in 
contrast, understands that its primary aim is to develop a genuine 
individuality in its members. In a fully mature society the stnicture of 
authority becomes a function of the individuals within it, all o f them, 
without distinctions of sex, class, or race, living, loving, thinking, and 
producing with a sense of space around them.
(ibid.)
More particularly, it is the ‘spiritual body’ which creates a mature society. Frye’s 
intention in this passage we have already considered is to make a connection between 
the two:
considers a third possibility: the possibility of the satisfaction of primary needs on the 
spiritual level. In this phase of his work he ties political achievement in not with 
education and work but with spirituality. The failure to move beyond the fulfilment of 
primary concerns and the various social evils which accompany that failure - ‘the 
violence, the drug addiction, and the general collapse of moral standards that 
accompany over-emphasis on the satisfying of physical wants’ - are ‘the result of a 
lack of spiritual vision’ (NFR, p. 171). Spiritual vision, then, would seem to be the 
‘sometliing’ that ‘is still missing’ (ibid).
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The genuine human being thus bom is the soma pneumatikon, the 
spiritual body (1 Corintliians 15:44). This phr ase means that spiritual 
man is a body: the natural man or soma psychikon merely has one. 
The resuiTection of the spiritual body is the completion of the kind of 
life the New Testament is talking about, and to the extent that any 
society contains spiritual people, to that extent it is a mature rather 
tlian a primitive society.
{NFR, p. 176)
The nature of such an existence is clarified in another section. ‘The spiritual form of 
primary concern, then, fulfils the physical need but incorporates it into the context of 
an individualized society’ {NFR, p. 172):
Freedom o f movement is not simply freedom to take a plane to 
Vancouver; it must include freedom of thought and criticism.
Similarly, property should extend to scientific discovery and the 
production o f poetry and music; sex should be a matter of love and 
companionship and not a frenetic mtting in mbber; food and drink 
should become a focus of the sharing of goods within a community.
{NFR, p. 171)
It is of course genuine democracy that Frye has in mind. In the wake of the Cold War 
Frye continued to speak against both capitalism and Communism. Rather he pinned 
his hopes on a third term:
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(ibid.)
In one of his late notebooks he discusses the ‘principle of resolving an adversary
Conclusion
With his study of the Christian Bible, Frye brought his career to a conclusion, adding 
a study of the Bible from the point of view of a literary critic to his earlier secular
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I think Americans are hardly aware of living under capitalism: what 
they want is democracy, whatever the economic basis for it is. East 
Europe right now also wants democracy, but isn’t necessarily being 
converted from Communism back to capitalism.
;
relationship, not by reconciling both sides but by breaking clear of the antithesis into a
new level’ (NFLN6, p. 622) and identifies democracy as what lies on the new level -f
beyond that of the capitalism-Communism opposition. This satisfaction of primary
concerns on a spiritual level is connected to democracy:
'
Tlnee stages: first, we belong before we are, & few o f us find any =
1:clarification of our social context. Second an antithesis develops in J'
which the individual with his wants collides with what society will let 
him do. Third, a state in which the individual is not diminished in
-V
dignity by his social contract. This is the ideal state of democracy, 
where primary concerns are primary, and therefore social concerns are 
subordinated to mdividual experience.
(NFLN5, p. 177) #
concerns. His study of the Bible is itself highly dialectic, being based on his 
conception of a third category distinct from the historical and the poetic ones. If the 
political sympathies we have connected with each half of the dialectic throughout the 
thesis are absent here, I have argued for the inevitability of this factor, given the 
historical attitude of the Left towards religion. I have also tlnown light on Frye’s late 
political thinking, which like his earlier thinking is liberal and clear of Left and Right.
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Epilogue
111 a sense the Left-Right, or radical-conservative distinction was always implicit in 
the French estate system, given that it stratified society in terms of nobility and 
commons, but the notion of Left and Right is derived from the interior of the French 
Estates General, which convened on 5 May 1789. In the Assembly the Coimnoners 
sat to the left of the Speaker, thereby establishing a spatial metaphor that is central to 
our worldview. The histoiy of the past two centuries tells the story of Left versus 
Right, the apotheosis of the conflict being the twentieth-century Cold War. Similarly, 
since this political spectrum was established. Left and Right have also developed 
contrasting views on cultural questions, and one could identify all manner of left-wing 
and right-wing attitudes to culture. Left and Right are broad-brush categories and the 
actual history of the last two centuries exhibits a great deal of merging and crossovers, 
but the readiness of artists, as well as critics, to take on a distinct political identity is 
quite striking.
For one of the most striking facts about modern literature is that the social attitudes of 
modem writers were fundamentally anti-social. Frye charts the development of such 
attitudes from Diderot onwards. ‘An attitude of defiance as well as of self-douht or 
submissiveness mns tlnough all literature’, but the past two centuries of literature 
have been characterized by a particularly ‘anti-establishment’ outlook:
Diderot’s Neveu de Rameau in the eighteenth century heralds a world 
in which practically every decade has thrown up some variety of anti­
establishment attitude associated with the arts. These include the 
Bohemians o f the late nineteenth centui-y and the Dadaists o f the time 
of the First World War. Contemporaiy with the latter, many great 
writers, along with minor ones, flirted with various types of fascism, 
evidently because that was the most obviously anti-social ideology
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within reach. In English literature they include Yeats, Ezra Pound,
Wyndam Lewis and D. H. Lawrence (whose Plumed Serpent is surely 
proto-Nazi in its implications). What seem in rehospect to be milder if  
no less perverse ideologies affected many others in the same period, 
and a tendency to simplistic obscurantism, whether located on the left 
or the right, extends both earlier, in the work o f some very prominent 
nineteenth-century novelists, and later in the sub-cultur al and 
counter-cultural movements of the last quarter-century.
{WWP, pp. 40-1)
Within the context of what Frye terms the ‘modem century’ - 1867 until 1967 - this 
factor becomes even more significant. In The Modern Century he conducts a brief 
survey of different groupings of writers, attempting to provide a rough guide to the 
social attitudes of writers: he speaks of the ‘anarchism’ of American modern 
literature, another group represents something of a ‘Freudian proletarian’ {NFMC, p. 
44); writers such as Eliot, Villiers de I’Isle-Adam, and others, make up an ‘elite or 
neo-aristocracy’ ((AFMC, p. 45); lastly, Fiye consider ‘the contemporary artist as 
criminal’ phenomenon. Summing up, he comments ‘All these antisocial attitudes in 
modem culture are, broadly speaking, reactionary. That is, their sense of antagonism 
to existing society is what is primary’ {NFMC, p. 48).
In Anatomy o f Criticism Frye sees the politics of the writers of the twentieth century 
in terms of a retum to the high mimetic mode. ‘There may be noticed a general 
tendency to react most strongly against the mode immediately preceding, and, to a 
lesser extent, to return to some of the standards of the modal grandfather’ {AC, p. 62). 
The latter consideration leads him to comment on the reappearance of high mimetic 
standards in twentieth century literature, and it is this factor which determines the 
political disposition of its writer;
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In the new mode the fondness for the small closely-knit group, the 
sense of tire esoteric, and the nostalgia for the aristocratic that has 
produced such very different phenomena as the royalism of Eliot, the 
fascism of Pound, and the cult o f chivalry in Yeats, are all in a way 
part of the reversion to high mimetic standards The sense of the poet 
as courtier, of poetiy as the service of a prince, of the supreme 
importance of the symposium or elite group, are among the high 
mimetic conceptions reflected in twentieth century literature, 
especially in the poetry of the symboliste tradition from Mallarmé to 
George and Rilke.
{AC, p. 63)
‘What lay behind Frye’s escape of this culture?’ one might ask. Undoubtedly, his 
decision to study Blake was the most important factor in the formation of his identity 
as a writer, hi ‘The Search For Acceptable Words’ Frye provides an autobiographical 
account of his indebtedness to Blake:
There are many reasons for getting interested in Blake: perhaps one 
may be of general interest. I am, in cultural background, what is 
kno'wn as a WASP, and thus belong to the only group in society which 
it is entirely safe to ridicule. I expected that a good deal of 
contemporary literature would be devoted to attacking the alleged 
complacency of the values and standards I had been brought up in, and 
was not greatly disturbed when it did. But with the rise of Hitler in 
Germany, the agony o f the Spanish Civil War, and the massacres and 
deportations o f Stalinism, tilings began to get more serious. For Eliot
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to announce that he was Classical in literature, royalist in politics, and 
Anglo-Catholic in religion was all part o f the game. But the feeling of 
personal outrage and betrayal that I felt when I opened After Strange 
Gods was something else. And when Eliot was accompanied by 
Pound’s admiration for Mussolini, Yeats’ flirtation with the most 
irresponsible of Irish leaders, Wyndham Lewis’s interest in Hitler, and 
the callow Marxism of younger writers, I felt that I could hardly get 
interested in any poet who was not closer to being the opposite in all 
respects to what Eliot thought he was. Or, if  that was too specific, at 
least a poet who, even if dead, was still fighting for something that was 
at least alive.
(SM, pp. 13-4) 
And in the Cayley interviews Frye offers a fascinating commentary on this aspect of 
his own intellectual history:
CAYLEY : With your interest in myth and symbol, you entered early 
into a kind of magical territory where a lot o f people seem to have 
turned wrong politically. Yeats and Pound and Eliot, in their different 
ways, would all be examples, But you seem to have always kept your 
head.
FRYE: Well, it was Blake who helped me to keep my head.
Rosenbmg’s Myth o f the Twentieth o f  the Century, which was a big 
Nazi polemic claiming that the racially pure come from Atlantis and so 
forth. Having been concentrating on Blake so heavily, I could see that 
this was the devil’s parody of Blake. I think Yeats plunged into 
sometliing rather similar without realizing that it was the devil’s 
parody o f Blake, although Yeats knew Blake.
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CAYLEY : So it was Blake but also your Christianity that kept you 
sane.
FRYE: I suppose so, yes. And I suppose besides being a student of 
Blake and a Christian, I’m also a bourgeois liberal. I feel that anybody 
who isn’t one, or at least trying to be one, is still in the trees.
{Cayley, pp. 65-6)
Frye declared that he learned eveiything he knew from Blake. His long education 
began with an epiphany which came to him as an undergraduate while working on 
Blake’s Milton, and he provides an illuminating picture of this moment of inspiration. 
While Frye was an undergraduate Pelham Edgar assigned him a paper on Blake, 
introducing him to the poet, and later at Emmanuel College Frye experienced what he 
thought of as a self-identifying moment:
CAYLEY : Did you see right away that you had found your teacher in 
Blake?
FRYE: Not right away. But here was a fascinating character that very 
little had been said about. Two years later, after my graduation, I was 
at Emmanuel, where Herbert Davis, who was a Swift scholar in the 
graduate school, gave a course on Blake, and I signed up for it. I was 
assigned a paper on Blake’s Milton, one of his most difficult and 
complex poems, and started working on it the night before I was to 
read it. It was around three in the morning when suddenly the universe 
broke open, and I’ve never been, as they say, the same since.
{Cayley, p. 47)
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Frye is of course rooted in and limited by his own distinctive contexts, but it is 
nevertheless true that in contradistinction to modernist literature, and the outlook of 
T. S. Eliot especially, Frye, inspired by Blake as well as Milton, sought an intellectual 
identity capable of transcending the partial visions of both Left and Right as those 
partial visions presented themselves to him at this early point in his career. In two 
discussions I have provided in-depth analyses of Frye’s politics, dealing with Frye’s 
interest in a politics which marks a evolutionary and dialectic movement beyond Left 
and Right. Such politics represent a dialectical process, and I have also discussed 
Frye’s views on culture in teims of the same dialectical process. Fiye aims to move 
beyond one half of a dialectic, the result of which is theories of Blake and secular 
literature which respect the dual nature of both, a theory of education and work which 
is sensible and free of class bias, and a theory of the Bible which is based on a third 
category beyond the historical and purely poetic. And as I have shown, Frye’s cultural 
thought has a political dimension. If his politics are beyond Left and Right, so too is 
his cultural thinking. It represents a move beyond English as well as American 
cultural conseiwatives and cultural radicals. His thinking on the Bible is something of 
an exception, on account of the fact that the backdrop to his study is not characterized 
by the same Left versus Right opposition, but the basic dialectic is nevertheless there. 
Moreover, Frye’s trajectoiy is, as I have shown suggestive of an overarching 
transcendence of Left and Right. In theoiy, such a transcendence could be achieved 
through a preference for the values of the Right - authority, hierarchy, property and 
community -  combined with the historical atheism of the Left, hi Frye’s works, 
however, it is liberty, equality, and fraternity, combined with Blakean Christianity, 
and especially the caritas Paul speaks of, that fonn the dialectic.
I would hope that hy this stage the appeal of Frye is clear. He is an example of that 
kind of thinker who is free of left-wing and right-wing biases, and consequently is 
obviously of great significance to anyone whose sympathies are with a non-partisan
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approach to culture and the teaching of it. My thesis is clearly suggestive of strong 4
support for Frye. In my account his position seems preferable to conservative and 
radical figures. Their view is partial; he attempts to rise above partiality. The reader 
may find it easy to accept the idea that Frye’s Blake criticism is ‘transcendental’
iwithin its context. He may even accept the idea that Frye’s view of education and 
work is an advance on conservative and radical ideas of the two. My articulation of 
Frye’s literary criticism may be more difficult to view sympathetically, however. The
■lreader may object to the notion that with Frye literary criticism reached a kind of 
apotheosis, in which highly political criticism was finally transcended, such a 
narrative being suggestive of what Frye teims the comedic structure. Literaiy 
criticism, after all, has a long histoiy. It may, then, be instructive to pick out the larger 
context for his own archetypal phase of criticism.
In the first essay of Anatomy o f Criticism Frye discusses what he terms the modes of
'4literature, identifying them as the mythical, romantic, high mimetic, low mimetic, and I
■4
ironic modes. This conception of modes allows him to present a short history of
literature. ‘Looking over this table,’ he states, ‘we can see that European fiction,
during the last fifteen centmies, has steadily moved its center of gravity down the list’
{AC, p. 34). He discusses works of literature where plot or mythos is the controlling
principle, and considers both comic and tragic forms of each phase, before going on 
. . .to discuss fiction in which dianoia is what shapes the form.
4
In the second essay he turns his attention to considerations of literary meaning as well I
as narrative, and discusses meaning in terms of five phases of significance: the literal,
descriptive, formal, mythical, and anagogic. Of primary concern to Frye are
considerations of narrative {mythos) and meaning {dianoia), but he relates these
concerns to related interests. He discusses the nature of the symbol on each level of
meaning; the kind of literature related to the level of meaning; the related literary
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criticism; the corresponding medieval critical approach; and the parallel mode. Robert 
Denham devised the table on page 200 to illustrate all of Frye’s main points. 
hi a very illuminating passage Frye sheds light on the relation between the modes and 
levels of meaning:
[..] the reader may have noticed a parallelism gradually shaping up 
between the five modes of our first essay and the phases of symbolism 
in this one. Literal meaning, as we expounded it, has much to do with 
the techniques of thematic irony introduced by symbolisme, and with 
the view o f many of the "new" critics that poetry is primarily (i.e., 
literally) an ironic structure. Descriptive symbolism, shown at its most 
uncompromising in the documentary naturalism of the nineteenth 
century, seems to bear a close connection with the low mimetic, and 
formal symbolism, most easily studied in the Renaissance and neo­
classical writers, with the high mimetic. Archetypal criticism seems to 
find its center of gravity in the mode of romance, when the interchange 
of ballads, folk tales, and popular stories was at its easiest.
{AC, p. 116) 
And of course the anagogic phase of meaning is thoroughly bound up with the 
mythical mode. 
We gain great insight into Frye’s own place in the history of criticism by turning to 
what Frye teims the ‘return of irony to myth’. Frye first makes the observation in the 
context of tragic forms:
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Irony descends from the low mimetic: it begins in realism and 
dispassionate observation. But as it does so, it moves steadily towards 
myth, and dim outlines of sacrificial rituals and dying gods begin to 
reappear in it.
p. 42)
And in the context of comic forms he revisits the point:
What we have said about the return of irony to myth in tragic modes 
thus holds equally well for comic ones. Even popular literature 
appears to be slowly shifting its center of gravity from murder stories 
to science fiction -  or at any rate a rapid growth of science fiction is 
certainly a fact about contemporary popular literature. Science fiction 
fr equently tries to imagine what life would be like on a plane as far 
above us as we are above savagery; its setting is often of a kind that 
appears to us as technologically miraculous. It is thus a mode of 
romance with a strong inherent tendency to myth.
(AC, pp. 48-9)
The ‘return of irony to myth’ provides us with a suggestive context for Frye’s 
criticism. Archetypal criticism is connected to medieval literature in the passage just 
quoted, but we can also see it in connection with the contemporary phase of literatm'e. 
Just as science fiction follows on from the ironic mode, Frye’s archetypal criticism 
follows on from the New Criticism in the history of criticism. It represents, then, a 
part of the same development which in literature involves the retum of irony to myth, 
and consequently his literary theory is similarly suggestive of a Viconian ricorso.
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So, what we have is a history of broad brushstrokes in which what is important about 
nineteenth and twentieth century literary theory is the movement from a mimetic 
theory of literature, to an aesthetic one, to the Frygian one, in which the social and the 
aesthetic are one and the same. Of course such a narrative fails to find a proper place 
for ideology criticism. An alternative is to view these various schools in connection 
with the Blakean metaphors. I started by discussing the Orc-Urizen narrative as a 
paradigm for Frye’s thinking. In comiection with Blake’s poetiy Frye discusses a 
world of dream, associating it with Ore. This world is of course the world of 
iimocence or Beulah. The world of law, is associated with Urizen, and can also be 
thought of as the world of experience or Generation. The inference is that New 
Criticism may be metaphorically connected with Urizen, while the descriptive phase 
outlined by Frye and discussed in Chapter 3 can be associated with Ore. Frye’s 
criticism, as I argued in Chapter 3, can be thought of in connection with the level of 
experience above innocence and experience, a level connected to Blake’s Los, as well 
as his conception of Eden. Ideology criticism has a place in this schema, though it is 
not a flattering one. Innocence and experience, devils and angels, radicals and 
conservatives are ‘contraries’. In addition to the transcendence of these opposites, 
Blake and, in his criticism of Blake, Frye, speak of the failure to engage with this 
opposition. The ‘negation’ is the figure who refuses to engage with the opposition 
established by Angels and Devils. If the ‘contraries’ of innocence and experience are 
to be associated with Beulah and Generation respectively, and Frye’s theoiy is to be 
connected with Eden, the ‘negation’ is bound up with Blake’s Ulro. When Frye 
speaks of ‘the negation’, we are reminded of the distaste of ideology critics for 
conceptions such as genius, imagination, and creativity. ‘Hobbes’ states Frye’ is a 
negation: he cares too little for imagination or liberty to clash with any defender of it’ 
(FS, p. 188), and we are reminded of the insistence on ideology of many 
contemporary critics and their corresponding coolness towards the imagination. To 
use Cummings’ terms once more, ideology critics could be said to simply ignore the
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question of the dichotomy suggested by ‘the dolce and the utile of literary 
experience’ {Cummings, p. 257).
It may be useful to situate Frye in one further context. The context in question will 
allow us to bring this thesis to a conclusion by considering an additional dialectic 
which is an integi al part of his theory of secular literature. Frye believes that in our 
day the reader has emerged as the hero of literature. In A Study o f English 
Romanticism Frye gives an in-depth account of the initial stages of this development. 
In the first place, the hero of literature is the man of action who represents the poet’s 
subject. In this context the poet is something of an outsider who looks in from without 
and focuses upon the hero whose actions determine the fate of his society. ‘As long as 
we have written literature,’ states Fiye, ‘what the poet is really related to in society is 
not the hero but a more settled order, usually presided over, in pre-Romantic times, by 
a prince or patron in whose court or hall the poet recites his poems or performs his 
dramas’ {SER, p. 35). In the Romantic age the patron is on his way out and the poet 
becomes ‘iimnersed’ (ibid.) in society. Now the poet has a more important function in 
society. ‘He sees society,’ explains Frye, ‘as held together by its creative power, 
incarnate in himself rather than in its leaders of action’ {SER, p. 36). Like the hero of 
old, the poet becomes the focus of society. ‘For him, therefore,’ explains Frye, ‘the 
real event is no longer even the universal or typical event, but the psychological or 
mental event, the event in his own consciousness of which the historical event is the 
outward sign or allegory’ (ibid.).
In one passage in Creation and Recreation Frye discusses a fascinating history of 
literature, influenced by his reading of Oscar Wilde:
In my first chapter I quoted a passage from Oscar Wilde’s essay “The
Critic as Artist.” This essay seems to make an exaggerated and quite
unr ealistic importance out of the reader of literature, the critic being
20 4
(NFR, p. 75)
One could abandon writing
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'I
the representative reader. He is paralleled with the artist in a way that 
seems to give him an equal share at least in what the artist is doing.
Here again Wilde is writing from the point of view of a later
■Î
generation. For many centuries the centre of gravity in literature was 
the hero, the man whose deeds the poet celebrated. As society slowly
changed its shape, the hero modulated into the “character,” and in 4
Wilde’s day it was still the creation o f character as one sees it so
impressively in Shakespeare, Dickens and Browning, that was the id
primary mark of poetic power. At the same time the Romantic 
movement had brought with it a shift o f interest from the hero to the 
poet himself, as not merely the creator of the hero but as the person
•jwhose inner life, was the real, as distinct from the projected, subject of 4
Ithe poem. There resulted an extraordinary mystique of creativity, in Iwhich the artist became somehow a unique if  not actually superior 
.species of human being, with qualities of prophet, genius, wise man.
and social leader. Wilde realized that in a short time the centre of *■t
gravity in literature and critical theory would shift again, this time
fr om the poet to the reader. The dividing line in English literature is
%probably Finnegans Wake, where it is so obvious that the reader has a
heroic role to play. |
-I■s
In our times some poets have questioned the purpose of writing poetry: is it not the 
case that a more meaningful pursuit is to read and attempt to understand literature, in 
other words, to be a critic? In his ‘Volcano’ Derek Walcott says:
We recall, however, that it is not the reader but the critic whom Wilde discusses in 
‘The Critic as Artist.’ He is not as guarded as Frye may make us think. Wilde is 
prepared to argue that a seismic shift in the verbal arts is immanent. We are at a 
turning point in history when plays, poems and novels are about to become the literary 
forms of the past. The critic is to take centre stage, as the poet and novelist grudgingly 
render the limelight to their successor:
Gilbert. [...] I myself am inclined to think that creation is doomed. It 
springs from too primitive, too natural an impulse. However, this may 
be, it is certain that the subject-matter at the disposal of creation is 
always diminishing, while the subject-matter of criticism increases 
daily. There are always new attitudes for the mind, and new points of 
view. The duty of imposing form upon chaos does not grow less as the
for the slow-burning signals
X
of the great, to be, instead
'Itheir ideal reader, ruminative,
.4:voracious, making the love of masterpieces
14;superior to attempting I
to repeat or outdo them,
and be the greatest reader in the world.
■
It is clearly the case that it is the reader that Frye has in mind when considering the T
1#heir to the poet. It seems as though he is at pains to steer a course away from any 4: F
statement which would set up the critic, and by implication himselfi rather then the
111reader as the descendant of the Romantic poet and the hero. Frye uses the term
à‘reader’ twice in quick succession in the passage from Creation and Recreation.
Derek Walcott, Collected Poems 1948-1984 (London: Faber and Faber, 1992), p. 324.
2 0 6
world advances. There never was a time when criticism was more 
needed than it is now.^^
Perhaps surprisingly in the Introduction to Words With Power Frye speaks of the 
critic as the heir to the Romantic poets after all. He refers to readers, but it is clear that 
the readers he has in mind are literary critics;
This question sounds like old-hat Romanticism, the main focus of 
criticism having shifted from the poet to the reader, the reader being 
the one who is involved in the Herculean labors of misreading and 
deconstructing his text. I do not se how the reader can acquire so 
heroic a role unless sometliing in literature gives it to him, even if  this 
merely throws us back on the question of what gives this something to 
literature.
{WWP, p. xxi)
(Frye’s gently ironic treatment of Deconstruction and other schools of criticism 
should not elude us. Frye is, we might say, loath to consider ‘the negation’ to be 
heroic in any sense.)
We should perhaps return to Frye’s reading of Wilde’s essay. Is Frye willing to 
entertain the notion that the critic is the heir to the Romantic poet in this context? If 
we turn to another of Frye’s commentaries on Wilde’s essay, we encounter another 
view of the latter’s claims. In ‘The Double Mirror’ Frye contends that the situation of 
criticism in his day is summed up in two of Oscar Wilde’s essays, hi a passage in 
‘The Double Mirror’ it is clear that when he speaks of the ‘reader’ who has a heroic
Oscar Wilde, Complete Works o f Oscar Wilde (London: Collins, 1966), p. 1055.
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role to play Frye has in mind the critic who has mastered a ‘disinterested response to 
literature’, the response to literature, Frye himself championed:
By a “critic” Wilde meant, I think, a serious and representative reader, 
who knows that his response is socially and culturally conditioned, but 
is none the less capable of weeding out of that response an egocentric 
element, such as, “I don’t like the way this poem ends because if I 
were writing it I wouldn’t end it that way.” I have always comiected 
this egocentric element with the conception of the critic as a judge or 
evaluator.
(NFR, pp. 87-8)
As we would have expected, Frye’s commentators have been quick to connect Frye 
with this conception of the reader. In his ‘Frye and Romanticism’ Imre Salusinszky 
identifies the critic - he has Frye in mind - as the heir of the poet, a central figure of 
‘neo-Romanticism’ :
Where the literary universe is viewed as a distinct and, ideal realm, the 
critic who is possessed o f the visionary faculty required to perceive 
and communicate it will assume a sacramental function. In neo- 
Romanticism, the prophetic power of Shelley’s Prometheus is 
extended from a poet to critic, who now also lifts a veil from in front 
of reality.
Imre Salusinszky, ‘Frye and Romanticism’ in Visionary Poetics: Essays on Northrop Frye's 
Criticism, ed. by Robert D. Denham and Thomas Willard (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), pp. 57-74 
(pp. 69-70).
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And another critic insists that Wilde is speaking about the critic rather than the reader 
in ‘The Critic as Artist/ and speaks of Frye within the context of Wilde’s framework, 
hr his essay ‘Romanticism: Studies and Speculations’ George Woodcock points out 
that Frye is an example of the artist-critic that Wilde anticipates in ‘The Critic as 
Artist’.48
Finally, in Fiye’s view the totality of the kind of criticism he produces and defends 
would be comparable to the totality of literature itself in terms of authority, and we 
might bring this thesis to a conclusion by turning to this final dimension of Frye’s 
theoretical thinldng. hr Words With Power Fiye comments that in his lifetime the 
focus in literary studies has moved from literature to criticism:
The main concern that seemed appropriate at that time was the defense 
of criticism as a discipline in its own right. The situation has reversed 
itself since then, like one of the tr ick drawings that illustrate one thing 
when the foreground is black and the background, white, and something 
quite different when the perspective is white on black. Today criticism 
looks as though it is taking over the enthe verbal area, and it is rather 
the integrity of literature and other traditional verbal enclaves that needs 
to be defended.
(WWP, pp. xvii-xviii)
What lies behind the emphasis on criticism is a greater awareness of the fact that a 
work of literature depends to a considerable extent on the resources of the reader. 
‘Every reader recreates what he reads’ (CR, p. 65). The excesses of this conception of 
the text serve to demote the writer, and the emphasis shifts to the reader’s own
48 George Woodcock, ‘Romanticism: Studies and Speculations,’ Sewanee Review  88 (Spring 1980), 
298-307.
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creation. His art was preceded by the art of the writer, but this fact becomes less and 
less significant. 4
Of course it would be entirely futile to return to the point where this process started.
The twentieth century produced a panoply of literary critics, and their achievements 
must be acknowledged. Undoubtedly, what is needed and what Frye wished for is a 
more balanced attitude toward the respective values of literature and criticism.
Literature as a whole is not an aggregate of exhibits with red and blue 
ribbons attached to them, like a cat-show, but the range of the 
articulate imagination as it extends from the height of imaginative 
heaven to the depth of imaginative hell. Literature is a human 
apocalypse, man’s revelation to man [...].
{El, p. 44)
The finale of the lecture continues in this way:
[...] and criticism is not a body of adjudications, but the awareness of 
that revelation, the last judgment of mankind.
(ibid.)
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How can one give critics their dues without diminishing the value of literature? Frye’s 
solution will not satisfy everyone. As we recall, he explains the value of literature in |
terms of metaphors drawn from religion, or, to be more precise, the Christian myth. It 
is the apocalypse aspect of myth which Frye connects with literature. We have already 
considered the following section from The Educated Imagination.
.1
If we describe Blake’s conception of art independently o f the 
traditional myth of fall and apocalypse that embodies it, we may say 
that the poetic activity is fundamentally one of identifying the human 
with the nonhuman world. This identity is what tire poetic metaphor 
expresses, and the end of the poetic vision is the humanization of 
reality, “All Human Forms identified,” as Blake says at the end of 
Jerusalem, Here we have the basis for a critical theory which puts such 
central conceptions as myth and metaphor into their proper central 
place. So far from usuiping the function of religion, it keeps literature 
in the context of human civilization, yet without limiting the infinite 
variety and range of the poetic imagination. The criteria it suggests are 
not moral ones, nor are they collections of imposing abstractions like 
Unity, but the interests, in the widest sense, o f mankind itself, or 
himself, as Blake would prefer to say.
v ; : |4
Fiye wants to make optimal claims for both literature and criticism, so he makes both
all-important. Even if literature needs the work of the reader to complete it, Frye is
prepared to attribute total value to it; if criticism is nothing without the literature it is 
.focused upon, Frye is nevertheless willing to associate the totality of vision with it. 4
4-
If Fiye is cagey about the figure of the critic in society it is perhaps simply that he 
believes that it is foolhardy to ignore the fact that while criticism possesses its own 
authority, both literature and criticism are authoritative, the latter deriving its power 
fr om the former. In ‘The Roads of Excess’ he offer his definitive statement on the 
relation of literature to criticism: the relation is dialectical for within this context he 
moves beyond ‘the creative power of shaping the form and the critical power of
seeing the world it belongs to.’ Frye resolves the problem of literature and criticism 
by identifying the two with one another, and this identification provides us with our 
last dialectic:
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In this conception of art the productive or creative effort is inseparable 
from the awareness of what it is doing. It is this unity of energy and 
consciousness that Blake attempts to express by the word “vision.” In 
Blake there is no either/or dialectic where one must be either a 
detached spectator or a preoccupied actor. Hence there is no division, 
though there may be a distinction, between the creative power of 
shaping the form and the critical power of seeing the world it belongs 
to. Any division instantly makes art barbaric and the knowledge of it 
pedantic— a bound Ore and a bewildered Urizen, to use Blake’s 
symbols. The vision inspires the act, and the act realizes the vision. 
This is the most thoroughgoing view of tlie partnership of creation and 
criticism in literature I know, but for me, though other views may seem 
more reasonable and more plausible for a time, it is in the long run the 
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